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Abstract
Canadian human rights law prohibits employers from discriminating against employees with
disabilities and protects employees’ right to workplace accommodation to the point of undue
hardship. However, the analysis of the case law illustrates that Canadian legal decision
makers have not consistently applied the fundamental human rights laws and principles to
cases involving individuals with drug and alcohol addiction disability. Stewart v. Elk Valley
Coal Corp. provided the Supreme Court of Canada with the opportunity to provide much
needed clarity and confirm the correct approach to be applied to claims of discrimination and
accommodation on the basis of drug and alcohol addiction. This decision was fatally flawed
in its application of the law. Despite this, Elk Valley has provided guidance with respect to
the principles to be applied in addiction disability cases, resulting in a progressive movement
towards the broad, liberal human rights approach to drug and alcohol addiction disability.

Keywords
Disability, Labour, Employment, Discrimination, Accommodation, Undue hardship, Human
rights, Addiction, Drugs, Alcohol.
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Summary for Lay Audience
Canadian human rights legislation prohibits employers from discriminating against
employees on the basis of protected human rights grounds, such as disability, and protects
employees’ right to workplace accommodation on the basis of their protected characteristic.
Under Canadian human rights law, drug and alcohol addiction constitutes a form of
disability, attracting human rights protections.
As a human right, the right to be accommodated for a disability must be applied broadly and
exceptions should be interpreted narrowly, in order to uphold the fundamental purpose of
human rights legislation. The Supreme Court of Canada has affirmed that all protected
human rights grounds are to be treated equally and the same discrimination and duty to
accommodate analyses apply to all protected grounds. Thus, Canadians suffering from
addiction are entitled to equal protection under the law as those with any other protected
human rights characteristic.
In 2017, the Supreme Court of Canada released the Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp.
decision, which failed to apply well-established human rights laws and principles to the
termination of an employee with an addiction for violating the employer’s drug policy. This
thesis provides an extensive survey of the jurisprudence on workplace discrimination and
accommodation on the basis of addiction disability, over the last 12 years, and examines the
treatment of this particular human rights ground by legal decision makers across Canada. It
analyzes whether Canadian legal decision makers have applied and currently apply
fundamental human rights laws and principles to cases of drug and alcohol addiction to
reveal any discrepancies between the black letter law and the actual application of the law to
addiction disability. This research examines whether Elk Valley set a precedent or followed a
line of decisions on addiction disability that also diverge from well-established human rights
law and analyzes the implications of Elk Valley on Canadian addiction disability law to
determine whether Elk Valley is the new legal norm, thereby shifting the direction of
Canadian human rights law, or a judicial misstep among the landscape of workplace
disability discrimination and accommodation case law that can be corrected in the coming
jurisprudence.
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Chapter 1

1

Introduction: Addiction Disability and the Duty to
Accommodate

Canadian human rights law prohibits employers from discriminating against employees
on the basis of protected grounds,1 such as age, sex, race, sexual orientation, religion and
disability, and protects employees’ right to workplace accommodation on the basis of a
protected human rights ground. Every single piece of Canadian human rights legislation
enshrines disability as a protected human rights ground.2 Jurisprudence establishes the
acceptance of drug and alcohol addiction as a form of disability and some human rights
statutes even define disability to specifically include drug and alcohol dependence.3
Human rights protections extend to drug and alcohol addiction by virtue of the legal
recognition of addiction as a form of disability. Under Canadian law, the use of drugs or
alcohol constitutes a disability “where an individual has reached a stage of addiction or
dependency.”4 Casual or recreational substance use does not reach this threshold and,
therefore, does not receive human rights protections.

1

The terms “protected human rights ground” and “prohibited ground of discrimination,” which appear
throughout this thesis, are used interchangeably.
2

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 15(1) [Canadian Charter]; Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985,
c H-6, s 3(1) [Canadian HRA]; British Columbia’s Human Rights Code, RSBC 1996, c 210, s 13(1);
Alberta Human Rights Act, RSA 2000, c A-25.5, s 7(1); The Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, RSS 1979,
c S-24.1, s 2(1)(m.01)(vii); Manitoba’s The Human Rights Code, CCSM c H175, s 9(2)(l); Ontario’s
Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H19, s 5(1) [Ontario HRC]; Quebec’s Charter of Human Rights and
Freedoms, CQLR 2016, c C-12, s 10 refers to “handicap;” Newfoundland and Labrador’s Human Rights
Act, SNL 2010, c H-13.1, s 9(1); New Brunswick’s Human Rights Act, RSNB 2011, c 171, s 2.1(h)-(i);
Nova Scotia’s Human Rights Act, RSNS 1989 c 214, s 5(1) [Nova Scotia HRA]; Prince Edward Island’s
Human Rights Act, RSPEI 1988, c H-12, s 1(1)(d); Nunavut’s Consolidation of Human Rights Act, SNu
2003, c12, s 7(1) [Nunavut HRA]; Yukon’s Human Rights Act, RSY 2002, c116, s 7(h); and Northwest
Territories’ Human Rights Act, SNWT 2002, c18, s 5(1).
3

Entrop v Imperial Oil Ltd (2000), 50 OR (3d) 18 [Entrop]; Handfield v North Thompson School District
No 26, [1995] BCCHRD No 4; British Columbia v British Columbia Government and Service Employees’
Union, [2007] BCCAAA No 37; Ontario (Disability Support Program) v Tranchemontagne, 2010 ONCA
593; and Wright v College and Association of Registered Nurses of Alberta (Appeals Committee), 2012
ABCA 267 [Wright]. Canadian HRA, supra note 2, s 25; Nova Scotia HRA, supra note 2, s 3(1)(vii); and
Nunavut HRA, supra note 2, s 1.
4

Entrop v Imperial Oil Ltd, [1995] 23 CHRR D/196 at para 24, affirmed in Entrop, supra note 3.

2

Of course, an employee’s drug or alcohol addiction can be a legitimate concern for
employers, especially if the employee is impaired at work. For instance, the impairment
of an employee’s judgment and ability, especially in a safety sensitive work environment,
can pose a serious risk of harm and ultimately threaten the employer’s operations.
Nevertheless, employers have a legal duty to accommodate employees with an addiction
disability to the point of undue hardship. An employer cannot disadvantage, terminate or
refuse to employ an individual as a result of their disability, unless it has exhausted
available accommodative efforts or the decision is based on a bona fide occupational
requirement, thereby fulfilling its legal obligations.
The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has repeatedly asserted that human rights
legislation must be given a liberal, contextual and purposive interpretation.5 As a human
right, the right to be accommodated for a disability must be applied broadly and
exceptions should be interpreted narrowly, in order to uphold the fundamental purpose of
human rights legislation.6 The SCC has also affirmed that there is no hierarchy of
protected human rights grounds and all grounds are to be treated equally.7 Thus,
Canadians suffering from drug and alcohol addiction are entitled to equal protection
under the law as individuals with any other protected human rights characteristic.

1.1 Fact Pattern
Consider the following case. Mr. S, a plant loader operator in a coalmine with 9 years of
service, is involved in a workplace incident. While operating the loader, he hit and broke
the mirror of a stationary truck. Pursuant to the employer’s drug and alcohol policy,
which enabled it to require an employee to undergo testing following a significant
workplace incident, the employee’s supervisor directed Mr. S to submit to a urine test. He

5

Ontario Human Rights Commission v Simpsons-Sears Ltd, [1985] 2 SCR 536 at 551 [Simpsons-Sears];
British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v British Columbia Government and
Service Employees’ Union, [1999] 3 SCR 3 at paras 43-44 [Meiorin]; and Quebec (Commission des droits
de Ia personne et des droits de Iajeunesse) v Bombardier Inc (Bombardier Aerospace Training Center),
2015 SCC 39 at para 31 [Bombardier].
6

Commission scolaire régionale de Chambly v Bergevin, [1994] 2 SCR 525 [Bergevin].

7

Gosselin (Tutor of) v Quebec (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 15.

3

subsequently tested positive for cocaine and was suspended. The employer met with Mr.
S and, during this meeting, he admitted to using cocaine on his days off and indicated that
he failed to recognize that he had a drug problem prior to the accident but subsequently
came to realize he was addicted. The employer’s drug and alcohol policy required
employees to disclose dependence issues before any substance-related workplace incident
occurred; under this policy, employees disclosing their substance issue or seeking
rehabilitative assistance after a workplace incident and positive drug or alcohol test may
be subject to termination, considering safety concerns and the importance of deterrence.
Accordingly, the employer decided to terminate Mr. S for violating the policy and
indicated that it would consider an application for new employment after 6 months and
reimburse 50% of his rehabilitation program costs.
The union filed a human rights complaint, alleging that the employer discriminated
against Mr. S and fired him due to his addiction. The Tribunal concluded that Mr. S was
not terminated because of his addiction but for breaching the employer’s drug and
alcohol policy, which required him to disclose his addiction before an accident. The
Tribunal held that the employee’s addiction disability was not a factor in his termination
and found no discrimination; the termination, pursuant to the policy, was not imposed
due to his disability but because of his failure to stop using drugs and failing to disclose
his addiction to the employer prior to the workplace incident. Furthermore, the Tribunal
concluded that, imposing a lesser punishment would reduce the deterrent effect of the
policy and constitute undue hardship on the employer, in light of its safety
responsibilities.
The union appealed this decision. The trial judge concluded that the employer terminated
Mr. S for breaching the workplace policy and not for his drug addiction. The employee’s
addiction was not a factor in his termination and, thus, the termination was not
discriminatory. However, the trial judge found that the employer failed to satisfy its duty
to accommodate to the point of undue hardship, as the employee’s denial led him to think
that he had nothing to report under the workplace policy; therefore, the no-risk selfreporting constituted inadequate accommodation.

4

Both the union and employer appealed this decision in part. The Court of Appeal held
that the termination did not amount to discrimination and concluded that the employer
accommodated Mr. S to the point of undue hardship.
Mr. S appealed the decision to the SCC. The majority of the Court found sufficient
evidence supporting the Tribunal’s conclusion that the employer did not terminate Mr. S
because of his drug addiction, but for breaching the employer’s drug policy. The majority
relied on the Tribunal’s findings that denial did not prevent Mr. S from disclosing his
addiction prior to the accident because he knew he should not take drugs before work, he
had the ability to decide not to take them and he had the capacity to disclose his drug use.
The SCC majority accepted the Tribunal’s conclusion that the employee’s addiction was
not a factor in his termination. The Court found the Tribunal’s decision to be reasonable
and dismissed the appeal.
This case is Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp.8 Although people suffering from addiction
disability are entitled to human rights protections under the law, Elk Valley reveals that
Canadian legal decision makers continue to diverge from the broad, flexible, liberal
human rights approach and impose a narrower standard in cases of alleged discrimination
on the basis of addiction disability and accept a low standard of direct objective evidence
of employers’ undue hardship defense, contrary to human rights jurisprudence and
principles. Canadian jurisprudence affirms that all human rights are to be treated equally
and applied broadly, while exceptions must be narrowly interpreted. Nevertheless, the
SCC accepted the conclusion that Elk Valley Coal Corporation terminated Ian Stewart,
not because he had an addiction, but because he breached the workplace drug policy,
despite the fact that his drug addiction impaired his ability to comply with the drug
policy. The Elk Valley decision clearly departs from fundamental human rights laws and
principles and reflects a lack of understanding of the realities of addiction. This thesis
investigates how Canadian legal decision makers apply well-established human rights
laws and principles in cases of workplace discrimination and accommodation on the basis

8

2017 SCC 30 [Elk Valley].

5

of drug and alcohol addiction and examines the implications of the Elk Valley decision on
subsequent addiction disability case law.

1.2 Chapter Overview
1.2.1 Chapter 2: Canadian Human Rights Law
Chapter 2 establishes the foundational framework of this research by providing an
overview of Canadian workplace discrimination and accommodation law. The chapter
outlines human rights legislation and interpretive principles as well as the pivotal prima
facie discrimination and workplace accommodation analyses.
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms specifically protects against
discrimination on the basis of disability;9 Canada is the first country in the world to
include such a protection in its constitution. Canadian human rights legislation prohibit
employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of an enumerated
protected human rights ground and protect employees’ right to workplace
accommodation. Under Canadian human rights law, every employer has the duty to
accommodate an employee with a protected characteristic, including a drug or alcohol
addiction, to the point of undue hardship.
The SCC has consistently confirmed the quasi-constitutional status of human rights
legislation10 and established that human rights statutes must be interpreted in a liberal,
contextual and purposive fashion11 and in light of the Canadian Charter and its values.12

9

Supra note 2, s 15(1): “Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination
based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.”
10

Béliveau St‑Jacques v Fédération des employées et employés de services publics inc, [1996] 2 SCR 345
at 402, reproduced in Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v
Montréal (City), 2000 SCC 27 at para 28; de Montigny v Brossard (Succession), 2010 SCC 51 at para 45;
and Bombardier, supra note 5 at para 30.
11

Simpsons-Sears, supra note 5 at 551; Meiorin, supra note 5 at paras 43-44; and Bombardier, supra note
5 at para 31.
12

Cooper v Canada (Human Rights Commission), [1996] 3 SCR 854 at para 21.

6

Human rights are to be given a broad interpretation and exceptions to these rights must be
interpreted narrowly.13
The chapter details the prima facie discrimination test, established by the SCC in Moore
v. British Columbia (Education),14 to be applied in cases of alleged discrimination. In
order to establish prima facie discrimination, the employee must demonstrate that they
have a protected characteristic, experienced an adverse impact and the protected
characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact.15 Once a prima facie case of
discrimination has been established, the burden shifts to the employer to justify the
conduct and, if it cannot be justified, discrimination will be found.16
The employer must prove that it made every reasonable effort to accommodate the
employee’s disability, short of undue hardship. Applying the Meiorin test, the legal
decision maker must determine whether the employer sufficiently justified the impugned
standard by establishing that it had adopted the standard for a purpose rationally
connected to the performance of the job and in an honest and good faith belief that it was
necessary to fulfill the legitimate work-related purpose and that the standard is reasonably
necessary to accomplish the legitimate work-related purpose.17 In order to prove that the
standard is reasonably necessary, the employer must demonstrate that it is impossible to
accommodate the individual without undue hardship.18
The SCC has provided a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider when assessing an
employer’s duty to accommodate to the point of undue hardship: financial cost,
disruption of a collective agreement, problems with employee morale, interchangeability
of the workforce and facilities, size of the employer’s operations and safety.19 Recent

13

Bergevin, supra note 6.

14

2012 SCC 61 [Moore].

15

Ibid at para 33.

16

Ibid.

17

Meiorin, supra note 5 at para 54.

18

Ibid.

19

Central Alberta Dairy Pool v Alberta (Human Rights Commission), [1990] 2 SCR 489 at 521.

7

decisions also indicate the emergence of a seventh factor: legitimate operational
requirements of a workplace.20 Legal decision makers must assess the employer’s duty to
accommodate to the point of undue hardship with common sense and flexibility, in light
of the circumstances of the particular case.21 The amount of hardship required to satisfy
the employer’s duty to accommodate must be substantial: “More than mere negligible
effort is required to satisfy the duty to accommodate. The use of the term ‘undue’ infers
that some hardship is acceptable.”22
Safety is the most frequently raised undue hardship factor in disability cases, which will
be evident in the cases examined in this thesis. The law indicates that employers cannot
make assumptions about disability and safety without conducting an individualized
assessment of the employee.23 Employers must present convincing evidence to
substantiate a safety claim because impressionistic or anecdotal evidence regarding the
magnitude of risk are inadequate. Claims of anticipated hardships on the basis of
proposed accommodations should not be accepted if based solely on speculative or
unsubstantiated concern that certain negative consequences might or could follow the
employee’s accommodation.24 Although safety sensitive and zero-tolerance rules are
often features of a modern workplace, they cannot be advanced to defeat a workplace
accommodation if a tolerable range of risk would allow an employee to work
productively.25

1.2.2 Chapter 3: Understanding Drug and Alcohol Addiction
Chapter 3 provides an overview of drug and alcohol addiction, including its prevalence,
symptoms, diagnostic criteria, potential causes, the impact addiction can have on one’s

20

Michael Lynk, “Disability and Work: The Transformation of the Legal Status of Employees with
Disabilities in the Canadian Workplace,” in R Echlin & C Paliare, eds, Law Society of Upper Canada
Special Lectures 2007: Employment Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008) 189 at 211.
21

Meiorin, supra note 5 at para 63.

22

Central Okanagan School District No 23 v Renaud, [1992] 2 SCR 970 at 984.

23

British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v British Columbia (Council of Human Rights),
[1999] 3 SCR 868 [Grismer].
24

Ibid at para 41; Meiorin, supra note 5 at paras 78-79.

25

Lynk, supra note 20 at 230-231.

8

employment and medical treatment. The chapter also establishes the theoretical
frameworks for understanding disability generally and drug and alcohol addiction, in
particular.
Chapter 3 outlines the three leading models of disability: the biomedical model,
economic model and sociopolitical model. The biomedical and economic models
characterize disability as an individual pathology26 and are informed by notions of pity,
charity and social segregation.27 The biomedical model focuses on the functional abilities
and limitations of the individual and the economic model concentrates on their ability to
perform occupational roles and skills.28 The sociopolitical model, on the other hand,
characterizes disability as a social pathology29 and stresses the importance of the social
environment and examines its impact on individuals with disability.30 Unlike the
biomedical and economic approaches, the sociopolitical model views disability as a
social construct and espouses a human rights approach.31
The legal human rights perspective of addiction disability is derived from human rights
legislation and jurisprudence. Under Canadian human rights law, drug and alcohol
addictions constitute a disability and are afforded human rights protections. The SCC has
affirmed that all protected human rights grounds are to be treated equally and subjected to
the same discrimination and duty to accommodate analyses. Thus, Canadians suffering
from addiction disability are entitled to equal protection under the law. Employers are
prohibited from discriminating against individuals on the basis of their drug or alcohol
addiction and have a legal duty to accommodate these individuals in the workplace to the
point of undue hardship.

26

David Hosking, “Critical Disability Theory” (Paper delivered at the 4th Biennial Disability Studies
Conference, Lancaster University, UK, 2-4 September 2008) at 6-7.
27

Lynk, supra note 20 at 191.

28

Harlan Hahn, “The Political Implications of Disability Definitions and Data” (1993) 4:2 Journal of
Disability Policy Studies 41 at 43.
29

Hosking, supra note 26 at 6-7.

30

Hahn, supra note 28 at 43.

31

Lynk, supra note 20 at 191.

9

Traditionally, theories of addiction disability have been divided into the moral model and
the medical model. The moral model perceives drug and alcohol addiction as “a choice
characterized by voluntary behavior”32 and ultimately a “moral failure.”33 However,
neuroscience research in the past two decades has increasingly supported the notion that
addiction is a chronic brain disease. The medical model describes addiction as “a
primary, chronic, neurobiologic disease, with genetic, psychosocial, and environmental
factors influencing its development and manifestations.”34 Addiction typically involves
craving for the substance, loss of control of the amount or frequency of use, the
compulsion to use and use despite harmful consequences, including physical,
psychological, interpersonal, financial and legal problems.35 Addictions are characterized
by an inability to consistently abstain from using the substance and, like many other
chronic diseases, often involve cycles of relapse and remission.36 Although the moral
model of addiction has largely fallen out of favour amongst healthcare professionals, the
stigma associated with drug and alcohol addiction continues to exist. More recently, the
biopsychosocial model of addiction has developed to expand on the medical perspective,
creating a multidimensional paradigm that recognizes the complex biological,
psychological and social components of addiction.

1.2.3 Chapters 4-6: Exploring Addiction Disability Jurisprudence
This thesis provides an extensive survey of the recent jurisprudence on workplace
discrimination and employers’ duty to accommodate employees struggling with addiction
disability and examines the treatment of this particular human rights ground by legal
decision makers across Canada. Adopting the doctrinal method, it analyzes whether

32

Edmund Henden, Hans Olav Melberg & Ole Jørgen Røgeberg, “Addiction: Choice or Compulsion?”
(2013) 4:77 Front Psychiatry at 1.
33

Hanna Pickard, Serge Ahmed & Bennett Foddy, “Alternative Models of Addiction” (2015) 6:20 Front
Psychiatry at 1.
34

Seddon Savage et al, “Definitions Related to the Medical Use of Opioids: Evolution Towards Universal
Agreement” (2003) 26:1 Journal of Pain & Symptom Management 655 at 662.
35

Marilyn Herie et al, Addiction: An information guide (Toronto: Centre for Addiction and Mental Health,
2010) at 2.
36

American Society of Addiction Medicine, “Definition of Addiction” (2019), online: <https://www.asam.
org/resources/definition-of-addiction>.

10

Canadian legal decision makers have applied and currently apply fundamental human
rights laws and principles to cases of drug and alcohol addiction to reveal any
discrepancies between the black letter law and the actual application of the law to
addiction disability. Specifically, this research examines whether Elk Valley sets a
precedent or, rather, follows a line of decisions on addiction disability that also appear to
diverge from well-established human rights law and analyzes the implications of the
recent SCC decision. This thesis seeks to determine whether Elk Valley is the new legal
norm, thereby shifting the direction of Canadian human rights law, or a judicial misstep
among the landscape of workplace disability discrimination and accommodation case law
that can be corrected in the coming jurisprudence.
To uncover and illustrate patterns in the jurisprudence, Chapters 4, 5 and 6
chronologically examine various cases across Canada on workplace discrimination and
accommodation on the basis of drug and alcohol addiction, from 2008 to present. As a
matter of practicality, this thesis does not review all the relevant decisions released in the
past 12 years. I deliberately selected arbitration, tribunal and court cases, across different
jurisdictions, decided in favor and against the employee seeking accommodation for their
addiction to illustrate the different legal approaches applied to addiction disability in the
years prior to and following the release of the 2017 Elk Valley decision. The selected
cases are representative of the Canadian jurisprudence on addiction disability during
these time periods.
The question of whether the Elk Valley decision is a judicial misstep is determined by
analyzing the decision in light of the fundamental, well-established human rights laws
and principles described in Chapter 2 that are meant to be applied to all human rights
grounds. Examining the cases released in the wake of the SCC’s decision in Elk Valley
illustrates the current direction of the addiction disability law landscape.

1.2.3.1

Chapter 4: Pre-Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp.

In order to establish the legal context necessary to understand Elk Valley, Chapter 4 of the
thesis analyzes the addiction case law preceding the SCC decision. In Canadian labour
law, there have historically been two competing schools of thought on how to approach
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workplace misconduct arising from drug and alcohol addiction: the disciplinary approach
and the human rights approach. The traditional disciplinary approach, which is rooted in
the long-standing arbitral approach to culpable misconduct, assesses whether the
employer had just cause to discipline or terminate the employee and whether the
disciplinary action was excessive in the circumstances. Under this approach, the
employee’s addiction is merely considered a mitigating factor in determining the
appropriate discipline, and not a trigger for the application of the discrimination analysis
and duty to accommodate. The human rights approach, on the other hand, originated from
human rights legislation and the statutory grant of power incorporated in labour relations
legislation, enabling arbitrators to interpret and apply human rights statutes.37 Applying
the human rights approach, the arbitrator seeks to determine whether the employee’s
misconduct is connected to their addiction disability and, if a compelling connection can
be established, the analysis centers on whether the employer fulfilled its duty to
accommodate the employee to the point of undue hardship.
The hybrid disciplinary approach developed as a middle ground between the disciplinary
and human rights approaches, integrating the traditional disciplinary analysis with
accommodation principles, and gained popularity in the context of addiction disability.
Under this approach, the legal decision maker applies a disciplinary or just cause analysis
to the voluntary, culpable aspects of the employee’s misconduct and applies the human
rights analysis to the involuntary, non-culpable components causally connected to the
disability.38
Chapter 4 analyzes eight cases from 2008 to 2016, prior to the release of the SCC’s
decision in Elk Valley: British Columbia (Public Service Agency) v. British Columbia
Government and Service Employees’ Union,39 New Flyer Industries Ltd. v. National
Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union of Canada (CAW-

37

For example, section 48(12)(j) of the Ontario Labour Relations Act, 1995, SO 1995, c 1, Sched A.

38

Brian Etherington, “Recent Developments in the Duty to Accommodate Disabilities” in Allen Ponak,
Jeffrey Sack & Brian Burkett, eds, Labour Arbitration Yearbook 2012-2013 (Second Series) (Toronto:
Lancaster House, 2012) 403 at 406.
39

2008 BCCA 357.

12

Canada), Local 3003,40 Wright v. College and Association of Registered Nurses of
Alberta (Appeals Committee),41 Seaspan ULC v. International Longshore & Warehouse
Union, Local 400,42 Canadian National Railway v. Teamsters Canada Rail
Conference,43

Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Saskatchewan Gaming Corp.,44

Ontario Nurses’ Association v. Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre45 and McNulty v.
Canada Revenue Agency.46 These cases illustrate the divergent approaches that have
commonly been applied to addiction cases by legal decision makers across Canada—
ranging from the broad, liberal human rights approach, reflecting an understanding and
appreciation of the features and challenges of addiction disability, to the narrow, stringent
approach, concerned with choice, control and causal connections—and provide the legal
background for analyzing and understanding the Elk Valley decision.

1.2.3.2

Chapter 5: Analysis of Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp.

Elk Valley is the first addiction disability accommodation case to be heard by the SCC. It
provided the Court with the opportunity to address the apparent inconsistencies in the
legal approach applied to addiction disability cases and offer much needed clarification.
Chapter 5 takes an in-depth look at the case of Elk Valley. It summarizes and examines
the previous decisions of the Human Rights Tribunal, Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta
and Court of Appeal of Alberta and the SCC decision, with a particular emphasis on the
latter, including the majority, partial dissent and dissenting decisions of the Court. The
chapter analyzes the legal reasoning adopted in these decisions from a human rights
perspective and with a sociopolitical understanding of addiction, grounded in human
rights principles, legislation and jurisprudence and illustrates how the decisions depart

40

[2010] MGAD No 43.

41

Wright, supra note 3.

42

[2014] BCCAAA No 108.

43

[2015] 122 CLAS 319.

44

[2015] SLAA No 27.

45

[2016] OLAA No 361.

46

2016 PSLREB 105.
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from these fundamental human rights laws and principles and reflect a lack of
understanding of the realities of addiction.
In Elk Valley, the SCC affirmed the prima facie discrimination test articulated in Moore
and concluded that no additional requirements are to imported into the analysis. The SCC
asserted that, in order to establish prima facie discrimination, the protected human rights
ground must merely be a factor in the adverse impact. Nevertheless, the majority of the
Court found sufficient evidence supporting the Tribunal’s decision that Stewart was not
terminated for his addiction, but for breaching the drug policy, and concluded that it was
reasonable for the Tribunal to find no prima facie discrimination. In finding that Mr.
Stewart’s termination was not discriminatory, based on the superficial distinction that Elk
Valley terminated him for breaching the employer’s drug policy, and not for his addiction
disability, the majority demonstrated faulty legal reasoning and departed from
fundamental human rights laws and principles as well as the modern scientific
understanding of addiction.

1.2.3.3

Chapter 6: Post-Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp.

Now, three years later, many decisions have been decided in the wake of the 2017 Elk
Valley decision. Chapter 6 explores the addiction disability jurisprudence following the
SCC’s decision in Elk Valley to examine the implications of the decision and the
development of new patterns in Canadian addiction disability law. This chapter analyzes
five cases that have been decided in the post-Elk Valley era: Toronto District School
Board v. Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 4400,47 Humber River Hospital v.
Ontario Nurses’ Association,48 Regional Municipality of Waterloo (Sunnyside Home) v.
Ontario Nurses’ Association,49 Canadian Pacific Railway v. Teamsters Canada Rail
Conference50 and Ontario Nurses’ Association v. Cambridge Memorial Hospital.51 These

47

[2018] OLAA No 119.

48

[2018] OLAA No 416.

49

[2019] OLAA No 16.

50

[2019] 139 CLAS 27.
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decisions reveal new trends in the jurisprudence and the future direction of addiction
disability law in Canada.
A review of these cases suggests that the Elk Valley decision has changed the landscape
of addiction law. The decisions illustrate a shift towards a broad, liberal human rights
approach to addiction disability. Relying on the SCC’s decision in Elk Valley, arbitrators
and judges have rejected the notion that there must be more than a mere connection
between the addiction and adverse impact and the imposition of additional factors and
considerations in the prima facie discrimination analysis. In the post-Elk Valley era, legal
decision makers have required employers to provide objective evidence of their
accommodation efforts and alleged undue hardship, even in the context of safetysensitive workplaces. The legal decisions in the wake of Elk Valley have adhered to the
well-established human rights approach to discrimination and workplace accommodation
and signify a change in the landscape of addiction disability case law.

1.3 Terminology
The terms substance use disorder, substance abuse and substance dependence are
commonly used in association with addiction and are adopted by sources cited in this
thesis. These different diagnostic terms reflect the changing approach to understanding
and diagnosing addiction. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
previously categorized substance use issues into two diagnoses: substance abuse and
substance dependence. This distinction “was based on the concept of abuse as a mild or
early phase and dependence as the more severe manifestation.”52 The current edition of
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders combines the previously
separate diagnostic categories of substance abuse and substance dependence into a single

51
52

2019 ONSC 3951.

American Psychiatric Association, “Substance-Related and Addictive Disorders” (2013), online: < https:
//www.psychiatry.org/psychiatrists/practice/dsm/educational-resources/dsm-5-fact-sheets> at 1.
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disorder called substance use disorder.53 The broad diagnosis of substance use disorder
refers to a problematic pattern of drug or alcohol use that results in clinically and
functionally significant impairment, such as social, physical, psychological and
interpersonal problems. The severity of the disorder is measured on a continuum, ranging
from mild to severe.
Over the years, various terms have been used to describe the different stages and severity
of addiction. Although “addiction” is not applied as a diagnostic term in the DSM-5, it is
commonly used to describe severe substance use problems. The term addiction indicates
“the most severe, chronic stage of substance-use disorder, in which there is a substantial
loss of self-control, as indicated by compulsive drug taking despite the desire to stop
taking the drug. In the DSM-5, the term addiction is synonymous with the classification
of severe substance-use disorder.”54 Although the DSM-5 does not refer to addiction as a
specific diagnosis, the term is still regularly used amongst the medical community and
commonly adopted in legal decisions. Thus, for the purposes of this thesis, I will continue
to use the term addiction. However, when a source refers to another term, I will adopt the
terminology used in the cited material in order to avoid the misinterpretation of the
findings, as the meaning of these terms may vary slightly.

1.4 Thesis Objectives
Canadians suffering from addiction are entitled to equal protection under the law as
individuals with any other protected human rights characteristic. Legal decision makers
are to treat all protected human rights grounds equally and apply the same legal tests to
all protected grounds. However, cases like Elk Valley illustrate that legal decision makers
diverge from the well-established liberal, broad human rights approach and subject
discrimination and accommodation claims on the basis of addiction to a higher standard,
thus making it relatively difficult for the employee to have a successful case.

53

American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th ed
(Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Publishing, 2013) [DSM-5].
54

Nora Volkow, George Koob & Thomas McLellan, “Neurobiologic Advances from the Brain Disease
Model of Addiction” (2016) 374:4 New England Journal of Medicine 363 at 364.
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Human rights law and principles are essentially ineffective if they are not being applied
consistently. The inconsistency between the stated law and the application of the law to
this particularly vulnerable group is a significant injustice that warrants critical attention.
Addressing this issue is the first step to remedying the systemic injustice perpetuated by
legal decision makers. The objective is to identify and raise awareness of the disparity
between the prescribed law and the actual application of the law in cases involving
vulnerable individuals with addiction to spark a conversation about practical solutions to
minimize this discrepancy and remedy the apparent differential treatment of addiction
disability by the legal system.
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Chapter 2

2

Canadian Workplace Discrimination and
Accommodation Law

Canadian human rights legislation prohibits employers from discriminating against
employees on the basis of enumerated protected grounds, such as age, religion, race,
sexual orientation and disability. Although there are some differences between the
various statutes, every single piece of Canadian human rights legislation enshrines
disability as a protected human rights ground.1 Canadian human rights law protects
against both direct and indirect discrimination. Direct discrimination occurs when an
employer adopts a practice or rule, which on its face, discriminates against a person or a
group of people on a prohibited ground.2 On the other hand, indirect discrimination, also
known as adverse effect or constructive discrimination, arises when an employer adopts a
rule or standard, for genuine business or economic purposes, which is neutral on its face
and applies equally to all employees, but has a discriminatory effect on an employee or
group of employees by imposing obligations, penalties or conditions, not imposed on
other members of the workforce, due to a special characteristic of the employee or
group.3

1

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 15(1) [Canadian Charter]; Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985,
c H-6, s 3(1) [Canadian HRA]; British Columbia’s Human Rights Code, RSBC 1996, c 210, s 13(1) [BC
HRC]; Alberta Human Rights Act, RSA 2000, c A-25.5, s 7(1) [Alberta HRA]; The Saskatchewan Human
Rights Code, RSS 1979, c S-24.1, s 2(1)(m.01)(vii) [Saskatchewan HRC]; Manitoba’s The Human Rights
Code, CCSM c H175, s 9(2)(l) [Manitoba HRC]; Ontario’s Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H19, s 5(1)
[Ontario HRC]; Quebec’s Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, CQLR 2016, c C-12, s 10 refers to
“handicap” [Quebec Charter]; Newfoundland and Labrador’s Human Rights Act, SNL 2010, c H-13.1, s
9(1) [Newfoundland HRA]; New Brunswick’s Human Rights Act, RSNB 2011, c 171, s 2.1(h)-(i) [NB
HRA]; Nova Scotia’s Human Rights Act, RSNS 1989 c 214, s 5(1) [NS HRA]; Prince Edward Island’s
Human Rights Act, RSPEI 1988, c H-12, s 1(1)(d) [PEI HRA]; Nunavut’s Consolidation of Human Rights
Act, SNu 2003, c12, s 7(1) [Nunavut HRA]; Yukon’s Human Rights Act, RSY 2002, c116, s 7(h) [Yukon
HRA]; and Northwest Territories’ Human Rights Act, SNWT 2002, c18, s 5(1) [NWT HRA] [collectively
cited as Canadian human rights statutes].
2

Ontario Human Rights Commission v Simpsons-Sears Ltd, [1985] 2 SCR 536 at 551 [Simpsons-Sears].

3

Ibid.
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In accordance with Canadians’ right to be free from discrimination, employers have a
duty to accommodate employees with a protected characteristic, such as a disability, to
the point of undue hardship. Only some jurisdictions explicitly provide for a duty to
accommodate in their human rights statute.4 Nevertheless, under Canadian law, every
employer has the duty to accommodate an employee with a disability to the point of
undue hardship, regardless of whether the relevant human rights statute specifically refers
to workplace accommodation.5
The jurisprudence provides important guiding principles for the application of these
human rights and obligations, including the Moore and Meiorin tests.6 The Supreme
Court of Canada (SCC) has confirmed that human rights statutes must be interpreted in a
liberal, contextual and purposive fashion7 and in light of the Canadian Charter and its
values.8 Human rights are to be given a broad interpretation. Therefore, as a human right,
the right to be accommodated for a disability must be applied broadly and exceptions
should be interpreted narrowly.9 This chapter examines the various pieces of Canadian
human rights legislation and interpretive human rights principles as well as explores the
legal analyses for prima facie discrimination and the employer’s duty to accommodate to
the point of undue hardship.

4

Ontario HRC, supra note 1, ss 17(1)-(2); Manitoba HRC, supra note 1, ss 9(1), 12; NWT HRA, supra note
1, s 7(4); Yukon HRA, supra note 1, s 8(1); and Nunavut HRA, supra note 1, s 9(5).
5

Central Alberta Dairy Pool v Alberta (Human Rights Commission), [1990] 2 SCR 489 [Central Alberta
Dairy Pool]; British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v British Columbia
Government and Service Employees’ Union, [1999] 3 SCR 3 [Meiorin]; and Stewart v Elk Valley Coal
Corp, 2017 SCC 30 [Elk Valley].
6

Moore v British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 [Moore].

7

Simpsons-Sears, supra note 2 at 551; Meiorin, supra note 5 at paras 43-44; Quebec (Commission des
droits de Ia personne et des droits de Iajeunesse) v Bombardier Inc (Bombardier Aerospace Training
Center), 2015 SCC 39 at para 31 [Bombardier].
8

Cooper v Canada (Human Rights Commission), [1996] 3 SCR 854 at para 21 [Cooper].

9

Commission scolaire régionale de Chambly v Bergevin, [1994] 2 SCR 525 [Bergevin].
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2.1 Human Rights Legislation and Principles
2.1.1 Federal Legislation
The Parliament of Canada has passed several pieces of legislation promoting equality and
human rights. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is part of the Constitution
Act, 1982, which forms part of the Constitution of Canada, the supreme law of Canada.10
The Canadian Charter defines the fundamental rights of the Canadian people, including
equality rights. The Charter applies to government action; it applies to the actions of the
Parliament and Government of Canada as well as the legislature and government of each
province with respect to all matters within its authority.11 The rights and freedoms
guaranteed in the Canadian Charter are “subject only to such reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”12
Section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter prohibits discrimination: “Every individual is
equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit
of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race,
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.”13 As
articulated by the SCC, the purpose of section 15 is “to ensure equality in the formulation
and application of the law” and “[t]he promotion of equality entails the promotion of a
society in which all are secure in the knowledge that they are recognized at law as human
beings equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration.”14 Although the Charter
does not specifically refer to employment, this broad equality right is still relevant and
important to workplace accommodation cases. Firstly, under the Canadian Charter,

10

Government of Canada, “Guide to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (8 June 2020), online:
<https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/services/how-rights-protected/guide-canadian-charter-rightsfreedoms.html>.
11

Supra note 1, s 32(1): “This Charter applies (a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect
of all matters within the authority of Parliament including all matters relating to the Yukon Territory and
Northwest Territories; and (b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters
within the authority of the legislature of each province.”
12

Ibid, s 1.

13

Ibid.

14

R v Kapp, 2008 SCC 41 at para 15 [Kapp]; citing Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1
SCR 143 at 171 [Andrews].
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individuals suffering from addiction are entitled to “equal protection and equal benefit of
the law” with respect to their human rights.15 Secondly, the jurisprudence establishes that
human rights statutes are to be interpreted in light of the Charter and its values.
The Canadian Human Rights Act, on the other hand, prohibits federally regulated
employers and service providers, including airports, radio and television broadcasters,
chartered banks, post offices and federal Crown corporations, from discriminating against
employees.16 Under the Canadian Human Rights Act, “the prohibited grounds of
discrimination are race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex, sexual
orientation, gender identity or expression, marital status, family status, genetic
characteristics, disability and conviction for an offence for which a pardon has been
granted or in respect of which a record suspension has been ordered.”17 Section 7
provides that, “It is a discriminatory practice, directly or indirectly, (a) to refuse to
employ or continue to employ any individual, or (b) in the course of employment, to
differentiate adversely in relation to an employee, on a prohibited ground of
discrimination.”18
The Canadian Human Rights Act expressly protects against both direct and indirect
discrimination.19 However, the legislation provides an exception to seemingly
discriminatory workplace practices; section 15(1)(a) states that a practice is not deemed
to be discriminatory if “any refusal, exclusion, expulsion, suspension, limitation,
specification or preference in relation to any employment is established by an employer
to be based on a bona fide occupational requirement,”20 meaning a legitimate workplace
rule. The Act also explicitly provides for the federally regulated employer’s duty to
accommodate. Section 15(2)(a) states that, “For any practice mentioned in paragraph

15

Supra note 1, s 15(1).

16

Government of Canada, “List of federally regulated industries and workplaces” (12 May 2020), online:
<https://www.canada.ca/en/services/jobs/workplace/federally-regulated-industries.html>.
17

Supra note 1, s 3(1).

18

Ibid.

19

Ibid, s 15(8).

20

Ibid.
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(1)(a) to be considered to be based on a bona fide occupational requirement… it must be
established that accommodation of the needs of an individual or a class of individuals
affected would impose undue hardship on the person who would have to accommodate
those needs, considering health, safety and cost.”21 Therefore, under this piece of
legislation, the federally regulated employer must demonstrate that accommodating the
employee with an addiction disability would impose undue hardship with respect to
health, safety or cost.
The Employment Equity Act specifically addresses equality in the workplace and requires
federally regulated employers—both private sector and certain public sector
employers22—to engage in proactive employment practices to increase the representation
of women, people with disabilities, Aboriginal peoples, and visible minorities in the
workforce. The purpose of the legislation is:
to achieve equality in the workplace so that no person shall be denied
employment opportunities or benefits for reasons unrelated to ability and,
in the fulfilment of that goal, to correct the conditions of disadvantage in
employment experienced by women, Aboriginal peoples, persons with
disabilities and members of visible minorities by giving effect to the
principle that employment equity means more than treating persons in the
same way but also requires special measures and the accommodation of
differences.23
The statute acknowledges the vital role accommodation plays in achieving equality in the
workplace and expressly enshrines the duty to accommodate.
The Employment Equity Act provides that every federally regulated employer must
implement employment equity by identifying and eliminating barriers arising from the
employer’s systems, policies and practices that are not legally authorized.24 Furthermore,
employers have a responsibility to institute positive policies and practices and make
reasonable accommodations to ensure that women, people with disabilities, Aboriginal

21

Ibid.

22

SC 1995, c 44, s 4(1).

23

Ibid, s 2.

24

Ibid, s 5(a).
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peoples and visible minorities achieve a degree of representation in each division of the
employer’s workforce that reflects their general representation in the Canadian
workforce.25 However, the statute provides for broad exceptions, extending beyond the
undue hardship defense, and states that:
The obligation to implement employment equity does not require an
employer (a) to take a particular measure to implement employment equity
where the taking of that measure would cause undue hardship to the
employer; (b) to hire or promote persons who do not meet the essential
qualifications for the work to be performed; (c) with respect to the public
sector, to hire or promote persons without basing the hiring or promotion
on merit in cases where the Public Service Employment Act requires that
hiring or promotion be based on merit; or (d) to create new positions in its
workforce.26
The Employment Equity Act further limits the scope of its application by stating that only
employees who identify themselves to an employer, or agree to be identified by an
employer, as an Aboriginal person, a visible minority or a person with a disability are
protected under the employment equity provisions.27 This piece of legislation falls short
of providing the human rights protections afforded by the Canadian Charter and
Canadian Human Rights Act and the human rights jurisprudence.

2.1.2 Provincial and Territorial Legislation
Every Canadian province and territory has developed and enacted its own human rights
legislation, directed at providing individuals with protection against discrimination in
various spheres of life, including employment. The purpose of these pieces of legislation
is similar: to recognize the dignity and equal and inalienable rights of every person,
promote the understanding and mutual respect for the dignity and worth of every person,
provide equal rights and opportunities to everyone and essentially prevent
discrimination.28 Although these various human rights statutes are not exactly alike, they

25

Ibid, s 5(b).

26

Ibid, s 6.

27

Ibid, s 9(2).

28

Canadian human rights statutes, supra note 1, Preamble.
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provide similar human rights protections with respect to employment. Ontario’s Human
Rights Code presents a general representation of the protections provided by the
provinces and territories’ human rights legislation. Important differences between the
legislation will be noted.
Each human rights statute states that employers must not discriminate against a person
based on a protected human rights ground, enumerated in the particular legislation. For
example, Ontario’s Human Rights Code provides that, “Every person has a right to equal
treatment with respect to employment without discrimination because of race, ancestry,
place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual orientation, gender
identity, gender expression, age, record of offences, marital status, family status or
disability.”29 Although the protected grounds vary slightly from statute to statute, every
single piece of human rights legislation includes disability as a protected ground.
Accordingly, an employer cannot refuse to employ, refuse to continue to employ or
otherwise discriminate against a person with regard to employment because of their
disability.
Some statutes, like Ontario’s Human Rights Code, specifically address indirect
discrimination while others do not. However, as discussed earlier in this chapter,
Canadian human rights law protects employees against both direct and indirect
discrimination. Therefore, all Canadian human rights legislation applies equally to
instances of direct and indirect discrimination, regardless of whether the particular statute
expressly addresses indirect discrimination. Ontario’s Human Rights Code specifically
refers to constructive discrimination, also known as indirect or adverse effect
discrimination, and provides that a person’s right to be free from discrimination is
violated “where a requirement, qualification or factor exists that is not discrimination on
a prohibited ground but that results in the exclusion, restriction or preference of a group

29

Supra note 1, s 5(1). Section 10(1) of the Code defines equal treatment to mean, “subject to all
requirements, qualifications and considerations that are not a prohibited ground of discrimination.”
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of persons who are identified by a prohibited ground of discrimination and of whom the
person is a member.”30
Each statute provides for a bona fide occupational requirement exception.31 An employer
cannot refuse to employ or refuse to continue to employ a person because of a protected
human rights ground unless the refusal is based on a bona fide occupational requirement,
a legitimate qualification for performing a particular job. If an employer can demonstrate
that the workplace rule in question establishes a necessary requirement for the proper
performance of the job, the validity of the rule will be upheld, despite its discriminatory
effect.32 The SCC developed a test for determining whether a workplace rule constitutes
a bona fide occupational requirement. In order to establish that the prima facie
discriminatory standard is a bona fide occupational requirement, the employer must
demonstrate that (1) it adopted the particular workplace standard for a purpose rationally
connected to the performance of the job; (2) it adopted the standard in an honest and good
faith belief that it was necessary for the fulfilment of that legitimate work-related
purpose; and (3) the standard is reasonably necessary for the attainment of that legitimate
work-related purpose, meaning it would be impossible to accommodate the employee
without imposing undue hardship on the employer.33

30

Ibid, s 11(1).

31

Canadian HRA, supra note 1, s 15(1)(a), BC HRC, supra note 1, s 13(4), Alberta HRA, supra note 1, s
7(3) and NWT HRA, supra note 1, 7(3): “bona fide occupational requirement;” Quebec Charter, supra note
1, s 20: “required for employment;” Newfoundland HRA, supra note 1, s 14(2): “good faith occupational
qualification;” NB HRA, supra note 1, s 2.2: “bona fide requirement or qualification;” PEI HRA, supra note
1, s 6(4): “genuine occupational qualification;” Yukon HRA, supra note 1, s 10(a): “reasonable
requirements or qualifications for the employment;” Nunavut HRA, supra note 1, s 9(4): “justified
occupational requirement;” Saskatchewan HRC, supra note 1, s 16(7): “reasonable occupational
qualification and requirement for employment;” Ontario HRC, supra note 1, s 11(1) and Manitoba HRC,
supra note 1, s 14(1): “reasonable and bona fide in the circumstances;” and NS HRA, supra note 1, s
6(f)(ia): “bona fide qualification, bona fide occupational requirement or a reasonable limit.”
32

Canadian Human Rights Commission, “Bona Fide Occupational Requirements (BFORs),” online:
<http://www.chrc-ccdp.gc.ca/historical-perspective/en/browseSubjects/bfors.asp>.
33

Meiorin, supra note 5.
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Some jurisdictions, including Ontario, also explicitly provide for a duty to accommodate
in their human rights legislation.34 Ontario’s Human Rights Code states that:
The Tribunal or a court shall not find that a requirement, qualification or
factor is reasonable and bona fide in the circumstances unless it is satisfied
that the needs of the group of which the person is a member cannot be
accommodated without undue hardship on the person responsible for
accommodating those needs, considering the cost, outside sources of
funding, if any, and health and safety requirements, if any.35
The statute prescribes particular undue hardship factors and expressly limits the duty to
accommodate to the point of undue hardship analysis to considerations of cost, outside
sources of funding and health and safety requirements. However, most of the provinces
and territories’ human rights statutes do not make reference to a duty to accommodate, let
alone specific undue hardship factors,36 thus allowing for more flexibility in the
accommodation analysis.
Every employer has the duty to accommodate to the point of undue hardship, regardless
of whether the relevant human rights statute specifically refers to workplace
accommodation. The Canadian Charter essentially embodies a duty to accommodate to
the point of undue hardship; even in the absence of a statutory duty to accommodate, no

34

Ontario HRC, supra note 1, ss 17(1)-(2); Manitoba HRC, supra note 1, ss 9(1), 12; NWT HRA, supra
note 1, s 7(4); Yukon HRA, supra note 1, s 8(1); Nunavut HRA, supra note 1, s 9(5); and Canadian HRA,
supra note 1, s 15(2).
35
36

Ontario HRC, supra note 1, s 11(2).

Apart from the Ontario HRC, three other pieces of legislation include undue hardship factors: Canadian
HRA, supra note 1, s 15(2): “For any practice mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) to be considered to be based
on a bona fide occupational requirement and for any practice mentioned in paragraph (1)(g) to be
considered to have a bona fide justification, it must be established that accommodation of the needs of an
individual or a class of individuals affected would impose undue hardship on the person who would have to
accommodate those needs, considering health, safety and cost”; Yukon HRA, supra note 1, s 8(2): “For the
purposes of subsection (1) ‘undue hardship’ shall be determined by balancing the advantages and
disadvantages of the provisions by reference to factors such as (a) safety; (b) disruption to the public; (c)
effect on contractual obligations; (d) financial cost; (e) business efficiency”; and Nunavut HRA, supra note
1, s 1: “‘undue hardship’ means excessive hardship as determined by evaluating the adverse consequences
of a provision in this Act that requires a duty to accommodate, by reference to such factors as (a) health and
safety; (b) disruption to the public; (c) effect on contractual obligations; (d) cost; and (e) business
efficiency.”
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piece of Canadian human rights legislation can be interpreted as precluding this duty.37
Canadian jurisprudence, which will be discussed in greater detail below, entrenches
employer’s legal obligation to accommodate employees.

2.1.3 Interpretive Principles
The SCC has consistently affirmed the quasi-constitutional status of human rights
legislation.38 This special status means that human rights statutes prevail over other
laws.39 In Insurance Corporation of British Columbia v. Heerspink, Chief Justice Lamer,
commented on the unique nature of human rights legislation in Canada:
When the subject matter of a law is said to be the comprehensive
statement of the “human rights” of the people living in that jurisdiction,
then there is no doubt in my mind that the people of that jurisdiction have
through their legislature clearly indicated that they consider that law, and
the values it endeavours to buttress and protect, are, save their
constitutional laws, more important than all others.40
Furthermore, in Ontario Human Rights Commission v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd., Justice
McIntyre stated that, “Legislation of this type is of a special nature, not quite
constitutional but certainly more than the ordinary -- and it is for the courts to seek out its
purpose and give it effect.”41 Accordingly, the SCC has repeatedly declared that human
rights legislation must be interpreted in a broad, liberal, contextual and purposive
manner42 and in light of the Canadian Charter and its values.43 This interpretive
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approach is consistent with the statutory guidelines provided in the federal Interpretation
Act, which stipulates that statutes are deemed to be remedial and “shall be given such
fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its
objects.”44
The purposive approach is the fundamental approach to Canadian statutory interpretation:
“there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in
their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the
scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.”45 In Canadian
National v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission), the SCC affirmed that,
Human rights legislation is intended to give rise, amongst other things, to
individual rights of vital importance, rights capable of enforcement, in the
final analysis, in a court of law. I recognize that in the construction of such
legislation the words of the Act must be given their plain meaning, but it is
equally important that the rights enunciated be given their full recognition
and effect.46
Human rights legislation must be interpreted in a manner that advances the broad policy
considerations underlying the statute,47 which is essentially the protection of Canadians’
equal rights.
The purposive approach requires analyzing the underlying purpose of the legislation and
interpreting the statute in light of its objectives and the particular context. As mentioned
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above, the general purpose of human rights legislation is to safeguard the equal
opportunity for all Canadians to participate in a wide range of socioeconomic spheres.48
The Preamble of Ontario’s Human Rights Code states that the purpose of the legislation
is:
to recognize the dignity and worth of every person and to provide for
equal rights and opportunities without discrimination that is contrary to
law, and having as its aim the creation of a climate of understanding and
mutual respect for the dignity and worth of each person so that each
person feels a part of the community and able to contribute fully to the
development and well-being of the community and the Province.49
Human rights statutes and the rights enshrined within them, including the employer’s
duty to accommodate, must be interpreted in light of these statutory objectives.
Human rights legislation must also be given a broad interpretation. Human rights are to
be interpreted broadly while statutory exceptions to the exercise of these rights must be
narrowly construed.50 The provisions that provide defences for discriminatory conduct
must be interpreted narrowly so as not to frustrate the fundamental purpose of the
legislation, and to give the fullest possible protection against discrimination.51 Human
rights legislation “is often the final refuge of the disadvantaged and the
disenfranchised;”52 these statutes are meant to protect the rights of disenfranchised
people and provide them with an avenue to rectify the injustice perpetrated against them.
Therefore, “As the last protection of the most vulnerable members of society, exceptions
to such legislation should be narrowly construed.”53 General terms and concepts must
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also be interpreted flexibly, allowing for provisions in the legislation to be adapted to the
changing social conditions and evolving concepts of human rights.54

2.1.4 The Meaning of Equality
Equality does not mean treating everyone the same. Canadian courts have rejected the
notion of formal equality, in favor of substantive equality. 55 Formal equality prescribes
“equal treatment for those in similar situations and different treatment for those in
dissimilar situations”—in other words, “treating likes alike.”56 Substantive equality, on
the other hand, “recognizes that not all differences in treatment are violations of equality
rights and that differences in treatment are sometimes necessary to achieve true
equality.”57 The Canadian Charter and the various pieces of Canadian human rights
legislation are aimed at securing substantive equality.58
In Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, Justice McIntyre illustrated the need for
and application of substantive equality:
[I]t may be said that a law which treats all identically and which provides
equality of treatment between “A” and “B” might well cause inequality for
“C”, depending on differences in personal characteristics and
situations. To approach the ideal of full equality before and under the
law -- and in human affairs an approach is all that can be expected -- the
main consideration must be the impact of the law on the individual or the
group concerned. Recognizing that there will always be an infinite variety
of personal characteristics, capacities, entitlements and merits among
those subject to a law, there must be accorded, as nearly as may be
possible, an equality of benefit and protection and no more of the
restrictions, penalties or burdens imposed upon one than another.59
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Substantive equality acknowledges and responds to the differences that particular groups
of people may experience, including “patterns of disadvantage” that require a proactive
response.60 Workplace accommodation, espousing the principles of substantive equality,
aims to counteract some of these disadvantages experienced by individuals with a
protected human rights characteristic. Workplace policies, standards and practices should
strive for substantive equality.
Employers’ duty to accommodate to the point of undue hardship should be interpreted in
view of the objectives of the duty to accommodate: providing Canadians with an equal
opportunity to employment.61 The law provides for the bona fide occupational
requirement exception; however, in order to preserve the rights of Canadians with
disabilities and provide substantive equality, this exception must be applied strictly and
sparingly.

2.2 Prima Facie Discrimination Analysis
An overwhelming amount of labour and employment law jurisprudence involves
discrimination in the workplace. In Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, the SCC
explained the concept of discrimination:
Discrimination may be described as a distinction, whether intentional or
not but based on grounds relating to personal characteristics of the
individual or group, which has the effect of imposing burdens, obligations,
or disadvantages on such individual or group not imposed upon others, or
which withholds or limits access to opportunities, benefits, and advantages
available to other members of society. Distinctions based on personal
characteristics attributed to an individual solely on the basis of association
with a group will rarely escape the charge of discrimination, while those
based on an individual’s merits and capacities will rarely be so classed.62
As previously mentioned, discrimination can either be direct or indirect.
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with a protected characteristic is subjected to differential and adverse treatment for no
justifiable reason.63 Under Canadian human rights law, intention is irrelevant to the prima
facie discrimination analysis and both direct and indirect discrimination are treated the
same.
It is important to note that not every distinction amounts to discrimination.
Discrimination focuses particularly on violations of human dignity—essentially, the
arbitrariness of the barriers imposed on people, whether intentionally or unknowingly.64
Employment practices, standards and requirements cannot disadvantage employees by
“attributing stereotypical or arbitrary characteristics;” the focus should be on employees’
actual abilities, not falsely attributed capabilities.65 However, an employer’s conduct
cannot be impugned solely on the basis that their actions had a negative impact on an
employee with a protected characteristic. Membership to a protected group does not in
itself guarantee access to a human rights remedy; there must be a connection between the
group membership and the arbitrariness of the disadvantageous standard or conduct,
either on its face or indirectly through its impact, in order to trigger the possibility of a
human rights remedy.66 The SCC subsequently confirmed the use of this approach in
Honda Canada Inc. v. Keays.67

2.2.1 Moore Test
The SCC established the three-part test for determining the presence of prima facie
discrimination in Moore v. British Columbia (Education). The Moore test reaffirmed the
discrimination test first articulated by the SCC in Simpsons-Sears and Central Alberta
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Dairy Pool.68 In order to find prima facie discrimination, the complainant must
demonstrate that:
They have a characteristic protected from discrimination under the Code;
that they experienced an adverse impact with respect to the service; and
that the protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact. Once a
prima facie case has been established, the burden shifts to the respondent
to justify the conduct or practice, within the framework of the exemptions
available under human rights statutes. If it cannot be justified,
discrimination will be found to occur.69
Both the employee and employer have the persuasive burden of establishing their case on
the balance of probabilities.70
The Moore test does not mention, let alone require, the employer’s knowledge of the
employee’s protected characteristic. However, the issue of knowledge has been raised in
subsequent workplace discrimination cases. In Telecommunications Workers Union v.
Telus Communications Inc., the Alberta Court of Appeal affirmed that an employee does
not have to demonstrate that the employer was aware of their disability in order to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination: “Demonstrating an employer’s knowledge
of an employee’s disability is unnecessary, in a case alleging adverse-effect
discrimination. By definition, adverse-effect discrimination is the uniform application of
a seemingly neutral employment policy to all employees, regardless of whether some
employees have protected characteristics.”71 The Court concluded that the three-part
Moore test is sufficient to accommodate both cases of indirect and direct discrimination;
therefore, knowledge should not be included as an additional element of the prima facie
discrimination test.72
More recently, in Quebec (Commission des droits de Ia personne et des droits de
Iajeunesse) v. Bombardier Inc. (Bombardier Aerospace Training Center), the SCC
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clarified the prima facie discrimination test. Although the case refers to the Quebec
human rights statute, it is applicable to other human rights legislation. The SCC stated
that human rights legislation should generally be interpreted consistently across
jurisdictions, unless otherwise specified.73 The Court rephrased the test in Moore,
adopting the terminology in Quebec’s Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, and
stated that, in order to establish prima facie discrimination, a plaintiff must prove the
following three elements on a balance of probabilities: 1) a “distinction, exclusion or
preference,” 2) based on a protected ground, 3) which “has the effect of nullifying or
impairing the right to full and equal recognition and exercise of a human right or
freedom.”74 Just as in Moore, once the plaintiff establishes prima facie discrimination, the
burden shifts to the respondent to justify the conduct on the basis of legislative or judicial
defenses and if they fail to do so, discrimination will be found to have occurred. 75 The
analysis is the same for all grounds of alleged discrimination.76
The SCC also addressed the issue of causality, which arose in the Elk Valley case. In
Bombardier, the Court held that, in order to find discrimination, the prohibited ground
must have contributed to the conduct.77 The plaintiff must simply establish a connection
between the prohibited ground of discrimination and the distinction, exclusion or
preference.78 The SCC stated that the terms “connection” and “factor” should be used in
relation to the discrimination analysis79 and “it is therefore neither appropriate nor
accurate to use the expression ‘causal connection’ in the discrimination context.”80
Requiring a causal connection between the protected ground and the adverse treatment
would impose an inappropriately heavy burden on the plaintiff since human rights
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legislation and jurisprudence focus on the discriminatory effects of conduct, be it direct
or indirect, rather than the intention to discriminate.81

2.3 Workplace Accommodation Analysis
The duty to accommodate is a fundamental legal obligation that arises from human rights
legislation as well as SCC decisions and the rulings of human rights tribunals and labour
arbitrators. The duty to accommodate requires employers to make every reasonable
effort, short of undue hardship, to accommodate an employee with a protected human
rights characteristic.82 Once an employee establishes a prima facie case that he or she has
a disability requiring accommodation, the burden shifts to the employer to prove that it
made every reasonable effort, short of undue hardship, to accommodate the employee’s
disability.
The underlying purpose of workplace accommodation is ultimately to provide Canadians
with an equal opportunity to employment. In most cases, the protected ground requiring
accommodation constitutes a form of disability.83 Accommodation enables individuals—
who, despite their disability, are still capable of fulfilling the essential duties of an
occupation—to have the opportunity to achieve and sustain employment. In order to
maintain the employment relationship, the employee must still productively perform the
core aspects of the job. However, this has been greatly subsumed by the considerable
obligations required under the employer’s duty to accommodate.84 To satisfy these legal
obligations, an employer must “be prepared to make changes to the organization of work,
to the tools required to perform the particular job, to the assignment of duties for the
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work position, to the content and application of work policies, and even to the attitudes of
the workforce.”85
The duty to accommodate applies to all employers and confers broad and substantial
obligations on employers as well as unions. The right to workplace accommodation
extends to all employees, at all stages of the employment relationship⎯before being
hired to post-termination.86 The accommodation process requires involvement from the
employer, the employee seeking accommodation and, in the case of a unionized
workplace, the union.87 All three parties assume legal responsibility for ensuring the
success of a workplace accommodation request.88 Nonetheless, the primary responsibility
lies with the employer because it has control over the workplace and employment
policies and practices. Once an employer receives an accommodation request, it must
initiate a search for reasonable accommodation.89 The union should cooperate with the
accommodation process and must not impede the employer’s reasonable efforts to
accommodate the employee.90 The employee is also expected to participate in the
accommodation process. When possible, the employee must communicate his or her
needs to the employer and provide the necessary information and details to facilitate
accommodation.91 However, the absence of an employee’s disclosure does not eliminate
the duty to accommodate. This situation often arises in the case of drug and alcohol
addiction, where the employee does not acknowledge their disability or does not want to
disclose this private information to the employer. The employer still has an obligation to
take steps to accommodate the employee, if they knew, or should have reasonably
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known, about the employee’s disability and the need for accommodation.92 Moreover,
the employee cannot refuse a reasonable accommodation proposal.93 The right to
workplace accommodation entitles an employee to a reasonable accommodation, not a
perfect solution or the accommodation of their choice.94
Under Canadian law, employers are required to determine whether existing positions can
be modified for the employee or whether other positions in the workplace might be
suitable.95 When exploring accommodation options, the employer must undergo an
investigation process, which involves: 1) determining whether the employee can
productively fulfill his or her existing job in its present form; 2) if not, determining
whether the employee can perform the core aspects of the original job in a modified
form; 3) if not, determining whether the employee can accomplish the duties of another
job in its present form; and 4) if not, then determining whether the employee can perform
another job in a modified form.96 Generally speaking, an employer will have fulfilled its
duty to accommodate if it has thoroughly investigated, and has been genuinely incapable
to satisfy, all four steps.97

2.3.1 Meiorin Test
In Meiorin, the SCC affirmed that the duty to accommodate must be applied in a
generous and liberal fashion and established a three-step test for determining whether a
prima facie discriminatory practice or standard constitutes a bona fide occupational
requirement and is thus justified under human rights law. This test applies to both cases
of direct and indirect discrimination. When assessing the validity of a challenged
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standard or practice, the legal decision maker must determine whether the employer
justified the impugned standard by establishing on the balance of probabilities that:
1. The employer adopted the challenged standard or practice for a purpose
rationally connected to the performance of the job;
2. The employer adopted the particular standard in an honest and good faith
belief that it was necessary to fulfill the legitimate work-related purpose; and
3. The standard is reasonably necessary to accomplish the legitimate workrelated purpose, meaning it would be impossible to accommodate the
employee without imposing undue hardship upon the employer.98
The employer should be attuned to “the possibility that there may be different ways to
perform the job while still accomplishing the employer’s legitimate work-related
purpose.”99 The SCC provided a list of important questions for employers to ask
themselves when considering an accommodation request:
(a) Has the employer investigated alternative approaches that do not have
a discriminatory effect, such as individual testing against a more
individually sensitive standard?
(b) If alternative standards were investigated and found to be capable of
fulfilling the employer’s purpose, why were they not implemented?
(c) Is it necessary to have all employees meet the single standard for the
employer to accomplish its legitimate purpose or could standards
reflective of group or individual differences and capabilities be
established?
(d) Is there a way to do the job that is less discriminatory while still
accomplishing the employer’s legitimate purpose?
(e) Is the standard properly designed to ensure that the desired
qualification is met without placing an undue burden on those to
whom the standard applies?
(f) Have other parties who are obliged to assist in the search for possible
accommodation fulfilled their roles?100
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These questions require the employer to consider whether modifications or alternative
approaches could effectively accommodate the employee’s needs. Of course, other
questions may also be pertinent to this analysis.

2.3.2 Undue Hardship
The third step of the Meiorin test—requiring the employer to demonstrate that the
standard is reasonably necessary to accomplish the legitimate work-related purpose and
that it would be impossible to accommodate the employee without imposing undue
hardship—establishes employers’ duty to accommodate to the point of undue hardship. In
Central Alberta Dairy Pool, the SCC developed a non-exhaustive list of factors to
consider when assessing the duty to accommodate to the point of undue hardship:
financial cost, disruption of a collective agreement, problems with employee morale,
interchangeability of the workforce and facilities, size of the employer’s operations and
safety.101 Recent decisions also indicate the emergence of a seventh factor: legitimate
operational requirements of a workplace.102 Legal decision makers may consider these
undue hardship factors, barring any limitations provided in the relevant human rights
legislation. For example, as noted earlier, Ontario’s Human Rights Code specifies that
only cost, outside sources of funding and health and safety requirements are to be
considered when assessing the duty to accommodate. The relevant undue hardship factors
are ultimately balanced with the employee’s right to be free from discrimination.
The duty to accommodate must be applied broadly while the undue hardship defense
should be given a narrow interpretation. The SCC jurisprudence provides guiding
principles for the narrow interpretation of undue hardship factors. Although excessive
financial cost may constitute a justification to refuse accommodation, “one must be wary
of putting too low a value on accommodating the disabled.”103 The financial cost must
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impose a significant impact on the employer in order to constitute an undue hardship.104
Meiorin and Grismer also establish that a mere statement of excessive cost, without
supporting evidence, is not generally sufficient to meet the standard of undue hardship.105
A reasonable accommodation may override the provisions of a collective agreement,
unless the proposed accommodation would significantly interfere with the rights of other
employees, such as seniority rights.106 In Renaud, the SCC stated that:
The employer must establish that actual interference with the rights of
other employees, which is not trivial but substantial, will result from the
adoption of the accommodating measures.107
…
While the provisions of a collective agreement cannot absolve the parties
from the duty to accommodate, the effect of the agreement is relevant in
assessing the degree of hardship occasioned by interference with the terms
thereof. Substantial departure from the normal operation of the conditions
and terms of employment in the collective agreement may constitute
undue interference in the operation of the employer’s business.108
Therefore, the accommodation of one employee cannot interfere with the job interests
and entitlements of another, as this will likely constitute undue hardship.
When assessing employee morale, legitimate concerns regarding one’s employment
rights must be distinguished from concerns premised on stereotypical or discriminatory
reactions to the employee with a disability.109 Furthermore, the proposed accommodation
must actually substantially interfere with the rights of the other employees. Employees’
objections based on well-grounded concerns that their rights will be impacted must be
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considered; however, objections based on attitudes that are inconsistent with human
rights are irrelevant to the analysis of undue hardship.110
The interchangeability of the workforce and facilities addresses the flexibility of the
employer’s operations, which is often linked to the size of the organization. This undue
hardship factor involves determining whether the workforce or facilities are large enough,
complex enough or adaptable enough to implement a modification without imposing
undue hardship.111 The SCC acknowledges that it may be easier for a larger operation to
accommodate an employee than a smaller operation with fewer resources.112
Safety is the most frequently invoked undue hardship factor in workplace
accommodation cases.113 It is also often the main defense in addiction disability cases. It
is important to understand that an employer’s duty to provide a safe workplace cannot
simply displace the duty to accommodate an employee with an addiction. In Meiorin and
Grismer, the SCC indicated that zero-tolerance safety rules contravene the duty to
accommodate. Safety standards must be applied flexibly and employers must accept that
a moderate level of safety risks may be reasonably necessary to ensure the reasonable and
successful accommodation of an employee; a workplace safety standard cannot require
absolute safety or no risk.114 In order to reach the threshold of undue hardship, the safety
risk must be serious.115 The magnitude of the safety risk and those who bear the safety
risk are relevant considerations.116
In Grismer, the SCC provided that employers cannot make assumptions about disability
and safety without conducting an individualized assessment of the employee in
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question.117 Employers must present convincing evidence to substantiate a safety claim
because impressionistic or anecdotal evidence regarding the magnitude of risk are
inadequate. Furthermore, claims of anticipated hardships on the basis of proposed
accommodations should not be accepted, if based solely on speculative or unsubstantiated
concern that certain negative consequences might or could follow the employee’s
accommodation.118 Although safety sensitive and zero-tolerance rules are significant
features of a modern workplace, they cannot be advanced to defeat a workplace
accommodation if a tolerable range of risk would permit an employee to work
productively.119
Although it is not yet clearly defined as an undue hardship factor, various arbitration
decisions have accepted and endorsed the consideration of a workplace’s legitimate
operational requirements.120 For example, several labour arbitration decisions have
indicated that an employer, who has attempted to accommodate an employee struggling
with addiction, will have satisfied its duty to accommodate where the employee has made
several unsuccessful attempts to return to work and his or her current rehabilitative
efforts do not appear to be promising.121 This instance of undue hardship does not clearly
fall within any of the classic Central Alberta Dairy Pool factors and suggests the need for
alternative considerations. Although it is an inchoate undue hardship factor that has not
yet received formal endorsement by the SCC, legal decision makers have expressed a
functional need to assess the employer’s legitimate operational requirements within the
accommodation analysis.122
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The employer’s assessment of an employee requiring accommodation must be based on
credible and objective evidence, not fears, myths or stereotypes. For example, in the case
of addiction disability, the stigma attached to drug and alcohol addiction should not
influence the individualized assessment of the employee’s capabilities and ability to
return to work following treatment. The rigorous application of these protections ensures
the inclusion of employees with mental illness in the workforce.123 It is, therefore,
imperative that arbitrators, human rights tribunals and courts uphold this standard.
The duty to accommodate to the point of undue hardship must be assessed with common
sense and flexibility, in light of the circumstances of the particular case.124 The duty to
accommodate must be applied broadly, while exceptions—namely, the undue hardship
defense—should be interpreted narrowly: “Courts, labour arbitrators and human rights
tribunals are to take a strict approach to exemptions from the duty to accommodate.
Exemptions are to be permitted only where they are reasonably necessary to the
achievement of legitimate business-related objectives.”125 Although there is no single
legal definition of undue hardship, the jurisprudence on workplace accommodation
clearly indicates that the amount of hardship required to satisfy the employer’s duty to
accommodate must be substantial: “More than mere negligible effort is required to satisfy
the duty to accommodate. The use of the term ‘undue’ infers that some hardship is
acceptable; it is only ‘undue’ hardship that satisfies this test… What constitutes undue
hardship is a question of fact and will vary with the circumstances of the case.” 126 Legal
decision makers are expected to apply this approach to all accommodation cases,
regardless of the protected human rights ground at issue.
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2.4 Conclusion
The laws and principles described in this chapter form the foundation of Canadian human
rights law in the realm of employment. The fundamental laws on workplace
discrimination and the duty to accommodate to the point of undue hardship are well
established and deeply entrenched in Canadian labour and employment law
jurisprudence.
The Moore and Meiorin tests, informed and guided by human rights principles, form the
legal analysis of workplace discrimination and accommodation with respect to all
protected human rights grounds. Accordingly, these human rights laws and principles
should be applied in all cases of alleged discrimination and workplace accommodation,
including cases involving drug and alcohol addiction disability. The legal analyses for
prima facie discrimination and the duty to accommodate are referred to throughout this
thesis and represent a benchmark for the addiction cases examined in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.
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Chapter 3

3

Understanding Drug and Alcohol Addiction Disability

Before analyzing the application of workplace accommodation law to cases of drug and
alcohol addiction, it is important to first understand what an addiction is and the negative
impact this illness can have on a person. Drug and alcohol addiction affects millions of
Canadians. It is characterized by a craving for the substance, loss of control of the
amount or frequency of use, the compulsion to use the substance and continuous use
despite harmful consequences.1 Canadian human rights law recognizes drug and alcohol
addiction as a form of disability and, by virtue of this legal recognition, human rights
protections extend to individuals struggling with addiction.
This chapter explores the status of drug and alcohol addiction as a form of disability
under Canadian human rights law, presents the three leading conceptual models of
disability, in general, and addiction, in particular, and lays the foundational groundwork
for understanding addiction disability. It examines the prevalence of drug and alcohol
addiction, the impact addiction can have on employment, diagnostic criteria and
symptoms of addiction, potential causes, the contentious issue of control with respect to
addictive behaviours, stigma and medical treatment.

3.1 Statistics
3.1.1 Prevalence
Drug and alcohol addiction afflicts hundreds of millions of people worldwide.
Approximately 5.1% of the world’s adult population—about 283 million people—suffer
from alcohol use disorder2 and about 0.7%—over 35 million people—suffer from drug

1

Marilyn Herie et al, Addiction: An information guide (Toronto: Centre for Addiction and Mental Health,
2010) at 2.
2

World Health Organization, Global status report on alcohol and health 2018 (Geneva: World Health
Organization, 2018) at 72. This statistic is based on individuals that are 15 years of age and older.
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use disorders.3 Approximately 21.6% of Canadians aged 15 and older—about 6 million
people—meet the criteria for substance use disorder, meaning drug or alcohol abuse or
dependence, during their lifetime, with about 18.1% of Canadians meeting the criteria for
alcohol abuse or dependence.4 In terms of drugs, about 6.8% of Canadians experience
symptoms of cannabis abuse or dependence in their lifetime and 4% meet the criteria for
abuse or dependence of other drugs, such as club drugs, cocaine, heroin, solvents and
prescription drugs.5 Approximately 4.4% of Canadians meet the criteria for a substance
use disorder in a 12-month period, with about 3.2% meeting the criteria for alcohol abuse
or dependence, 1.3% experiencing symptoms of cannabis abuse or dependence and 0.7%
meeting the criteria for abuse or dependence of other drugs.6
Although these statistics are informative, it is important to acknowledge that this data
may underestimate the extent of substance use disorders in Canada as the Statistics
Canada survey only measures select substance use disorders and does not include people
living on reserves, full-time members of the Canadian Forces or institutionalized
individuals.7 Furthermore, the stigmatization of drug and alcohol addiction may also
contribute to the underreporting of substance use problems: “Stigma marks substance use
problems as shameful and makes people want to hide their addiction.”8 Accordingly, the
national rate of drug and alcohol addiction is likely higher than the study suggests.

3

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2020, booklet 2, “Drug Use and Health
Consequences” (Vienna: United Nations, 2020) at 11.
4

Caryn Pearson, Teresa Janz & Jennifer Ali, “Health at a Glance: Mental and Substance Use Disorders in
Canada,” (27 November 2015), online: <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/82-624-x/2013001/article/11855eng.htm>. For the purposes of this study, substance abuse was “characterized by a pattern of recurrent use
where at least one of the following occurs: failure to fulfill major roles at work, school or home, use in
physically hazardous situations, recurrent alcohol or drug related problems, and continued use despite
social or interpersonal problems caused or intensified by alcohol or drugs.” Substance dependence was
defined as the occurrence of at least three of the following within a 12-month period: “increased tolerance,
withdrawal, increased consumption, unsuccessful efforts to quit, a lot of time lost recovering or using,
reduced activity, and continued use despite persistent physical or psychological problems caused or
intensified by alcohol or drugs.”
5

Ibid.

6

Ibid.

7

Ibid.

8

Herie, supra note 1 at 7.
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3.1.2 Impact on Employment
Addiction can significantly impact a person’s life, including their performance and
attendance at work. Drug and alcohol addiction exists across all professions and can
affect employees in any industry and at any job level.9 Considering the symptoms of
addiction, it is not difficult to imagine the negative impact addiction can have on one’s
employment. Drug and alcohol addiction is “linked to numerous workplace outcomes,
including absenteeism, lost productivity, on-the-job accidents and injuries, and workplace
violence and harassment.”10 Individuals with substance use disorders, compared to those
without substance issues, are more likely to work part-time jobs and are more than twice
as likely to be permanently unable to work.11
The detrimental effects of addiction disability not only permeate the specific workplace
of the individual struggling with addiction, but also significantly impact the economy as a
whole. The lost work productivity attributable to drug and alcohol abuse costs the
Canadian economy over $14 billion per year.12 Appropriate and effective workplace
accommodation, coupled with rehabilitative support, would likely enable employees to
return to work sooner and help limit the costs associated with lost productivity.

3.2 Legal Human Rights Perspective
Every Canadian human rights statute protects against discrimination on the ground of
disability. These pieces of legislation provide broad definitions of disability to allow for
the protection of various physical and mental illnesses and the case law has established

9

Mental Health Commission of Canada, Canadian Centre on Substance Use and Addiction & Conference
Board of Canada, Start the Conversation: Problematic Substance Use and the Workplace, (2018) online:
<https://www.mentalhealthcommission.ca/sites/default/files/2018-05/substance_use_
brochure_2018_eng.pdf>.
10

Conference Board of Canada, Problematic Substance use and the Canadian Workplace, (Ottawa:
Conference Board of Canada, 2016) at 4.
11

Eric Diotte, Mental Health and Equality Rights: Substance Use Disorders – A Human Rights-Based
Analysis using the 2012 Canadian Community Health Survey – Mental Health, (Ottawa: Canadian Human
Rights Commission, 2012) at 10.
12

Canadian Centre on Substance Use and Addiction, Canadian Substance Use Costs and Harms Report
(2018), online: <https://csuch.ca/>.
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the acceptance of drug and alcohol addiction as a form of disability.13 Accordingly,
individuals struggling with addiction are afforded human rights protections. Employees
with a drug or alcohol addiction are entitled to be free from discrimination in the
workplace and accommodated to the point of undue hardship.

3.2.1 Legislation
The various pieces of Canadian human rights legislation define disability differently.
There are three legislative approaches to defining disability: (1) an explicit and detailed
definition of disability;14 (2) a brief and stripped-down definition of disability;15 and (3)
providing no definition of disability at all,16 which allows for maximum flexibility and
enables legal decision makers to apply a broad and liberal approach to the meaning of
disability, unfettered by statutory constraints. Nevertheless, regardless of the particular
approach adopted by the human rights statute, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has
stated that disability is to be given a broad and encompassing definition, consistent with
the liberal and purposive approach to interpreting human rights.17

13

Entrop v Imperial Oil Ltd, [1995] 23 CHRR D/196 [Entrop Board], affirmed in Entrop v Imperial Oil
Ltd (2000), 50 OR (3d) 18 [Entrop]; Handfield v North Thompson School District No 26, [1995] BCCHRD
No 4; British Columbia v British Columbia Government and Service Employees’ Union, [2007] BCCAAA
No 37; Ontario (Disability Support Program) v Tranchemontagne, 2010 ONCA 593 [Tranchemontagne];
and Wright v College and Association of Registered Nurses of Alberta (Appeals Committee), 2012 ABCA
267 [Wright].
14

Alberta Human Rights Act, RSA 2000, c A-25.5, s 44(1) [Alberta HRA]; The Saskatchewan Human
Rights Code, RSS 1979, c S-24.1, s 2(1)(d.1) [Saskatchewan HRC]; Ontario’s Human Rights Code, RSO
1990, c H19, s 10(1) [Ontario HRC]; Newfoundland and Labrador’s Human Rights Act, SNL 2010, c H13.1, s 2(c) [Newfoundland HRA]; New Brunswick’s Human Rights Act, RSNB 2011, c 171, s 2 [NB HRA];
Nova Scotia’s Human Rights Act, RSNS 1989 c 214, s 3(1) [NS HRA]; Prince Edward Island’s Human
Rights Act, RSPEI 1988, c H-12, s 1(c.1) [PEI HRA]; Yukon’s Human Rights Act, RSY 2002, c 116, s 37
[Yukon HRA]; Northwest Territories’ Human Rights Act, SNWT 2002, c18, s 1(1) [NWT HRA]; and
Employment Equity Act, SC 1995, c 44, s 3 [EEA].
15

Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC 1985, c H-6, s 25 [Canadian HRA]; and Nunavut’s Consolidation of
Human Rights Act, SNu 2003, c12, s 1 [Nunavut HRA].
16

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Canadian Charter]; British Columbia’s Human Rights Code, RSBC
1996, c 210 [BC HRC]; Manitoba’s The Human Rights Code, CCSM c H175 [Manitoba HRC]; and
Quebec’s Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, CQLR 2016, c C-12 [Quebec Charter].
17

Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v Montreal (City), 2000
SCC 27 at paras 46, 48, 71, 76, 81 [City of Montreal].
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Although the statutory definition of disability varies between jurisdictions and the
majority of Canadian human rights statutes do not specifically refer to addiction, drug
and alcohol addiction are uniformly protected under each piece of human rights
legislation. The Canadian Human Rights Act and Nova Scotia and Nunavut’s human
rights statutes define disability to explicitly include drug and alcohol dependence,18
whereas other statutes do not expressly include drug and alcohol addiction in their
definition of disability.19 Nevertheless, these definitions are flexible enough to
encompass addiction. For example, Ontario’s Human Rights Code, which provides a
more restrictive definition compared to the statutes previously mentioned, designates five
different categories of disability:
(a) any degree of physical disability, infirmity, malformation or
disfigurement that is caused by bodily injury, birth defect or illness and,
without limiting the generality of the foregoing, includes diabetes mellitus,
epilepsy, a brain injury, any degree of paralysis, amputation, lack of
physical co-ordination, blindness or visual impediment, deafness or
hearing impediment, muteness or speech impediment, or physical reliance
on a guide dog or other animal or on a wheelchair or other remedial
appliance or device,
(b) a condition of mental impairment or a developmental disability,
(c) a learning disability, or a dysfunction in one or more of the processes
involved in understanding or using symbols or spoken language,
(d) a mental disorder, or
(e) an injury or disability for which benefits were claimed or received
under the insurance plan established under the Workplace Safety and
Insurance Act, 1997.20
The wording “without limiting the generality of the foregoing” creates a broad definition
of disability and allows for flexibility.21 The categories of mental impairment, mental
disorder and even physical disability, given the potential physical symptoms associated

18

Canadian HRA, supra note 15, s 25; NS HRA, supra note 14, s 3(1); and Nunavut HRA, supra note 15, s

1.
19

EEA, supra note 14; Alberta HRA, supra note 14; Saskatchewan HRC, supra note 14; Newfoundland
HRA, supra note 14; NB HRA, supra note 14; PEI HRA, supra note 14; NWT HRA, supra note 14; and
Yukon HRA, supra note 14.
20
21

Supra note 14, s 10(1).

Ibid. This approach is also reflected in Alberta HRA, supra note 14; Saskatchewan HRC, supra note 14;
NB HRA, supra note 14; NS HRA, supra note 14; PEI HRA, supra note 14; and Yukon HRA, supra note 14.
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with addiction, can be interpreted as including drug and alcohol addiction. The
Employment Equity Act and the human rights legislation of Alberta, Saskatchewan,
Newfoundland, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, the Northwest Territories and the
Yukon have adopted similar definitions of disability. Each of these definitions address
both physical and mental impairments and are broad enough to encompass addiction.
Although not every piece of human rights legislation specifically states that addiction is a
disability, recent jurisprudence recognizes drug and alcohol addiction as a form of
disability under human rights law. Thus, human rights protections are extended to drug
and alcohol addiction, regardless of whether the relevant statute specifically refers to
addiction. Under Canadian human rights law, drug and alcohol addictions are to be
treated the same as any other disability or protected human rights ground. Employers are
prohibited from discriminating against employees on the basis of their addiction and have
a legal duty to accommodate these individuals to the point of undue hardship.

3.2.2 Jurisprudence
In most workplace accommodation cases, the protected characteristic requiring
accommodation is a form of disability.22 Canadian legal decision makers have long
recognized the disadvantaged position of individuals with disabilities. In Ontario Nurses’
Association v. Mount Sinai Hospital, the Ontario Court of Appeal acknowledged that,
“people with disabilities have historically been undervalued in Canadian society
generally, and in the area of employment in particular.”23 As a group, people with
disabilities “suffer from pre-existing disadvantage, vulnerability, stereotyping and
prejudice.” 24 People who are subject to unfair treatment in society by virtue of personal
characteristics or circumstances, such as disability, are often not given equal concern,

22

Michael Lynk, “Disability and Work: The Transformation of the Legal Status of Employees with
Disabilities in the Canadian Workplace,” in R Echlin & C Paliare, eds, Law Society of Upper Canada
Special Lectures 2007: Employment Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008) 189 at 203.
23

(2005), 75 OR (3d) 245 at para 25 [Mount Sinai].

24

Ibid.
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respect or consideration.25 Therefore, it is logical to conclude that further differential
treatment, which could arise from the imposition of ostensibly neutral workplace
standards and policies, “will contribute to the perpetuation or promotion of their unfair
social characterization, and will have a more severe impact upon them, since they are
already vulnerable.”26
Canadian human rights statutes provide broad definitions of disability to allow for the
protection of various physical and mental illnesses and the common law has brought
these statutory provisions to life by developing and expanding the interpretation of
disability. One of the most notable early addiction cases is Entrop v. Imperial Oil Ltd.,
where the Ontario Court of Appeal acknowledged that substance abuse and dependence
“are each a handicap”—now referred to as disability—under human rights legislation.27
This case involved the appeal of a 1995 Ontario Board of Inquiry decision, which appears
to be the first case in Ontario to consider whether alcoholism constituted a handicap.28
The Court of Appeal accepted the Board’s conclusion that substance abuse “fits without
difficulty into the definition of ‘handicap’ under the Code, as an illness or disease
creating physical disability or mental impairment, and interfering with physical,
psychological and social functioning,” thus entitling such individuals to human rights
protections.29 The Court’s finding that drug and alcohol addiction constitutes a disability
under Canadian human rights legislation has been accepted and confirmed by the
subsequent jurisprudence.
The case law establishes that employers have an onerous obligation to ensure that
employees with drug and alcohol addictions are appropriately accommodated in the
workplace. The jurisprudence suggests that employer’s accommodation duty remains
operative, even when the employee failed to disclose their disability, violated a last
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Law v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 SCR 497 at para 63.

26

Mount Sinai, supra note 23 at para 25, quoting ibid.

27

Supra note 13 at para 89.
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Entrop Board, supra note 13 at para 19.
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Entrop, supra note 13 at para 89, quoting ibid at para 24.
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chance agreement or displayed signs and symptoms of the illness at work.30 As denial
and relapse are common elements of addiction, employers must tolerate some
interference with the accommodation process, in order to satisfy the duty to
accommodate. Furthermore, “While safety sensitive and zero-tolerance rules in the
workplace are significant features of a modern workplace, they cannot be advanced to
defeat an accommodation if a tolerable range of risk could be employed that would
permit an employee with a mental health or addiction disability to productively work.”31
Post-discharge evidence of active and successful rehabilitation efforts by terminated
employees with an addiction often persuade labour arbitrators that the employer’s
accommodation duty has not been exhausted to the point of undue hardship and a
productive employment relationship remains possible.32
The accommodation process also requires the participation and cooperation of the
employee seeking accommodation. Given the nature of addiction disability, this involves
positive rehabilitative efforts towards recovery. Although denial is a common feature of
addiction, employees are expected to acknowledge and address the seriousness of their
condition and manage their addiction.33 Where an employee refuses to take responsibility
for his or her actions and is consistently unable to effectively manage their addiction, a
legal decision maker may determine that the employer has fulfilled its duty to
accommodate, under the circumstances.
Courts have acknowledged the complexities underlying addiction disability and the
public perceptions of drug and alcohol addiction. While many disabilities are or appear to
be beyond an individual’s control, drug and alcohol addictions are perceived to contain
an element of control or “a quasi-voluntary aspect.”34 In Canada (Attorney General) v.
PHS Community Services Society, the SCC stated that the ability to make some choices
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Lynk, supra note 22 at 230.
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Ibid at 230-231.
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Ibid at 231.
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Ibid.
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Ibid at 233.
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with respect to substance use does not negate the finding that “addiction is a disease in
which the central feature is impaired control over the use of the addictive substance.”35
Furthermore, the issue of addiction “attracts a variety of social, political, scientific and
moral reactions”36 and is associated with “great social stigma.”37 As a result, “People
with addictions may face unique experiences of marginalization and disadvantage. These
may be due to extreme stigma, lack of societal understanding, stereotyping and
criminalization of their addictions.”38
Although drug and alcohol addictions are legally recognized as disabilities, these
illnesses continue to be viewed differently from other medical conditions.
Marginalization, stigmatization and misunderstanding are the unfortunate realities of
many individuals struggling with addiction. Nevertheless, the negative stereotyping of
addiction disability has no place in legal decision-making. It is crucial that these negative,
external factors do not influence the judicial treatment of addiction disability in
workplace accommodation cases.

3.3 Models of Disability
Drug and alcohol addiction are legally recognized as a form of disability, but what is a
disability and what are the implications of having a disability? Disability has been
defined in various ways; accordingly, different conceptual models of disability have
developed over time. This thesis concentrates on three leading formulations of disability:
the biomedical model, economic model and sociopolitical model. The biomedical and
economic models characterize disability as an individual pathology, whereas the
sociopolitical model views disability as a social pathology.39 Both the biomedical and
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2011 SCC 44 at para 101 [PHS].
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Tranchemontagne, supra note 13 at para 126.

38

Ontario Human Rights Commission, “Recognizing mental health disabilities and addictions” (18 June
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economic models view disability as “individual deformities and limitations, a diminished
deviation from the idealized bodily norm” and are informed by notions of pity, charity
and social segregation.40 While the biomedical model focuses on the individual’s
functional abilities and limitations, the economic model concentrates on their ability to
perform occupational roles and skills.

41

The sociopolitical model, on the other hand,

stresses the importance of the social environment and examines its impact on individuals
with disability.42 Unlike the biomedical and economic approaches, the sociopolitical
model regards disability as a social construct and espouses a human rights approach.43
Models of disability shape and inform public policy, laws and regulations, and vice versa.
These theoretical models influence public attitudes, shape legislation and determine the
services provided to people with disabilities, all of which can create prejudice and
discrimination.44 The biomedical and economic models view disability as the deviation
from a valued norm or standard and consider disability to be undesirable and focus on
minimizing its prevalence and effects. The adoption of these models gives rise to further
prejudice, discrimination, marginalization and reduced opportunity for people with
disabilities.45 As public policy fundamentally shapes both the social structure and built
environment, laws and regulations play a fundamental role in determining the skills and
attributes that an individual requires to participate in society.46 The sociopolitical model
illustrates how the social structure and environment precludes certain individuals from
participating in society.
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Admittedly, there is no general social or legal consensus regarding the meaning of
disability and this uncertainty arguably “causes and contributes to the ongoing conflict
around policies, programs, laws, and advocacy that are purported to be based on equality
and human rights.”47 The visible tension in contemporary debates regarding disability
arises from this lack of consensus and the different theories that shape the collective
understanding of disablement.48 These formulations of disability can help explain why
there is a discrepancy in the implementation and provision of rights and equality with
respect to disability and addiction, in particular.

3.3.1 Biomedical Model
For most of the twentieth century, the predominant paradigm for understanding disability
was the biomedical model, which characterizes disability as “an inherent characteristic of
a person arising from an objectively identified impairment of the mind or body.”49
Remnants of this paradigm are still visible today. The biomedical model presumes that
disability is an individual pathology, resulting from biological characteristics,50 and
identifies the individual’s medical condition as the source of their disadvantage.51 Under
this model, disability is defined as a defect, an unfortunate deviation from the norm:
The most commonly held belief about [this model of] disablement is that it
involves a defect, deficiency, dysfunction, abnormality, failing, or medical
“problem” that is located in an individual. We think it is so obvious as to
be beyond serious dispute that disablement is a characteristic of a defective
person, someone who is functionally limited or anatomically abnormal,
diseased, or pathoanatomical, someone who is neither whole nor healthy,
fit nor flourishing, someone who is biologically inferior or subnormal. The
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essence of disablement, in this view, is that there are things wrong with
people with disabilities.52
Clearly, disability is not a neutral category within the biomedical model; it is a politically
loaded term and is essentially “used to identify and stigmatize people and behaviours that
are considered abnormal or morally wrong.”53 Under this model, disability is located
within the individual and great effort is directed at eliminating the defect and disability.54
Accordingly, the individual with a disability constitutes the unit of analysis, for both
research and policy purposes, and the individual’s condition is the primary point of
intervention.55
Under the biomedical model, “normal” is the ideal and diagnostic tools and interventions
seek to cure or minimize the pathology.56 The biomedical model prioritizes the
prevention, cure, containment, amelioration and palliation of disability.57 Medicine and
biotechnology are used to treat disability and biological or genetic intervention and
screening serve as preventative measures.58 Where the elimination or cure of the
disability is not possible, the objective shifts to improving the condition and providing
comfort to the individual with a disability, ultimately accepting disadvantage as an
inevitable outcome for people with disabilities.59 The biomedical model regards disability
and its associated costs as an anomaly and a social burden and suggests that the social
inclusion of people with disabilities is a private responsibility, rather than a public one.60
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The biomedical model does not account for systemic discrimination or the societal
barriers that impact people with disabilities. As a result of the model’s focus on the
“individualization, privatization, and medicalization of disability,” it has remained silent
on the issues of discrimination and social justice61 and “precluded the diagnosis of
architectural or other environmental barriers in the treatment of permanent
impairments.”62 The biomedical model is not an interactional model; under this
paradigm, “the definition, the ‘problem,’ and the treatment of the disability are all
considered to lie within the individual with the disability.”63 It presumes that both the
cause of the disability and responsibility for its solution rest with the individual and,
therefore, “has the authority to relieve society of any responsibility to accord civil rights
to individuals with disabilities.”64 Rather than addressing and changing the social
problems that oppress people with disabilities, the biomedical model seeks to change
these individuals and retain the social structure that enables their oppression.65 The
ultimate goal of the biomedical model is to eliminate or, at the very least, reduce the
prevalence of disability—not cure the disadvantage that people with disabilities
experience.

3.3.2 Economic Model
The economic model of disability essentially “reduces the definition of disability to an
economic dimension”66 and views disability through the narrow lens of economic
participation and productivity. The model frames disability in terms of the interaction
between an individual’s impairment and the supply-side conditions of the labour market
and, accordingly, regards disability as “a limitation to an employee’s repertoire of
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productive capacities, abilities and skills to adapt to mainstream societal structures.”67
Much like the biomedical model, the economic model characterizes disability as an
individual pathology, whereby the ability to work is the desired condition and the
inability to work is considered deviant.68 The economic model presumes that disability
limits the amount or type of work an individual is able to perform and renders an
individual incapable of participating in the labour force and meaningfully contributing to
the economy.69
Under the economic model, people with disabilities are viewed “either as past
contributors to the economic system and thus deserving of assistance or as outside the
economic system and so meriting only charity.”70 Individuals who are unable to work and
require public resources are labeled as burdens to society.71 From this perspective, an
individual’s sense of worth is reduced to their earning capacity. Although different
factors, including the economic climate, may contribute to an individual’s state of
unemployment, the economic paradigm views functional limitations and inadequate work
skills as the primary barriers preventing people with disabilities from engaging in various
types of work.72 The economic model postulates that an individual’s ability to work is
primarily dependent on their functional capacities and neglects to appropriately assess the
prospect of successful workplace accommodation.73 Notions of respect, accommodation
and civil rights are subordinate to an individual’s ability to work and contribute to the
economy.74 The individual with a disability is expected to fulfill the existing occupational
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requirements and minimal consideration is given to the possibility of altering job
expectations and accommodating the needs and skills of the employee with a disability.75
The economic model prioritizes economic efficiency and strives to reduce the costs
associated with unemployment and limited work productivity arising from disability.
Accordingly, reform under this model focuses on rehabilitation and some modest
economic integration.76 The economic model views disability as “a deficit in human
capital that limits labour force participation” and presents strategies for overcoming this
shortcoming through individual enhancements.77 It does not attempt to modify
occupational requirements or the environment to facilitate the participation of individuals
with disabilities in the labour force; rather, the model presumes that, if the individual with
a disability develops vocational skills, they will be able to adapt to the existing
environment and participate in the workforce.78
Furthermore, flowing from the underlying notions of charity and pity, the economic
model leads to welfare programs for people with disabilities that are unable to work and
support themselves. Financial assistance may help improve the circumstances of some
individuals with disabilities but these programs do not change or limit the pre-existing
barriers that such individuals encounter in society and upon entering the workforce nor
do they promote equality and independence. Although the conception of disability
involves an economic component, a purely economic understanding unnecessarily and
inappropriately simplifies disability, to the exclusion of non-monetary considerations.
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3.3.3 Sociopolitical Model
The sociopolitical model of disability emerged in the 1970s and challenged the previous
paradigms that pathologized disability79 by espousing the view that disability is a
difference, not an anomaly, arising from the social environment. The model interprets
variations in human ability as natural, expected events, not as rationales for restricting the
potential of people with disabilities to contribute to society, and examines the broad
systemic factors that prevent these individuals from participating in society as equals.80
Under this model, disability stems, not from the individual’s limitations, but from “the
failure of the social environment to adjust to the needs of people with different
abilities.”81 The model “separate[s] ‘disability’ from ‘impairment,’ defining disability as
the oppression imposed on disabled people as a result of [their] impairments.” 82 The
model contends that:
(1) disability is a social construct, not the inevitable consequence of
impairment, (2) disability is best characterised as a complex
interrelationship between impairment, individual response to impairment,
and the social environment, and (3) the social disadvantage experienced
by disabled people is caused by the physical, institutional and attitudinal
(together, the ‘social’) environment which fails to meet the needs of
people who do not match the social expectation of ‘normalcy.83
The sociopolitical model defines disability as “a form of social injustice attributable to
the stigmatizing attitudes and discriminatory practices in the larger society”84 and
ultimately traces the source of inhospitable environments to negative social attitudes
towards people with disabilities. People with disabilities are “subjected to prejudice and
discrimination on the basis of visible or labeled physical differences” and these social
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attitudes of the non-disabled majority give rise to the various environmental restraints
encountered by people with disabilities. 85
The sociopolitical model criticizes the biomedical and economic models for locating
disability solely within the affected individual and ignoring society’s role in creating
unnecessary barriers for people with disabilities.86 By viewing disability as a product of
the interaction between people and their surroundings, the model shifts the emphasis
away from the individual’s abilities and limitations to the barriers created by the social,
cultural, economic, and political environment.87 The sociopolitical approach regards
disability as a consequence of the existing social structure and suggests that disability can
be remedied by removing the social barriers88 and enhancing the participation of people
with disabilities in the community, including the workforce.89
The SCC has expressly endorsed and adopted the sociopolitical model and this approach
has since formed the foundation of the human rights framework for understanding and
the legal treatment of disability. In Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des
droits de la jeunesse) v. Montréal (City), the SCC acknowledged the importance of “a
multi-dimensional approach that includes a socio-political dimension:”
By placing the emphasis on human dignity, respect, and the right to
equality rather than a simple biomedical condition, this approach
recognizes that the attitudes of society and its members often contribute to
the idea or perception of a “handicap”. In fact, a person may have no
limitations in everyday activities other than those created by prejudice and
stereotypes.90
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The SCC accepts that disability results from the interaction between an individual’s
impairment and the social environment,91 thus adopting the view of disability as a social
construct.
Under the sociopolitical model, disability arises from the various societal barriers that
restrict people with disabilities from participating in economic and social domains. Thus,
the treatment of disability is achieved through the reformulation of economic, social and
political policies as well as increased individual control of services and supports.92 From
this perspective, the elimination of systemic social, economic and physical barriers along
with the recognition and acceptance of disability as an inherent part of society, rather
than an aberration, help facilitate prevention.93 In order to effect change, policies must
target the environment, not just the functional or economic capabilities of people with
disabilities.94 Under the sociopolitical model of disability, the social structure represents
the unit of analysis for research and policy-making and the social, environmental, and
economic structures of society constitute the primary points of intervention.95 The
sociopolitical model regards the social inclusion of people with disabilities as a public
responsibility and, accordingly, directs the community to provide the supports and
assistance required to enable their social, political and economic integration, selfdetermination and legal and social rights.96

3.4 Models of Addiction
The biomedical, economic and sociopolitical models of disability provide a framework
for understanding disability in general but do not account for the distinct features inherent
to drug and alcohol addiction, in particular. Nevertheless, these models have influenced
and formed the foundation for the development of addiction-specific paradigms. The
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moral, medical and biopsychosocial models of addiction build upon the broad conceptual
models of disability to address the unique aspects and complexities of addiction,
including the issues of choice and control.
Theories of addiction have traditionally been divided into the moral model and the
medical model. The moral model, much like the biomedical model of disability, views
addiction as a personal defect.97 From this perspective, addiction is considered to be “a
refusal to abide by some ethical or moral code of conduct” and freely chosen behavior
that is both wrong and irresponsible.98 The moral model of addiction has largely fallen
out of favour amongst healthcare professionals; however, the stigma associated with drug
and alcohol addiction continues to exist. The medical model, on the other hand,
characterizes addiction as a chronic brain disease and acknowledges the influence of
genetic, psychosocial and environmental factors.99 The model “proposes that addictions
are a disease like any other disease and are not a symptom or manifestation of any other
underlying psychological or physical process.”100 The biopsychosocial model of
addiction builds on the medical perspective to create a multidimensional paradigm that
recognizes the biological, psychological and social elements of addiction.
The jurisprudence reflects an oscillation between the moral and medical models of
addiction. Legal decisions in favor of reinstating and accommodating individuals with an
addiction invariably adopt the medical model, not the moral perspective, and view
addiction as a legitimate illness and compulsion. Although the medical model legitimizes
addiction as a disease, it primarily focuses on biological factors and continues to locate
disability within the individual. What appears to be missing from the addiction
jurisprudence is an equivalent of the sociopolitical model of disability that defines
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addiction as a socially constructed disadvantage. The fields of psychology, social work
and counseling have embraced the biopsychosocial model of addiction, which resembles
the sociopolitical model of disability. It neither portrays addiction as a moral failing nor a
purely biological phenomenon, but rather an interaction between the various dimensions
of an individual’s biological, social, psychological, spiritual and cultural environment,101
thereby providing a more comprehensive view of the complex processes underlying
addiction disability.

3.4.1 Moral Model
The moral model of addiction became prevalent in the first half of the twentieth century,
before the proliferation of the scientific developments enabling the neurobiological study
of addiction.102 The moral model views addiction as “a choice characterized by voluntary
behaviour under the control of the addict.”103 The model portrays addiction as a character
defect—a sign of irresponsibility, impulsiveness or` lack of willpower—and not a
disease. This characterization associates addiction with weakness and deviance and
ultimately perpetuates the stigma surrounding the illness. Addiction is seen as a “moral
failure,” for which individuals are held responsible and judged accordingly.104 Although
the medical community has generally abandoned the moral model of addiction, this
perspective, along with its stigmatizing effects, still lingers today.
With the rise of evidence supporting the view that addiction is a chronic brain disease, the
medical model of addiction has largely displaced the use of the moral model within the
scientific community; however, some medical professionals and academics continue to
support the view that addiction is a voluntary choice, rather than a compulsion fueled by
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a disease.105 Under the moral model, individuals with addictions are viewed as “selfish
and hedonistic and personally responsible for creating suffering for themselves and
others” and, thus, deserve the various health, social, employment and legal problems they
encounter.106
The moral model utilizes the notion of volition to distinguish addiction from other
disabilities and medical conditions:
[W]hile symptoms of typical diseases such as Alzheimer’s or cancer are
biologically based and non-voluntary in the sense that they do not develop
as the result of decision-making processes but are beyond the person’s
capacity to volitionally influence, this is not so in the case of the repetitive
drug-oriented behavior of addicts. Although this behavior is the most
prominent symptom of addiction, its development is clearly affected by
decisions made and is volitionally influenced. It is flexible, adaptable, and
involves elements of planning.107
The moral model suggests that the initial choice to consume drugs or alcohol signifies
that the development of an addiction is fundamentally a choice and thus disproves the
notion that addiction is a disease. However, many other chronic illnesses, such as heart
disease and diabetes, also have risk factors, like obesity and diet, that arguably involve
similar decision-making processes. Consequently, the notion of choice and control are
contentious issues that are often raised in addiction disability cases.
Advocates of the moral model argue that the medical model obscures the element of
choice108 and suggests that the categorization of addiction as a brain disease “excuse[s]
personal irresponsibility and criminal acts instead of punishing harmful and often illegal
behaviors.”109 However, the harmful effects and criminality of drug use does not detract
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from the scientific evidence that addiction is a chronic brain disease. By placing so much
emphasis on personal choice, this perspective fails to acknowledge and appreciate the
inherent complexities underlying drug and alcohol addiction and mistakenly simplifies
the notion of addiction. The moral model fails to account for the various genetic,
biological, psychological, sociological and environmental factors that have been linked to
the development of addiction and this omission ultimately detracts from the accuracy and
applicability of the model.
The moral model places the primary focus—and ultimately, blame—on the individual,
rather than external factors that may trigger the development of an addiction. Framing
addiction as a character defect perpetuates the misperceptions and social stigma attached
to this illness. The notion that addiction is a choice and a moral defect continues to
pervade public perceptions of drug and alcohol addiction. These sentiments are even
apparent in legal decisions involving individuals with addiction.110 The stigma associated
with drug and alcohol addiction ultimately perpetuates the gap between neurobiological
facts and findings and public perceptions of addiction:
The most beneficent public view of drug addicts is as victims of their
societal situation. However, the more common view is that drug addicts
are weak or bad people, unwilling to lead moral lives and to control their
behavior and gratifications. To the contrary, addiction is actually a
chronic, relapsing illness, characterized by compulsive drug seeking and
use… The gulf in implications between the ‘bad person’ view and the
‘chronic illness sufferer’ view is tremendous. As just one example, there
are many people who believe that addicted individuals do not even
deserve treatment. This stigma, and the underlying moralistic tone, is a
significant overlay on all decisions that relate to drug use and drug
users.111
The medical model, on the other hand, aims to reduce the stigma attached to drug and
alcohol addiction by redirecting the focus from the individual’s deficiencies to the
neurobiological underpinnings and predispositions of addiction.
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3.4.2 Medical Model
Scientific developments in the latter half of the twentieth century enabled the discovery
and understanding of the neurobiological underpinnings of addiction. As the ability to
examine neurobiological phenomena improved, the medical model “became scientific
orthodoxy,

increasingly

dominating

addiction

research

and

informing

public

understandings of addiction”112 and advancements in neuroscience demonstrated the
need for addiction to be “redefined by what’s going on in the brain.”113 Over the past two
decades, addiction research has increasingly produced evidence supporting the notion
that addiction is a brain disease.114 This finding has laid the foundation for the medical
model of addiction.
The medical model departs from the moral model and defines addiction as a chronic brain
disease, caused by neurobiological changes arising from continuous drug or alcohol
use115 and characterized by compulsive and relapsing substance use “over which the
addict has little or no control.”116 The medical model shifts the attention from the
individual to the neurobiological underpinnings of addiction and “challenges deeply
ingrained values about self-determination and personal responsibility that frame drug use
as a voluntary, hedonistic act.”117

3.4.2.1

Role of the Brain in Addiction

Under the medical model, addiction is characterized as a chronic brain disease. The
Canadian Society of Addiction Medicine, a national organization of medical
professionals and scientists in the field of substance use disorders, defines addiction as:
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A primary, chronic disease, characterized by impaired control over the use
of a psychoactive substance and/or behaviour. Clinically, the
manifestations occur along biological, psychological, sociological and
spiritual dimensions. Common features are change in mood, relief from
negative emotions, provision of pleasure, pre-occupation with the use of
substance(s) or ritualistic behaviour(s); and continued use of the
substance(s) and/or engagement in behaviour(s) despite adverse physical,
psychological and/or social consequences. Like other chronic diseases, it
can be progressive, relapsing and fatal.118
Similarly, the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health—Canada’s largest mental health
and addiction teaching hospital and one of the world’s leading research centres with
respect to addiction and mental health—describes addiction as “a primary, chronic,
neurobiologic disease, with genetic, psychosocial, and environmental factors influencing
its development and manifestations. It is characterized by behaviors that include one or
more of the following: impaired control over drug use, compulsive use, continued use
despite harm, and craving.”119
The medical model emphasizes the relationship between addiction and brain function to
promote the understanding of addiction as a brain disease. The overwhelming evidence
demonstrating the neurobiological changes associated with drug and alcohol addiction
appears to support the medical model.120 Scientific research has uncovered connections
between addiction and the regulatory, reward, motivation, memory and related circuitry
of the brain.121 In particular, addiction has been linked to:
the desensitization of reward circuits, which dampens the ability to feel
pleasure and the motivation to pursue everyday activities; the increasing
strength of conditioned responses and stress reactivity, which results in
increased cravings for alcohol and other drugs and negative emotions
when these cravings are not sated; and the weakening of the brain regions
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involved in executive functions such as decision making, inhibitory
control, and self-regulation that leads to repeated relapse.122
The “altered signaling in prefrontal regulatory circuits, paired with changes in the
circuitry involved in reward and emotional response, creates an imbalance that is crucial
to both the gradual development of compulsive behavior in the addicted disease state and
the associated inability to voluntarily reduce drug-taking behavior, despite the potentially
catastrophic consequences.”123 These changes in brain circuitry may even persist beyond
detoxification and rehabilitation; the prevalence of repeated relapses and continuous
cravings reflect the lasting behavioural effects of these brain changes. 124

3.4.2.2

Symptoms and Diagnostic Criteria

The behavioural symptoms associated with drug and alcohol addiction can be simply
described as craving for the substance, loss of control over the amount or frequency of
use, the compulsion to use and use despite harmful consequences, including physical,
psychological, interpersonal, financial and legal problems.125 The presence of harmful
consequences and the loss of control over one’s drug or alcohol use are telling signs of
problematic substance use.126 The harmful consequences associated with substance use
can range from mild to severe—experiencing a hangover or being late for work the next
day to homelessness and acute disease.127 Addictions are characterized by an inability to
consistently abstain from using the substance and this difficulty may persist in the
recovery process. Like other chronic diseases, drug and alcohol addiction often involves
cycles of relapse and remission.128
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The DSM-5, an “authoritative guide to the diagnosis of mental disorders”129 that is used
by health professionals across the world, provides a framework for diagnosing substancerelated and addictive disorders. The DSM-5 combines the previously separate categories
of substance abuse and substance dependence into a single disorder—substance use
disorder—measured on a continuum ranging from mild to severe.130 The DSM-5 provides
distinct substance use disorder diagnoses based on nine different classes of substances:
alcohol; cannabis; hallucinogens; inhalants; opioids; sedatives, hypnotics, and
anxiolytics; stimulants; tobacco; and other substances.131 The same overarching
diagnostic criteria apply to the various categories of substance use disorder but some
symptoms are less salient for certain classes of substances and withdrawal symptoms are
not specified for hallucinogens or inhalants.132
The DSM-5 groups the symptoms associated with substance use disorder into four
categories: impaired control, social impairment, risky use and pharmacological
indicators, meaning tolerance and withdrawal.133 The DSM-5 defines substance use
disorder as the occurrence of at least two of the following criteria within a 12-month
period:
1. The substance is often taken in larger amounts or over a longer period of time
than intended;
2. There is a persistent desire or unsuccessful effort to decrease or control use of
the substance;
3. A great deal of time is spent on activities to obtain the substance, use the
substance or recover from its effects;
4. Craving or a strong desire or urge to use the substance;
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5. Recurrent use of the substance resulting in a failure to fulfill major obligations
at work, school or home;
6. Continued use of the substance despite experiencing persistent or recurrent
social or interpersonal problems caused or exacerbated by the effects of its use;
7. Discontinuation or reduction of participation in important social, occupational,
or recreational activities because of substance use;
8. Recurrent use of the substance in situations where it is physically hazardous;
9. Continued use of the substance despite the individual knowing that they have a
persistent or recurrent physical or psychological problem that is likely caused
or exacerbated by the substance;
10. Tolerance, characterized by either a need for markedly increased amounts of the
substance to achieve intoxication or the desired effect, or a markedly
diminished effect when continuing to use the same amount of the substance; or
11. Experiencing withdrawal symptoms134 or taking the substance or a similar
substance to relieve or avoid withdrawal.135
The DSM-5 acknowledges that substance use disorders vary in terms of severity.
Substance use disorders are classified as mild, moderate, or severe, depending on the
number of diagnostic criteria met. If an individual meets two or three of the
aforementioned criteria, they are considered to have a mild substance use disorder; a
person who meets four or five of the DSM-5 criteria is considered to have a moderate
substance use disorder and an individual who satisfies six or more criteria has a severe
case of substance use disorder.136
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3.4.2.3

Theorizing Causes of Addiction

The medical model of addiction calls attention to the biological and genetic factors
previously ignored by the moral model, and emphasizes the scientific evidence revealing
significant neurobiological changes in individuals that develop addiction.137 People
generally drink alcohol and use drugs because they “stimulate the brain in ways that ‘feel
good’” and this immediate rewarding experience induces people to continue using the
substance.138 Of course, not everyone who uses drugs or alcohol become addicted.
Approximately 10% of individuals exposed to addictive drugs actually develop severe
symptoms of addiction.139 Although long-term exposure to drugs and alcohol is
necessary for the development of addiction, it is not sufficient in itself. Under the medical
model, addiction is thought to develop in vulnerable individuals when repeated drug or
alcohol use triggers a biological change, related to the impairment of brain reward
circuits and physiological stress responses,140 that results in an overwhelming urge to use
the substance.
Susceptibility to addiction varies between individuals. Many different genetic,
environmental, social and developmental factors contribute to a person’s unique
susceptibility to drug or alcohol use, continuing substance use and experiencing the
progressive changes in the brain that characterize addiction.141 The medical model
particularly focuses on the role of genetics in the development of addiction. The model
acknowledges that some people may inherit a vulnerability to the addictive properties of
alcohol or drugs: “Some individuals have relatively low predisposition to developing
addiction with drug exposure and may use drugs repeatedly in a manner that produces
reward without the development of addiction, whereas others rapidly develop addiction
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following minimal exposure to rewarding drugs.”142 Nevertheless, many individuals who
possess a genetic vulnerability do not actually develop an addiction.143 Other factors have
been found to increase an individual’s vulnerability to addiction, including family history
of addiction, early exposure to drug use, socially stressful environments with limited
available support and certain mental illnesses, such as mood disorders, psychoses and
anxiety disorders.144
Although biology and genetic predispositions play an important role in the development
of addiction, the presence of these factors is not determinative:
Like many other chronic conditions, such as diabetes, cardiovascular
disease, and asthma, addiction is a multidimensional disease. Although a
neurobiological predisposition is thought to be important to the evolution
of addiction, psychological and social factors are also important,
particularly as they shape patterns of risky drug use in vulnerable
individuals and sustain drug use over time. In addition, many studies
suggest that stress may be a critical element in the development of
addiction in some settings. Psychosocial factors are also important
influences on recovery from addiction.145
Drug and alcohol addictions have a biological component but it is clear that various
factors underlie its development and manifestation.

3.4.2.4

Notion of Personal Choice and Control in Addiction

In the early nineteenth century, loss of control came to be recognized as the defining
feature of the addiction.146 Neuroscientific research has indicated that people with
addictions lack decision-making capacity.147 Accordingly, the issue of control and the
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capacity to make decisions still remains a part of the discussion surrounding addiction.
This is especially evident in workplace accommodation cases involving addiction
disability. Dr. Raju Hajela, an addiction medicine specialist and former president of the
Canadian Society of Addiction Medicine, has stated that, “the disease creates distortions
in thinking, feelings and perceptions, which drive people to behave in ways that are not
understandable to others around them. Simply put, addiction is not a choice. Addictive
behaviors are a manifestation of the disease, not a cause.”148 Thus, the argument that
individuals struggling with drug and alcohol addiction are in full control of their
substance use is contrary to the very essence of an addiction.
In light of the medical model, “Describing addiction as a reflection of moral character
and choice takes us back to an earlier, more ignorant time. Science now shows that
addiction, including alcoholism, is not a simple phenomenon.”149 Granted, the
development of an addiction requires the initial decision to consume drugs or alcohol;
however, this is not a feature unique to addiction. The risk factors associated with many
different chronic diseases involve behavioural choices. Only a fraction of individuals who
drink alcohol or use drugs actually become addicted. Similarly, not everyone who is
overweight, a known risk factor for various health conditions, develops diabetes or heart
disease, for example. The development of a drug or alcohol addiction stems from
multiple causes, such as an individual’s particular tolerance to drugs and alcohol, brain
inhibitory circuits and genetic predispositions, rather than character flaws.150 In this
sense, as articulated by Dr. Richard Soper, former director of the American Society of
Addiction Medicine, “Addiction is a disease, just like asthma, diabetes and heart
disease”151 and should be treated as such. Furthermore, “No one plans to become
addicted. People may think that they can handle their substance use and that they only use
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when they want to. But when they want to change the way they use, they may find it’s
not that simple.”152 Diseases, including addiction, arise from the presence and interaction
of various risk factors and predispositions, some of which may be completely out of the
person’s control.
Many of the central features of addiction undermine the notion that an individual assumes
control over their addiction and freely makes choices regarding behaviour associated with
their addiction. Current addiction science indicates that it is not always possible for
people struggling with addiction to simply “make better choices” with respect to their
substance use.153 As illustrated above, several of the DSM-5 criteria for substance use
disorder reflect a lack of control or, at the very least, impaired control over substance use.
The first DSM-5 criterion provides that the individual “may take the substance in larger
amounts or over a longer period than was originally intended” and the second criterion
indicates that they may experience “multiple unsuccessful efforts to decrease or
discontinue use,”154 thus demonstrating an inability to effectively control or limit their
use. Furthermore, the ninth DSM-5 criterion provides that individuals with addictions
may continue to use the substance, despite acknowledging that they have a physical or
psychological problem likely caused or exacerbated by their substance use. Some
individuals are aware that their substance use has become problematic, but still continue
to use despite wanting to stop, while others may not even recognize that their substance
use is out of control and causing problems. This denial, which is also a common feature
of addiction, “may simply be a lack of awareness or insight into the situation.”155
Regardless of whether or not the individual recognizes that they have a problem, the
inability to control or limit their substance use is a sign of addiction.156
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A person without substance use issues would likely find it quite easy to go a day without
drinking alcohol or using drugs. However, this feat can be extremely difficult for
individuals struggling with drug and alcohol addiction. The Centre for Addiction and
Mental Health notes that the immediate positive effects of consuming drugs and alcohol
can make it difficult for a person to limit their substance use.157 People may rely on the
effects of drugs or alcohol to provide some semblance of short-term relief from difficult
and stressful life events or painful emotions. After using the substance, the person may
temporarily feel better, have more confidence and forget about his or her problems,
whereas the negative consequences associated with the substance may not be obvious or
acknowledged for an extended period of time.158 When people use alcohol or drugs to
change or escape the way they feel, the substance use can become a habitual coping
mechanism that is difficult to break.159 Individuals with an addiction may come to
genuinely “believe that they cannot function or make it through the day without
drugs.”160 A person who develops physical dependence may also experience distressing
symptoms of withdrawal upon attempts to stop using the substance. Continued substance
use, especially heavy use, can also give rise to neurobiological and physiological changes
that further perpetuate the addictive behaviors. These changes to the brain may be lasting
and explain why people continue to crave drugs and alcohol long after they have stopped
using the substance and commonly experience relapses.161

3.4.3 Biopsychosocial Model
Canadian jurisprudence on the duty to accommodate employees with addictions appears
to either reflect the moralistic perspective or, at best, the medical, brain disease model of
addiction. Although the medical model has provided a greater understanding of the
biological and genetic underpinnings of addiction and “legitimizes addiction as a medical
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condition,” it has been critiqued for promoting neuro-essentialist thinking as well as
categorical notions of responsibility and free choice and undermining the complexity of
addiction.162 By concentrating on the neurobiological features and processes that are
inherently located within the individual, the medical model primarily places the focus
within the person with an addiction, as opposed to external factors. Reductive,
neurobiological explanations of addiction preclude a comprehensive understanding of the
additional influence of psychological, social, cultural and other factors and the various
complex processes underlying the development of addiction.163 It also “implies simplistic
categorical ideas of responsibility, namely that addicted individuals are unable to exercise
any degree of control over their substance use.”164
As illustrated by the sociopolitical model of disability, social factors play an important
role in the development and manifestation of disability. However, these factors are not
thoroughly considered under the moral and medical models of addiction. Although the
SCC has endorsed the sociopolitical model of disability, the jurisprudence reveals that
legal decision makers have not adopted this approach, which lays the very foundation of
the human rights framework, to addiction disability cases. The biopsychosocial model, a
sociopolitical-like model specific to addiction, has already been adopted and supported in
the fields of psychology, social work and counseling165 and could be implemented to
remedy this apparent gap in Canadian human rights law.

3.4.3.1

Complex Interaction of Multiple Factors

The biopsychosocial model recognizes the deficiencies in the moral and medical models
of addiction and acknowledges that, “the etiology of addiction is complex, variable, and
multifactorial” and involves the interaction between various genetic, biological,
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psychological, sociocultural and environmental factors.166 The biopsychosocial model of
addiction looks beyond neurobiology and “places the individual in his or her social
environment and integrates his or her life narrative.”167 Adopting “a holistic, systems
approach,” the model identifies the influence and dynamic interaction of the various
dimensions of the individual’s biological, social, psychological, spiritual and cultural
environment and appreciates that the particular combinations, interactions and influence
of each factor will be different for each individual.168 The biopsychosocial model
acknowledges the complexities underlying the development of addiction and postulates
that addiction is caused by a combination of these various factors. No single factor causes
addiction. By recognizing and emphasizing the influence of these once ignored external
factors, the biopsychosocial model provides an alternative to “a forced choice between
brain disease and condition of a weak will.”169
Although the biopsychosocial model asserts that addiction is not a purely neurobiological
phenomenon, it does not deny the influence of biological and genetic characteristics and
processes. The model acknowledges that some individuals may be genetically or
biologically predisposed to developing an addiction. Such a predisposition can arise from
a combination of genes, changes in brain chemistry or a deficiency in the ability to
metabolize alcohol or drugs.170 Nevertheless, the presence of a biological predisposition
is not determinative. In fact, the National Institute on Drug Abuse estimates that genetics
account for approximately 30% of the cause of an individual’s addiction, while
environmental factors account for the remaining 70%.171 An individual’s biological
predisposition can either be triggered or offset by an accumulation of these other factors,
such as psychological stressors, positive support systems and role models. Thus, it is
important to acknowledge and examine the influence of non-biological factors.

166

Ibid.

167

Buchman, supra note 147 at 40.

168

Bethea, supra note 101 at 129.

169

Buchman, supra note 147 at 40.

170

Borsos, supra note 100 at 12.

171

Ibid.

78

Research suggests that an individual’s social environment and certain personality traits or
psychological characteristics may predispose or contribute to the development of an
addiction. Although it is difficult to determine causation—and particularly, whether the
personality trait preceded the addiction or the addiction led to the personality trait—some
characteristics are often shared by individuals with addictions, such as anxiety,
depression, impulsivity, low self-esteem, a low tolerance for frustration or stress, poor
coping skills and poor interpersonal relationship skills.172 Similarly, an individual’s
sociocultural environment and relationships play a role in their susceptibility to
developing an addiction: “Social norms regulate behaviour and may act as informal
mechanisms of social control. Social groups construct norms that affect individual
behaviour, prevalence, and substance use patterns. Group membership in which
substance use is socially acceptable, encouraged, or perhaps coerced is significantly
associated with patterns of use.”173 Family, peer and community values and attitudes
toward prosocial activities and alcohol and drug use interact with family, peer and
community supports and social stressors, such as poverty, family conflict, peer pressure
and lack of emotional support.174 The biopsychosocial model acknowledges that an
individual’s predisposition and development of an addiction depends on the interaction of
various dynamic factors.

3.4.3.2

Social Construction

The emphasis traditionally placed on the biological characteristics of an individual fails
to acknowledge the role of various social, cultural and political factors involved in the
development of addiction. Much like the sociopolitical model of disability, the
biopsychosocial model attempts to remedy this gap and emphasizes the social
components underlying addiction. The biopsychosocial model endorses the examination
of “society’s role as an antecedent to addiction” and the development of subsequent
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problems.175 Although addiction involves biological components and processes, it is
important to recognize that the identification and meaning of addiction disability are
ultimately “framed by changing social, cultural and political values.”176 Ideas commonly
held with respect to mental illnesses are “cultural artifacts”—the products of the social
construction of the particular era—that “shape and mold the community’s generalized
reality orientation in subtle and unseen ways” and, thus, “reinforce and reproduce the
constellations of power, wealth, and influence within their respective societies.”177
Accordingly, addiction disability and the lived experience of individuals with addictions
must be examined in light of the social context and climate.
Drug and alcohol addictions undoubtedly pose very real limitations and can severely
impair an individual’s ability to function and perform day-to-day activities, such as going
to work. Drug and alcohol addiction generally requires medical intervention, workplace
accommodation as well as personal efforts to achieve and maintain sobriety. Individuals
with addictions are also expected to manage their disability and cooperate with prescribed
treatment in order to retain their job. In addition to these challenges, individuals
struggling with addiction also encounter the negative perceptions, stereotypes and stigma
pervasively associated with drug and alcohol addiction. The social perceptions of drug
and alcohol addiction shape and influence the experience of people with addictions and
can pose a barrier to their meaningful participation in society, including employment. In
this sense, addiction and some of the limitations experienced by individuals with
addictions are socially constructed.
Despite the recent focus on mental health initiatives and the resulting increased
awareness and acceptance of mental illness, addiction continues to be stigmatized and
misunderstood by society. Moralistic sentiments remain deeply embedded in the social
dialogue surrounding addiction disability. Addiction remains a stigmatizing label and
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“the loss of control attributed to the state of addiction is considered deviant behaviour
outside societal norms.”178 Individuals struggling with addiction disability may be
viewed as morally defective or weak, irresponsible, deviant, dishonest and untrustworthy.
These misconceptions fuel the stigma and negative stereotypes attached to addiction and
result in discrimination against individuals with addictions and, consequently, barriers to
their social inclusion. For instance, the termination of an employee upon the discovery of
their addiction or the employer’s resistance to accommodate an employee in recovery is a
result of discrimination, fueled by the negative stereotypes and misconceptions about
addiction. These socially constructed notions obstruct opportunities to participate in
society, including acquiring and maintaining employment. The imposition of an
ostracizing societal attitude toward addiction heightens the adversity and challenges
experienced by such individuals.179

3.4.3.3

Notion of Personal Choice and Control in Addiction

One of the primary critiques of the medical model of addiction is its all-or-nothing
approach to characterizing an individual’s ability to control their addictive behaviours.
Although the impairment of decision-making capabilities is an important feature of
addiction, the medical model’s emphasis on total lack of control is inappropriate and
inaccurate, as it appears to view control as binary and static. Control should be
conceptualized on a spectrum; an individual’s ability to exercise self-control can change
day to day and may even increase and decrease throughout the day. The ability to abstain
or limit use in certain instances does not eliminate the existence of the addiction disability
or its role in the adverse impact experienced by the individual, and should not be relied
upon to negate human rights protections. The subsequent chapters demonstrate how this
flawed, all-or-nothing approach to understanding personal choice and control has been
adopted by legal decision makers in addiction disability cases to dismiss the
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discrimination and accommodation claims of individuals who appear to display some
restraint with respect to their addictive behaviours.
The medical model’s reliance on neurobiological factors does not fully resolve the
dispute regarding the volitional nature of addiction. The biopsychosocial model provides
a more nuanced approach and strives to “contextualize the individual” in order to provide
a better understanding of responsibility and control within the particular context of
addiction.180 The model recognizes the various complex processes underlying decisionmaking and “does not portray people as only controlled by the state of their brains.” 181
Under this perspective, an individual’s “[a]ddictive behaviours are neither viewed as
controlled or uncontrolled but as difficult to control a matter of degree.” 182 The
biopsychosocial model acknowledges that, “While making a decision is itself a mental
act, a mental act or event does not cause behaviour alone, but is one part of the complex
process between neuronal firing and action.”

183

The intention to use drugs or alcohol

does not in itself cause the individual to use the substance. Other factors are necessarily
involved: “Action, subjective experience of action, and consequently responsibility for
action is mediated by many factors, including psychological phenomenon such as an
individual’s emotional processes.”184
While the biopsychosocial model acknowledges the issues of control and decisionmaking concerning addictive behaviors, it challenges the view that people struggling with
addiction are completely enslaved by their brain, rendering them incapable of controlling
their actions at all times. Buchman, et al. describe the various processes underlying
decision-making in the context of addiction:
The brain responds to particular social cues that may provide instant
pleasure, or regulate biological homeostasis, such as relief from
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withdrawal (Li and Sinha 2008). Brain systems that moderate feeling,
memory, cognition, and engage the individual with the world influence the
decision to consume or not consume a drug, or participate in a specific
behaviour or series of actions. Accordingly, this cybernetic brainenvironment interaction may trigger strong somatic signals such as desire,
urge and anticipation (Verdejo-Garcia and Bechara 2009). In effect, this
process may limit autonomy as it allows for “preference reversals” (Levy
2007a) to occur in situations where an individual would rather not use.
The degrees in which self-control is exerted, free choice is realized and
desired outcomes achieved are dependent on these complex interacting
biopsychosocial systems... Accordingly, the matrix of a person’s sociohistorical context, life narrative, genetics, and relationships with others
influence intention, decision, and action, and thus shape the brain.
Autonomy, therefore, is not adequately defined just by the events in the
brain or the “quality” of the decision being made. As Gillett (2009)
remarks, “a decision is...not a circumscribed event in neuro-time that
could be thought of as an output, and an intention is not a causal event
preceding that output, but both are much more holistically interwoven
with the lived and experienced fabric of one’s life” (p. 333).185
A complex combination of various biological, psychosocial and systemic factors,
including brain processes, somatic mechanisms along with the ethical rules and norms
that govern society, and the nature of this interaction guide an individual’s behavior and
may, accordingly, explain why it is so difficult for some individuals to refuse drugs and
alcohol in the face of increasingly negative consequences.186
The biopsychosocial model contextualizes the responsibility placed on individuals with
addictions and recognizes society’s role in facilitating substance use issues.187 From the
biopsychosocial perspective, the issue of control is contextual, and not categorical. Given
the spectrum of substance use problems, it is appropriate to also characterize an
individual’s related decision-making capacity along a spectrum. Therefore, an
individual’s decision-making capacity is neither completely present nor completely
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absent, but rather, may be impaired in certain contexts and to varying degrees.188 The
addiction does not render a person completely incapable of making decisions at all times.
However, a person’s ability to exercise some self-control in some circumstances does not
necessarily render the person “in control” of their addictive behaviours or diminish the
legitimacy of their addiction.

3.5 Treatment and Recovery
The workplace accommodation process is inescapably intertwined with the employee’s
rehabilitative efforts and prognosis. Many accommodation cases centre on whether the
individual has complied with prescribed treatment and the prognosis of their recovery.
Thus, it is important to touch on addiction treatment, the prevalence of relapses and the
general prognosis of the disease.
Drug and alcohol addiction can be successfully treated and managed, just like other
chronic diseases.189 Rehabilitative interventions can help people stop using drugs and
alcohol and resume productive lives. Effective treatment “enables people to counteract
addiction’s powerful disruptive effects on their brain and behavior and regain control of
their lives.”190 Studies show that the brain can recover, at least partially, after prolonged
abstinence.191 The medical model of addiction has cultivated the development of
behavioural interventions targeting the restoration of brain circuitry impacted by
addiction, such as strategies to strengthen the salience of healthy rewards and mitigate
stress reactivity.192
Research indicates that combining treatment medications, where applicable, with
behavioural therapy is generally the most effective way to ensure successful
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rehabilitation.193 Medications, such as methadone, buprenorphine and naltrexone, are
available for the treatment of opioid drug and alcohol addiction; these medications aid the
recovery process by reducing withdrawal symptoms and cravings. 194 Behavioural
treatments, such as cognitive behavioural therapy, “help engage people in drug abuse
treatment, provide incentives for them to remain abstinent, modify their attitudes and
behaviors related to drug abuse, and increase their life skills to handle stressful
circumstances and environmental cues that may trigger intense craving for drugs and
prompt another cycle of compulsive abuse.”195 Of course, there is no one ideal approach
to treating addiction. Treatment plans must be tailored to the particular individual’s needs
and circumstances, including the severity of the addiction, their motivation to change and
the availability of support from family and friends.196
Addiction treatment services vary in terms of length and intensity. Some are communitybased and others are residential. The various treatment options include withdrawal
management, counselling, day or residential treatment, recovery homes, support groups,
like Alcoholics Anonymous, and aftercare, which aims to help people who have already
completed a treatment program to return to the community and avoid relapse.197 The
Centre for Addiction and Mental Health acknowledges the value of the different
approaches and notes their distinctions:
While all types of treatment services can be effective, a person’s specific
circumstances influence which approach makes the most sense. People
using community treatment services live at home and come to an agency
for services. In general, community services are more willing to work with
people who continue to use substances while they are in treatment. In
contrast, people in residential programs live at a treatment facility for a set
period. These programs typically require abstinence from all
nonprescribed substances during people’s stay. Treatment approaches and
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philosophies about addiction do vary within different services and
agencies.198
Therefore, although the fundamental goals underpinning addiction treatment services are
similar, each person’s road to recovery will inevitably be different.
Due to the chronic nature of addiction, relapses are very common in the recovery process.
However, relapses do not necessarily mean that treatment has failed. The treatment of
chronic illnesses often involves changing deeply embedded behaviours. For a person
recovering from drug or alcohol addiction, returning to substance use does not
necessarily indicate failed rehabilitation, but rather, suggests that their treatment must be
reinstated or adjusted.199 Relapses are not unique to drug and alcohol addiction. As a
matter of fact, the relapse rates for addiction are similar to relapse rates for other chronic
illnesses, such as diabetes, hypertension and asthma, which, much like addiction, also
have physiological and behavioural components.200 According to an American study,
approximately 40% to 60% of people treated for alcohol or drug addiction return to
substance use within one year of their discharge from treatment.201 Comparably,
approximately 30% to 50% of adult patients with type 1 diabetes and 50% to 70% of
adult patients with hypertension or asthma experience the recurrence of symptoms that
require additional medical care in order to reestablish remission.202 The similar
recurrence rates across these various chronic illnesses illustrate that relapse is a common
feature of many different medical conditions and suggests that drug and alcohol addiction
should be treated like any other chronic illness.203
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3.6 Conclusion
This chapter has outlined the common manifestations of drug and alcohol addiction and
the various conceptualizations of addiction disability, through the lens of the biomedical,
economic and sociopolitical models of disability and the moral, medical and
biopsychosocial models of addiction. These models advance distinct notions of drug and
alcohol addiction and perceptions of those who struggle with substance use issues. The
moral model is seriously problematic, as it portrays addiction as a moral defect and a
voluntary choice, perpetuating the negative public perceptions and stigma associated with
addiction disability. Although the medical model recognizes important biological factors,
it is one-dimensional and depicts addiction as a biological abnormality within the
individual. The biopsychosocial model provides the most suitable and complete
representation of addiction disability. It neither portrays addiction as a moral flaw nor a
purely biological condition, but rather an interaction between the various dimensions of
an individual’s biological, social, psychological, spiritual and cultural environment. The
biopsychosocial perspective acknowledges the complex processes underlying addiction
disability and offers a more comprehensive view of the disability than the other two
models.
It is clear that drug and alcohol addiction can severely impair an individual’s ability to
participate in society, particularly maintaining productive employment. Accordingly, an
employee with an addiction will likely require workplace accommodation during as well
as after rehabilitation. However, in many cases, the employer fails to fulfill its duty to
accommodate to the point of undue hardship. The following three chapters illustrate how
the issues of choice, control, denial and relapse are commonly raised in addiction
disability cases and add a layer of complexity to the discrimination and accommodation
analyses. The subsequent chapters examine whether these fundamental laws and human
rights principles are consistently applied in the addiction disability context.
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Chapter 4

4

Pre-Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp. Jurisprudence

In Canadian labour law, there have been three competing schools of thought on how to
approach workplace misconduct arising from addiction: the disciplinary approach, the
human rights approach and the hybrid disciplinary approach. The traditional disciplinary
approach—rooted in the long-standing arbitral approach to culpable misconduct—
determines whether the employer had just cause to discipline or terminate the employee
and whether the disciplinary action was excessive, in the circumstances. Under this
approach, the arbitrator acknowledges the applicability of the duty to accommodate but
generally regards it as a mitigating factor, once the grievor’s culpability has already been
determined.1 The employee’s addiction disability is merely considered a mitigating factor
in determining the appropriate discipline, and not a trigger for the application of the
discrimination analysis and the employer’s duty to accommodate. The human rights
approach, on the other hand, originated from human rights legislation and the subsequent
statutory grant of power, incorporated in labour relations legislation, enabling arbitrators
to interpret and apply human rights statutes.2 The arbitrator seeks to determine whether
the employee’s misconduct is connected to their underlying addiction disability and, if a
compelling connection can be established, the analysis focuses on whether the employer
fulfilled its duty to accommodate to the point of undue hardship—not the employee’s
culpability. The hybrid disciplinary approach—evidenced in British Columbia (Public
Service Agency) v. British Columbia Government and Service Employees’ Union,3 which
is discussed in this chapter—developed as a middle ground between the disciplinary and
human rights approaches and integrates the traditional disciplinary analysis with
accommodation principles. Under the hybrid analysis, the legal decision maker applies a
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disciplinary or just cause analysis to the voluntary, culpable aspects of the employee’s
misconduct and a human rights analysis to the involuntary, non-culpable components
causally connected to the disability.4
This chapter examines eight cases from 2008 to 2016, prior to the release of the Supreme
Court of Canada’s (SCC) decision in Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp.:5 British Columbia
(Public Service Agency) v. British Columbia Government and Service Employees Union,
New Flyer Industries Ltd. v. National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and
General Workers Union of Canada, Local 3003,6 Wright v. College and Association of
Registered Nurses of Alberta (Appeals Committee),7 Seaspan ULC v. International
Longshore & Warehouse Union, Local 400,8 Canadian National Railway v. Teamsters
Canada Rail Conference,9 Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Saskatchewan Gaming
Corp.,10 Ontario Nurses’ Association v. Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre11 and
McNulty v. Canada Revenue Agency.12 This is clearly not an exhaustive list of all the
addiction cases during this time period; however, these decisions are representative of the
Canadian case law on addiction at that time. These eight cases across Canada illustrate
the divergent approaches commonly applied to addiction cases by legal decision makers,
ranging from the broad, liberal human rights approach, reflecting an understanding and
appreciation of the features and challenges of addiction disability, and the narrow,
stringent approach, concerned with choice, control and causal connections.
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In each of the eight cases, the employer—or in the case of Wright, the professional
regulatory body—contended that it had not disciplined the employee for their addiction,
but rather the employee’s misconduct, which resulted from their addiction—be it
excessive absenteeism, theft or impairment at work. Of course, the presence of an
addiction does not fully shield an employee from discipline for serious misconduct; there
must be a connection between the addiction and prohibited behaviour. The existence and
strength of such a connection is a point of contention in many addiction cases.
The first three cases examined in this chapter—Gooding, New Flyer and Wright—were
released prior to the establishment of the Moore test;13 however, a similar approach to
prima facie discrimination existed at the time.14 In all eight cases, the first two
requirements of the prima facie discrimination analysis were not challenged: the
employee had a drug or alcohol addiction, constituting a disability under the relevant
human rights legislation, and the employee experienced an adverse impact in the form of
disciplinary action. The point of contention comes down to the third element of prima
facie discrimination: establishing a connection between the employee’s addiction and the
adverse impact. Similarly, where the legal decision maker finds prima facie
discrimination, the first two elements of the Meiorin test15 are conceded and the analysis
subsequently centers on the third step of the test: demonstrating the policy or standard is
reasonably necessary to accomplish its legitimate work-related purpose.
The SCC developed the Moore and Meiorin tests to standardize the approach for
analyzing instances of discrimination and the duty to accommodate to the point of undue
hardship. Although the Moore and Meiorin tests should be applied equally and uniformly
to all cases of discrimination and accommodation, the following cases demonstrate the
different approaches applied by Canadian arbitrators, courts and tribunals to addiction
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disability. The jurisprudence reveals that these legal tests have at times been
misinterpreted and misapplied in the context of addiction.
Prior to examining the eight addiction disability cases, this chapter briefly summarizes
the legal concept of standard of review, which is the level of deference given by a court
when reviewing the decision of a lower court, tribunal or arbitration decision. The laws
and principles concerning standard of review are pertinent to the appealed decisions
discussed in this chapter as well as Chapters 5 and 6.

4.1 Standard of Review
In Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, the SCC affirmed the two standards of review: the
standards of correctness and reasonableness.16 Until very recently, determining the
appropriate standard of review depended on various factors, including (1) the presence or
absence of a privative clause, typically in the enabling statute of an administrative
tribunal, stating that its decisions are final and not subject to review, indicating the need
for deference; (2) the purpose of the tribunal as determined by its enabling statute; (3) the
nature of the issue under consideration, and; (4) the expertise of the decision maker.17 In
its December 2019 Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov
decision, the SCC affirmed that the standard of review analysis begins with the
presumption that the standard of reasonableness applies in all cases. 18 However, this
presumption can be rebutted where the legislation indicates that a different standard is to
apply or where the rule of law requires the standard of correctness to apply—namely, in
cases that raise constitutional questions, general questions of law of central importance to
the legal system as a whole and questions related to the jurisdictional boundaries between
administrative bodies.19
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4.1.1 Reasonableness Standard
The reasonableness standard is concerned with the presence of justification, transparency
and intelligibility within the decision-making process and “whether the decision falls
within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the
facts and law.”20 Reasonableness is a deferential standard of review that recognizes that
certain questions and issues “do not lend themselves to one specific, particular result.”21
Under the reasonableness standard, reviewing courts are to give due consideration to the
original decision makers’ determinations.22 The policy of deference espoused by the
reasonableness standard “recognizes the reality that, in many instances, those working
day to day in the implementation of frequently complex administrative schemes have or
will develop a considerable degree of expertise or field sensitivity to the imperatives and
nuances of the legislative regime” that the reviewing courts simply do not possess.23
Prior to the presumption of the application of reasonableness standard, prescribed in
Vavilov, the standard of review analysis involved the examination of various factors. The
reasonableness standard typically applied to questions of fact, discretion and policy as
well as questions of mixed fact and law, where the legal issues cannot be readily isolated
from the factual issues.24 Although questions of law generally attract the correctness
standard, issues of general law within the original decision maker’s area of expertise fell
under the standard of reasonableness.25 The presence of a privative clause in an
administrative tribunal’s enabling statute, a provision that eliminates or restricts the scope
of judicial review, also suggested the need to apply deference.26
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In Vavilov, the SCC addressed two fundamental flaws that make a decision unreasonable:
internally incoherent reasoning and not being justified in light of the relevant legal and
factual constraints.27 In order to be reasonable, a decision must be based on rational and
logical reasoning.28 A decision is “unreasonable if the reasons for it, read holistically, fail
to reveal a rational chain of analysis or if they reveal that the decision was based on an
irrational chain of analysis.”29 The use of logical fallacies, such as circular reasoning,
false dilemmas, unfounded generalizations or an absurd premise, may also call into
question the internal rationality of a decision.30 Ultimately, the reviewing court must be
satisfied that the reasoning “adds up.”31 Furthermore, a reasonable decision must be
justified with respect to the legal and factual constraints relevant to the decision.32 The
SCC listed a number of factors that are generally relevant in evaluating the
reasonableness of a decision: the governing statutory scheme, other relevant statutory or
common law, the principles of statutory interpretation, the evidence before the decision
maker and facts the decision maker may consider, the submissions of the parties, the past
practices and decisions of the administrative body and the potential impact of the
decision on the individual to whom it applies.33

4.1.2 Correctness Standard
The correctness standard, on the other hand, does not require the reviewing court to apply
deference to the decision maker’s determinations and reasoning process. Rather, a
reviewing court will undertake its own legal analysis of the issue and determine whether
the original decision was correct.34 If the reviewing court disagrees with the decision, it
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will substitute the previous determination with its own opinion of the correct answer to
the question.35
The standard of correctness typically applies to questions of law. A question of general
law “that is both of central importance to the legal system as a whole and outside the
adjudicator’s specialized area of expertise” attracts the correctness standard; given “their
impact on the administration of justice as a whole, such questions require uniform and
consistent answers.”36 Accordingly, constitutional issues and questions directly related to
the administrative bodies’ jurisdiction and the scope of its powers are held to the standard
of correctness.37

4.2 British Columbia (Public Service Agency) v. British
Columbia Government and Service Employees’ Union
This case concerned the termination of Brian Gooding, a long-time manager of a rural
provincial liquor store, who began stealing alcohol from the store upon developing an
addiction to alcohol. He stole alcohol several times a week for approximately one year
and, when the employer confronted Gooding about the thefts, he admitted to stealing
alcohol from work and advised the employer that he struggled with an alcohol addiction.
In response, the employer informed Gooding of the Employee Assistance Program. He
subsequently entered into a rehabilitation program and remained abstinent. The employer
terminated Gooding for “wilfully” committing the thefts and fundamentally breaching the
employer’s trust.38 The union grieved his termination.
Gooding’s termination was originally upheld at arbitration. The arbitrator accepted the
expert evidence indicating that individuals struggling with addiction act involuntarily in
the theft of their substance of choice but Gooding ultimately knew it was wrong to steal
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from his employer.39 Accordingly, the arbitrator found Gooding’s behavior to be culpable
and applied the traditional disciplinary approach to the case, as opposed to the human
rights approach. The arbitrator considered Gooding’s alcohol addiction to be a mitigating
factor but concluded that the addiction did not overcome the seriousness of the
misconduct and upheld his termination.40 The union sought a judicial review of this
decision.
The British Columbia Labour Relations Board overturned the arbitration award and
remitted the case back to the arbitrator, directing him to apply the new hybrid legal
analysis, developed in the 2002 Fraser Lake Sawmills Ltd. v. IWA-Canada, Local 1-424
decision,41 for addressing the culpable and non-culpable elements of addiction-related
misconduct.42 This analysis required the arbitrator to apply a disciplinary, or just cause
analysis, to the culpable aspects of the misconduct and a human rights analysis to the
non-culpable aspects.43 Applying the hybrid approach, the arbitrator found a connection
between Gooding’s addiction and the thefts and determined that the employer had not
fulfilled its duty to accommodate.44 Accordingly, the arbitrator ordered the employer to
reinstate Gooding to a non-supervisory position. The employer appealed the decision to
the British Columbia Court of Appeal (BCCA).
On appeal, the employer argued that the arbitrator erred in finding prima facie
discrimination, asserting that:
[H]uman rights law should not allow an employee to rely on his addiction
as a legal defence to termination and as a shield to any form of discipline,
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simply because there is some connection between the misconduct and the
disability. The employer would limit the protection offered by
discrimination laws to addicted employees who engage in misconduct to
cases where the discipline imposed was based on stereotypical or
prejudicial beliefs, or cases where the addiction rendered the employee
entirely unable to control his or her own behaviour.45
However, requiring an individual to be entirely unable to control his or her behavior
would set an extremely high bar and effectively limit human rights protections to only
those with the most severe cases of addiction. The union argued that the employer’s
restrictive definition of prima facie discrimination did not account for instances of
indirect discrimination, which must be considered.46 Furthermore, the employer claimed
that the arbitrator erred in his assessment of the duty to accommodate by not giving
weight to “the irreparable breach of the employment relationship constituted by Mr.
Gooding’s theft,” and that requiring the employer to maintain the employment
relationship would amount to undue hardship.47
On behalf of the BCCA majority, Justice Huddart, with Justice Tysoe concurring, held
that the Human Rights Code48 did not require the employer to accommodate an employee
who has committed theft at work, because he suffered from an alcohol dependency,
stating that:
I can find no suggestion that Mr. Gooding’s alcohol dependency played
any role in the employer’s decision to terminate him or in its refusal to
accede to his subsequent request for the imposition of a lesser penalty. He
was terminated, like any other employee would have been on the same
facts, for theft. The fact that alcohol dependent persons may demonstrate
“deterioration in ethical or moral behaviour”, and may have a greater
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temptation to steal alcohol from their workplace if exposed to it, does not
permit an inference that the employer’s conduct in terminating the
employee was based on or influenced by his alcohol dependency.49
The majority relied on three SCC decisions indicating the importance of demonstrating
the stereotypical or arbitrary nature of the discriminatory conduct:50 McGill University
Health Centre (Montreal General Hospital) v. Syndicat des employés de l’Hôpital
général de Montréal,51 Honda Canada Inc. v. Keays52 and Hydro-Québec v. Syndicat des
employé-e-s de techniques professionnelles et de bureau d’Hydro-Québec, section locale
2000 (SCFP-FTQ).53 Justice Huddart found no evidence of stereotypical or arbitrary
decision-making to substantiate Gooding’s claim of discriminatory conduct54 and, thus,
found no prima facie discrimination. She acknowledged that, “his conduct may have been
influenced by his alcohol dependency” but ultimately concluded that this connection was
“irrelevant if that admitted dependency played no part in the employer’s decision to
terminate his employment and he suffered no impact for his misconduct greater than that
another employee would have suffered for the same misconduct.”55 The BCCA majority
allowed the employer’s appeal and remitted the matter of whether Mr. Gooding’s
dismissal was excessive to the original arbitrator.56 Gooding appealed the BCCA
decision to the SCC but the SCC refused leave to appeal.57
The majority decision disregarded the clear connection between Gooding’s alcohol
addiction and the reason for his termination: theft of alcohol. Although the Moore test
had not yet been established, the prevailing discrimination analysis resembled the
approach later adopted in Moore and simply required the disability to be a factor in the
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termination, not a causal or direct factor.58 Furthermore, the determination that any other
employee would have been terminated for the same misconduct appears to accept the
antiquated concept of formal equality, which prescribes equal treatment for those in
similar situations; this is contrary to the SCC’s rejection of formal equality, in favor of
substantive equality—the notion that differential treatment may be necessary for certain
groups of people to achieve equal status in society.59 According to human rights laws and
principles, Gooding should not have been terminated for the theft of alcohol, as it was
clearly fueled by his addiction disability, unless the employer could establish it
accommodated him to the point of undue hardship. Despite these flaws, the approach of
the BCCA majority in Gooding has been applied in subsequent cases, including Wright,
Bish v. Elk Valley Coal Corp.60 and Cambridge Memorial Hospital v. Ontario Nurses’
Association,61 which are examined in this thesis.
In dissent, Justice Kirkpatrick affirmed that, given the evidence establishing a connection
between Gooding’s addiction and the theft of alcohol, it was reasonable to infer that his
addiction was related to his termination for theft—the stated reason for his termination;
therefore, Gooding established prima facie discrimination.62 Justice Kirkpatrick also
concluded that the arbitrator did not err in finding the employer failed to satisfy its duty
to accommodate to the point of undue hardship, considering Gooding’s rehabilitation
efforts and positive prognosis and the fact that the employer made no effort to
accommodate him, aside from merely informing him of the employee assistance
program.63
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The majority remitted the issue of whether Gooding’s termination was excessive under
the circumstances to the arbitrator. In light of the BCCA’s finding of no prima facie
discrimination, the arbitrator did not apply the human rights approach. The arbitrator
determined that Gooding engaged in particularly egregious misconduct, as he frequently
committed theft over a long period of time, the thefts were premeditated and, as a store
manager, he occupied a position of trust. The arbitrator concluded that Gooding’s alcohol
addiction and his subsequent recovery were not sufficient factors to mitigate his
dismissal, given the seriousness of his misconduct.64 The arbitrator held that Gooding’s
termination was not excessive in the circumstances and dismissed the grievance.

4.3 New Flyer Industries Ltd. v. National Automobile,
Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers Union
of Canada, Local 3003
Jose Salvador, a machine operator for New Flyer Industries Ltd., experienced attendance
and disciplinary problems related to his drug and alcohol addiction throughout much of
his employment with the company. The employer’s Merit/Demerit Plan provided that,
“An employee who accumulates a minimum of one hundred (100) demerit points shall be
discharged and deemed to have been discharged for just cause.”65 In 2003, Salvador
committed multiple infractions and informed the employer that he struggled with an
addiction. He attended a rehabilitation day program under accommodation by the
employer. In December 2005 and February 2008, Salvador committed various
infractions—refusal of an order, reporting to work under the influence and absenteeism in
2005 and refusal of an order and failure to comply with the rules in 2008—which put him
over the 100 demerit threshold for automatic termination under the Plan. However, the
employer accommodated Salvador by providing him with addiction rehabilitation
treatment in 2006 and a last chance agreement—an agreement between the employer,
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union and grievor, extending the grievor’s employment based on specific terms and
conditions—in 2008.
Salvador continued to experience attendance issues in 2008 and 2009. In the meetings
addressing his excessive absenteeism, Salvador acknowledged the problem but did not
mention his addiction to the employer. The attendance issues continued and, in December
2009, the employer issued Salvador a written warning for failure to attend work. He came
to work the next day but appeared to be intoxicated and subsequently tested positive for
cocaine. This incident put Salvador over 100 demerit points and the employer terminated
his employment. The union grieved the termination, claiming that it was unjust and the
employer had not fulfilled its duty to accommodate.
The union asserted that the employer “failed to take sufficient initiative and interest in the
grievor’s medical condition, contrary to its human rights law obligation” and could have
helped him avoid termination.66 Knowing that Salvador had a history of addiction, the
employer should have made regular inquiries with respect to his addiction and provided
ongoing offers of support.67 The union claimed that the employer had not sufficiently
accommodated Salvador and that he should be reinstated with conditions. The employer
contended that it accommodated Salvador to the point of undue hardship and was now
legally entitled to terminate the employment relationship, given work scheduling and
safety concerns. The employer also pointed to evidence suggesting a poor prospect for
improvement.
The arbitrator assessed whether the employer met its obligation to accommodate
Salvador to the point of undue hardship and whether he met his obligation as an
employee to participate in the accommodation process. The arbitrator accepted that,
although the employer knew he struggled with addiction and previously required
accommodation for his disability, Salvador “was not forthcoming about his needs at the
material times” and, therefore, the employer, treating the 2008 attendance infractions as a

66

Ibid at para 3.

67

Ibid at para 44.

100

regular attendance management problem, was restricted in the types of accommodation it
could offer.68 However, given the employer’s knowledge of Salvador’s lengthy addiction
history and related workplace misconduct, the employer should have at least inquired
about his health when he began missing work again. The arbitrator noted that, although
the employer failed to fulfill its obligation to inquire in this instance, it had
accommodated Salvador on various occasions and gave him another chance after his
excessive absenteeism in 2008.
The arbitrator found no medical evidence to support the grievor’s assertion that he was
able to return to work. Accordingly, the arbitrator concluded that he was unable to make
a positive conclusion about the grievor’s health and ability to return to work:
The grievor in the present case was emotionally distraught during part
of his testimony and did not present a picture of good health. He lacks
a support network and has been estranged from his family. His
testimony denying a cocaine problem was unconvincing and troubling.
He stopped attending AA in May 2010 and has not engaged in any
addiction program since that time. He is not involved in work or other
regular productive activity. His pattern of denial and inability to take
personal responsibility for his illness continued right up to the final
workplace incident on December 18, 2009. His promise to do better if
reinstated is no doubt heartfelt but I find that objectively there is no
reasonable prospect of a successful return to work at this time
[emphasis added].69
The arbitrator held that the employer fulfilled its accommodation duty, by protecting
Salvador’s employment on multiple occasions and facilitating his addiction treatment,
and that any further accommodation would constitute undue hardship.70 He denied the
grievance and did not interfere with the deemed just cause termination of the grievor.
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4.4 Wright v. College and Association of Registered Nurses
of Alberta (Appeals Committee)
Wright concerned the discipline of two nurses, Genevieve Wright and Mona Helmer, by
the College and Association of Registered Nurses of Alberta for stealing narcotics from
work and falsifying records to cover up the thefts. Both nurses had been diagnosed with
an opioid addiction and there was no indication that it impaired their ability to perform
their nursing duties. Wright and Helmer appealed the College’s decision to charge them
with unprofessional conduct and claimed that, in light of their addiction disability, their
conduct was not and should not be deemed “unprofessional.”71 The nurses asserted that
the medical evidence established a connection between their addiction and conduct and,
thus, the disciplinary proceedings were discriminatory. The College asserted that the
nurses were not being disciplined for their addiction, but for their criminal conduct,72 and
that they were treated as any nurse who stole drugs from work.73
Helmer was initially caught forging narcotic prescriptions in 1997 and, following
treatment for her addiction, she returned to work under supervision. In 2008, Helmer
relapsed and began stealing narcotics from the hospital again. The Hearing Tribunal
accepted the addictions specialist’s conclusion that there was “a plausible connection
between the opioid dependence and the behavior of the member.”74 Nevertheless, the
Hearing Tribunal applied the disciplinary approach of the BCCA majority in Gooding
and asserted that, while the “conduct may have been influenced by her drug
dependency… the prosecution was for the theft and fraud just as is the case in the
Gooding decision.”75 The Tribunal found the nexus between Helmer’s addiction and her
behavior to be insufficient, stating: “There was volition, planning and choices made by
Ms. Helmer. While there is some connection no doubt, it is not the mental or physical
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disability that is the issue in Ms. Helmer’s case, it is the theft and fraud.” 76 The Tribunal
found Helmer guilty of professional misconduct, imposed a reprimand and suspended her
nursing registration, pending compliance with rehabilitative treatment. The Hearing
Tribunal also ordered Helmer to pay $39,000 for costs incurred by the College for the
disciplinary proceedings. Helmer appealed the Tribunal’s decision to the Appeals
Committee. The Appeals Committee agreed that there was an insufficient link between
the disability and misconduct and, thus, found no discrimination. In the alternative, even
if there was prima facie discrimination, the duty to accommodate did not extend to
tolerating theft.77 The Appeals Committee affirmed the Tribunal’s finding of professional
misconduct, imposed sanctions and cost award; it also awarded an additional $16,000 for
costs of the appeal.
Wright acknowledged consuming large quantities of Percocet to cope with pain related to
a medical condition. An opinion letter from an addictions specialist, attached to the
agreed statement of facts, asserted that her “uncharacteristic behaviour of stealing opioids
was entirely due to her untreated Opioid Dependence, at the time, in the context of
chronic pain.”78 Nevertheless, the Hearing Tribunal concluded that Wright had sufficient
mental capacity to control her actions and recognize that what she was doing was wrong:
The member had control of her situation, and even though satisfying a
drug addiction may have been a cause of the thefts of drugs and
falsification of records, continuance of this thievery and falsification of
records was not the only answer to the member’s addiction. It is not as
if the member had ceased to function rationally and lost the ability to
think and organize her practice, as evidenced by her exemplary
employee evaluation. …This Tribunal does accept that the Human
Rights Citizenship and Multiculturalism Act applies to CARNA as it is
governed by the Health Professions Act but does not agree that this
member was discriminated against due to her illness by this process.
She has been treated the same as any other nurse who steals drugs. 79
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The Hearing Tribunal asserted that her addiction disability would be considered in
determining the appropriate sanction.80 The Tribunal concluded that Wright was guilty of
professional misconduct, ordered a reprimand and suspended her license until she
provided medical proof that her addiction was sufficiently controlled; conditions were
also placed on her future employment.
Wright appealed the decision to the Appeals Committee, arguing that the medical opinion
that her conduct was entirely caused by her addiction was uncontradicted and should
have been accepted by the Tribunal. The Appeals Committee concluded that the Hearing
Tribunal implicitly rejected the evidence that the addiction was the sole cause of her
conduct, as there was evidence demonstrating that she knew what she was doing and
acted, at least partly, with volition.81 The Appeals Committee concluded that, in order to
be discriminatory, the treatment must be arbitrary, and disciplining a member for criminal
conduct is not arbitrary.82 Following the Gooding approach, the Appeals Committee
found no discrimination and asserted that Wright’s addiction was to be considered in
determining the appropriate discipline.83 The Appeals Committee found the Tribunal’s
decision to be reasonable and ordered Wright to pay $10,000 for costs of the appeal.
Wright and Helmer appealed the findings of the Appeals Committee directly to the Court
of Appeal of Alberta (ABCA). They claimed that the Committee erred in its application
of human rights principles and challenged the cost awards. On appeal, the ABCA
analyzed whether: the College was required to use alternative procedures, as opposed to
its disciplinary procedures; the College correctly applied the human rights legislation; the
College discriminated against the appellants and, if so, were its actions reasonable and
justifiable; and the costs awards were reasonable.84 The ABCA applied the standard of
correctness to the application of the human rights legislation, as it was “a question of law
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of general importance to the legal system” and the College had no expertise in human
rights law,85 and applied the standard of reasonableness to the issue of costs.86
The appellants argued that, in light of their addiction, the College should not have taken
disciplinary action, as more appropriate procedures were available—namely, the
College’s Alternative Complaints Resolution procedure and its ability to deal with
“incapacity” under section 118 of the Health Professions Act, which enables the
complaints director to suspend the disciplinary proceedings of an incapacitated
member.87 The College responded that the appellants were ineligible for the alternative
process due to the criminal nature of the complaints, the medical evidence indicated that
the nurses were not incapacitated with respect to their ability to perform their job and the
complaints director had wide discretion in choosing the remedial process.88 The ABCA
majority, composed of Justices Slatter and Ritter, asserted that the professional
organization’s decision to apply its disciplinary process was not reviewable for mere
unreasonableness; in order to elicit judicial intervention, the error “must likely approach
an abuse of process.”89 The majority concluded that it was not unreasonable, let alone an
abuse of process, for the complaints director to decline to use the Alternative Complaints
Resolution Process because the appellants were not eligible for the process, as the
regulations specifically excluded criminal complaints.90 The majority indicated that the
extent to which the human rights issues might demand the use of alternative procedures
should be considered separately, under the duty to accommodate.91
The majority found it was reasonable for the Hearing Tribunal and Appeals Committee to
conclude that the decision to invoke the disciplinary proceedings was not prima facie
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discriminatory, given that: the criminal conduct underlying the discipline was distinct
from any personal characteristic of the appellants; although “the conduct of the appellants
was caused by their addiction, and without that addiction they would not have stolen
drugs,” there was no indication that “theft is predominantly caused by addictions, nor that
addictions generally result in theft;” the College had no discriminatory intent or
motivation in laying the charges; the objective standard of criminal behaviour was not
based on stereotypical thinking or attributed characteristics; and criminal standards are
not arbitrary, they are objectively based on social norms.92 The majority concluded that:
It was the theft and forgery that were the subject of the disciplinary
charges; how those acts came to be committed was irrelevant to the
College. The College would have laid disciplinary charges as a result
of theft of narcotics, whether the member was an addict or not. On this
point the appellants’ argument falters at a factual level. Both of the
Hearing Tribunals found as a fact that the appellants were not being
disciplined for their disability, but rather for their conduct. The finding
was that the appellants’ disability did not play any role in the decision
to proceed with the prosecutions. Further, the Hearing Tribunals
rejected any argument that the thefts were solely caused by addiction.
Those findings were upheld by the Appeals Committee, and they
demonstrate no reviewable error [emphasis added].93
It is evident the majority accepted the notion of formal equality based on equal treatment
and erroneously required the addiction to be the sole cause of the misconduct as well as
discriminatory intent. Furthermore, the majority emphasized that discipline for criminal
conduct was not arbitrary or based on stereotypical thinking;94 however, these elements
are not required for establishing prima facie discrimination. Reflecting floodgates
reasoning, the majority also opined that the potential consequences of excusing criminal
behaviour on the basis of addiction would be “far-reaching.”95 Despite acknowledging a
connection between the addiction and thefts—the legal threshold for demonstrating prima
facie discrimination—the majority found no discrimination: “The fact that the appellants’
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conduct was motivated or caused at some level by the addiction does not raise the
College’s proceedings to the level of discrimination in law.”96
With respect to the issue of accommodation, the majority stated that the imposed
sanctions “were clearly sensitive to the appellants’ circumstances” and indicated that, “To
the extent that accommodation was called for, it was adequately represented in these
sanctions. Even if there was a duty to accommodate that does not entitle the appellants to
a complete exemption from the disciplinary process.”97 Eliminating access to disciplinary
procedures in the case of stolen drugs and forged records “would likely amount to undue
hardship.”98 The majority also found the cost awards to be reasonable under the
circumstances and dismissed the appeals. Wright and Helmer appealed the BCCA
decision to the SCC but the SCC dismissed the application for leave to appeal.99
Justice Berger dissented from the majority decision and found many errors in the Appeals
Committee’s decision. Citing the SCC’s rejection of identical treatment as a means to
achieving equality, Justice Berger rejected the finding that the discipline did not
constitute discrimination because all nurses who steal were treated alike, regardless of
their addiction.100 He also rejected the view that the test for prima facie discrimination
required arbitrariness or stereotyping in order to find discrimination.101 Justice Berger
held that both the Tribunal and Appeals Committee erred by requiring the addiction to be
the sole reason for the misconduct, as the protected ground only needs to be a factor, not
a sole or overriding factor, in the adverse treatment, in order to constitute prima facie
discrimination.102 Justice Berger concluded that:
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Because Ms. Wright and Ms. Helmer have a disability and the medical
evidence proves a nexus between that disability and their theft of
narcotics, both tribunals erred in not conducting a human rights analysis.
They failed to appreciate the nature of adverse effect discrimination,
failed to appreciate that the prohibited ground does not have to be the sole
ground for the adverse treatment before a human rights analysis is
engaged and failed to treat the Appellants’ addiction as a disability.
Properly applied, a human rights analysis demonstrates that proceeding
on a culpable basis under the HPA is prima facie discriminatory
[emphasis added].103
Justice Berger rejected the College’s claim that accommodation occurred in the discipline
phase of the process, as this was too late and failed to remedy the discrimination: “The
imposition of a lesser sanction on the basis of the Appellants’ disability does not as a
matter of law mitigate the discipline of the Appellants on a prohibited ground. Mere
acknowledgment of the Appellants’ addiction disability is insufficient.”104 The Tribunal
and Appeals Committee failed to conduct a proper human rights analysis and did not
fully consider the possibility of accommodation.105 Justice Berger indicated that he
would have quashed the Appeal Committee’s decision, remitted the matter to the
Committee “for resolution in a manner consistent with this judgment” and set aside the
cost awards.106

4.5 Seaspan ULC v. International Longshore & Warehouse
Union, Local 400
The grievor worked as a deckhand at Seaspan and had a long history of drug and alcohol
addiction. In 2006, the grievor experienced a relapse after approximately 14 years of
sobriety. He disclosed his addiction to the employer and entered into a residential
addiction treatment program. Upon returning to work, he signed a Return to Work
Agreement and Contingency Monitored Recovery Agreement, which required him to
abstain from drugs and alcohol for two years, submit to testing and continue treatment.
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The grievor successfully completed the two-year program but relapsed in May 2009 and
February 2010. He was accommodated on both occasions and returned to his safety
sensitive position, subject to continued abstinence, monitoring and treatment. The grievor
relapsed again in January 2011 and subsequently entered into a last chance agreement,
which provided that “any positive alcohol or drug test, or substantive breach of the
monitoring agreement or treatment recommendations, will result in the immediate
termination of [GH]’s employment” and that the agreement satisfied the employer’s duty
to accommodate.107 While off work for a knee injury, the grievor tested positive for
alcohol in a random drug test in August 2013. The employer terminated him following
the positive test result, pursuant to the last chance agreement. The union grieved the
termination, claiming that it amounted to discrimination and the employer failed to
accommodate the grievor to the point of undue hardship. The employer argued that the
last chance agreement provided for immediate termination and the agreement fulfilled its
duty to accommodate.
The arbitrator—notably, the same arbitrator that heard the Gooding grievance—relied on
the jurisprudence establishing that last chance agreements cannot nullify the employer’s
duty to accommodate and are thus unenforceable in this respect.108 The arbitrator
accordingly applied a human rights analysis to the grievance. He concluded that prima
facie discrimination had been established, as the employer clearly stated that the grievor’s
termination flowed directly from the last chance agreement, which provided that a
positive alcohol or drug test would result in immediate termination; therefore, his “drug
and alcohol addiction was not only a factor but the primary factor in the termination.”109
The arbitrator found that Seaspan’s Substance Use Policy, aimed at providing a drug and
alcohol free workplace and help to employees with addiction, was adopted for a purpose
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rationally connected to the performance of the job and in an honest and good faith belief
that it was necessary to fulfill the legitimate purpose.
The last chance agreement stated that the employer had satisfied its duty to accommodate
the grievor to the point of undue hardship. However, the arbitrator recognized that “under
the law, this claim, standing alone, does not satisfy the duty to accommodate”110 and
determined that assessing the duty to accommodate requires a global examination of the
grievor’s circumstances, including past accommodation efforts as well as the grievor’s
prognosis. The arbitrator emphasized the following factors: the grievor self-disclosed all
instances of relapse; he never reported to work while impaired; there was no evidence he
used drugs at work; there was no evidence the grievor committed any workplace
misconduct as a result of his alcohol or drug use or that he posed a safety risk; and the
grievor’s doctor indicated that the new comprehensive treatment plan, which also treated
his other mental health conditions, increased the likelihood of prolonged abstinence and
determined that he could satisfy the demands of his safety sensitive position.111
The arbitrator found that accommodating the grievor’s four relapses in four years, while
in a safety-sensitive position, satisfied the employer’s duty to accommodate. He then
went on to consider the prospect of reinstatement in a non-safety sensitive position:
It is at this point in respect to the duty to accommodate that I give
significant weight to the circumstances of his past relapses — that he selfdisclosed, that he never reported to work impaired, that there is no
evidence of the use of alcohol or drugs at the workplace, and that there has
been no workplace incident arising from drugs or alcohol… Thus, in view
of these off-duty relapses, which have not resulted in any workplace
misconduct, I have determined that the Grievor is to be reinstated to a
position that is not safety sensitive.112
The arbitrator concluded that the employer had fulfilled its duty to accommodate to the
point of undue hardship with respect to safety-sensitive work but not with respect to non-
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safety sensitive work. The arbitrator ordered the grievor’s reinstatement, subject to the
previously imposed return to work conditions. However, he held that the grievor was not
entitled to reimbursement for lost wages, in accordance with the last chance agreement.

4.6 Canadian National Railway v. Teamsters Canada Rail
Conference
Canadian National Railway concerned the termination of a long-serving locomotive
engineer with a history of addiction. In July 2014, the grievor operated a train from
Manitoba to Minnesota and was subject to random alcohol testing by the U.S. Federal
Railroad Administration and tested positive for alcohol, contrary to both the Canadian
Rail Operating Rules and the CN Drug and Alcohol Policy. Rule G of the Operating
Rules provided that, “The use of intoxicants or narcotics by employees subject to duty, or
their possession or use while on duty is prohibited” and the Policy stated that, “Any
employee whose breath alcohol concentration is over 0.04 or who tests positive for illegal
drugs would be considered in violation of this policy.”113 The grievor admitted to
consuming alcohol while on duty and the employer consequently terminated him for
violating Rule G.
The employer claimed that the grievor’s termination was warranted because he consumed
alcohol while on duty in a safety sensitive position, which threatened the safety of
himself, his crew and the public. The employer also raised the fact that the grievor did not
report his alcohol addiction or seek assistance through the employer’s support services
until his termination; the employer suggested that disclosing his addiction after violating
the policy was a self-serving tactic. The union, on the other hand, contended that the
employer discriminated against the grievor due to his addiction disability. The union
pointed to the grievor’s history of alcohol addiction and rehabilitative treatment during
his employment with CN: in 2006, the grievor contacted the company’s employee
assistance program with respect to his addiction and completed a residential treatment
program, attended Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings for the next two years and
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suffered a relapse in 2009, at which time he took himself out of service for two months
and resumed attending AA meetings. The grievor confirmed that the 2014 incident was a
relapse and acknowledged the seriousness of his behavior. Upon his termination, the
grievor attended AA meetings and maintained his sobriety.
The arbitrator acknowledged the seriousness of the grievor’s misconduct, given the safety
critical work environment, but also considered the substantial and ongoing evidence of
the grievor’s rehabilitation efforts as well as the letter from his rehabilitation counselor,
confirming his participation in and commitment to recovery.114 Adopting a broad human
rights approach, the arbitrator examined all the evidence and, despite the safety
sensitivity of the workplace, gave considerable weight to the grievor’s 37-year
employment record and his successful rehabilitative efforts, notwithstanding the relapses.
The arbitrator concluded that, “In view of the grievor’s long service, the requirements to
accommodate the grievor to the point of undue hardship under the Canadian Human
Rights Act,115 the grievor’s continuing and ongoing rehabilitation efforts and the relevant
CROA&DR jurisprudence,116 reinstatement with conditions is appropriate.”117 The
arbitrator ordered the grievor’s reinstatement, subject to conditions, including continued
abstinence, random drug and alcohol testing and regular attendance of AA meetings, with
no loss of seniority but without compensation for any lost wages or benefits. The
arbitrator affirmed that noncompliance with the conditions would result in termination.

4.7 Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Saskatchewan
Gaming Corp.
Saskatchewan Gaming concerned the termination of Ms. AB, a casino dealer with a drug
addiction. In 2008, Ms. AB developed an addiction to crack cocaine. She obtained
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rehabilitative treatment for her cocaine addiction in the summer of 2008 and remained
sober for several months but experienced a relapse and continued to use crack cocaine
until the termination of her employment. As a result of her drug use, Ms. A.B.’s
absenteeism from work far surpassed the average absenteeism rate of employees at the
Saskatchewan Gaming Corporation. She used drugs on payday and would typically be
absent from work for the shift she expected to receive her pay as well as the next day to
recover from the previous day’s drug use. The employer issued several warnings
indicating that her employment could be terminated as a result of her continued,
excessive absenteeism. Ms. AB disclosed her drug addiction to the employer on several
occasions and stated that it impacted her ability to improve her attendance. The employer
indicated that it required further medical information from her physician with respect to
her disability. Ms. AB’s family physician indicated that she did not have a disability;
however, the physician testified that she never treated Ms. AB for addiction and thought
the question was in reference to her shoulder injury.118 With no substantive improvement
in her work attendance and the absence of medical documentation indicating she suffered
from a medical disability, the employer decided to terminate Ms. AB’s employment in
October 2013. The union grieved her dismissal. Following her termination, Ms. AB
stopped using cocaine, attended a recovery program and maintained perfect attendance at
her subsequent job.
The employer contended that it had terminated Ms. AB for frustration of the employment
contract, due to her excessive absenteeism, and, therefore, her termination should be
upheld. The employer claimed it sufficiently warned Ms. AB that her job would be in
jeopardy if she did not improve her attendance and argued that it had fulfilled its duty to
accommodate by seeking a physician’s diagnosis. The union claimed that the employer
discriminated against Ms. AB by terminating her employment due to addiction-related
absences and by failing to accommodate her to the point of undue hardship. The union
asserted that the warnings given to Ms. AB did not clearly communicate attendance goals
and the employer failed to provide a final warning that she would be terminated if her
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attendance did not improve.119 Furthermore, Ms. AB was able to maintain regular work
attendance after receiving treatment. The union contended that Ms. AB’s employment
should be reinstated.
The arbitrator concluded that the employer’s repeated warnings concerning Ms. AB’s
attendance record did not constitute a final warning: “Ms. AB was told over and over
again only that she ‘could’ be terminated, but there was never any real and final warning
that she ‘would’ be terminated if her absenteeism did not improve.”120 Had the employer
given a clear and effective final warning of an imminent termination, Ms. AB might have
consulted with the union and raised the question of her drug addiction and whether an
accommodation would be considered.121 Accepting the evidence provided by Ms. AB
and an addiction expert, the arbitrator concluded that Ms. AB’s excessive absenteeism
was a result of her drug addiction. Thus, the employer discriminated against Ms. AB by
terminating her due to absences caused by an addiction disability.
The arbitrator acknowledged the realities of addiction, including denial and relapse, and
the impact it can have on an employee’s ability to identify the need for accommodation:
In summary, an employee suffering from a drug addiction that is not in
recovery or has relapsed may, as a symptom of his or her disease and
therefore beyond his or her control, lie to his or her employer about the
status of their recovery, deny the existence of any drug problem, and
continue to do or say anything necessary to maintain the flow of
employment income that supports the addiction…
Accordingly, if the employee is suffering from the disability of addiction,
and is either not in recovery or has relapsed, and the evidence shows that
such employee has failed to disclose this fact to the employer, then that
employee cannot necessarily be expected to cooperate any further with the
employer in identifying the need for accommodation. The duty of an
employee to assist in the identification of the need for accommodation will
be exhausted in these circumstances.122
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The arbitrator concluded that Ms. AB fully satisfied her duty to assist and cooperate in
the identification of her addiction disability by raising the matter with her employer. She
disclosed her addiction and, under the circumstances, the employer knew or, at the very
least, should have known she had a drug addiction.123 The employer did not further
investigate Ms. AB’s condition and consequently failed to fulfill its duty to
accommodate. The arbitrator held that the termination was invalid and ordered Ms. AB’s
reinstatement, subject to conditions, including random drug testing and attendance
performance, the breach of which would result in immediate termination.

4.8 Ontario Nurses’ Association v. Sunnybrook Health
Sciences Centre
Sunnybrook addressed the termination of a nurse who stole narcotic drugs from the
hospital she worked at, in order to support her drug addiction, and falsified medical
records to conceal the thefts. Upon being confronted by the hospital with evidence of
discrepancies in the narcotic records, the nurse denied stealing any hospital drugs. The
employer terminated the grievor for the theft of narcotics and gross misconduct relating
to nursing protocols. The union grieved the dismissal. On the first day of the arbitration
hearing, the grievor admitted to the thefts, acknowledged that she had an addiction and
apologized to the hospital for her misconduct. Following her termination, the grievor
sought treatment for her drug addiction and maintained abstinence. Her physicians
indicated she could return to work under certain conditions and restrictions regarding her
access to drugs in the hospital.
The employer’s medical expert perceived addiction as a choice and asserted that the
addiction did not cause the grievor to steal drugs.124 On the other hand, the grievor’s
treating addictions specialist stated that the cravings associated with addiction are “very
strong” and “persons who otherwise have no inclination toward criminal behaviour may
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commit such behaviour in order to feed their addiction.”125 The employer argued that the
thefts constituted a fundamental breach of trust, destroying the employment relationship.
Furthermore, the employer claimed that no position within the hospital could meet the
conditions imposed by the College of Nurses of Ontario because narcotics were readily
available, even in units where drugs were not administered to patients, and the possibility
of relapse constituted undue hardship on the employer.126 The union contended that the
grievor’s termination for theft constituted indirect discrimination based on her addiction
disability and argued for her reinstatement, relying on the evidence that she
acknowledged her addiction, was working hard to maintain sobriety, fully cooperated
with the treatment program and was capable of returning to work.127
The arbitrator acknowledged that having an addiction does not fully shield an employee
from discipline for misconduct; a “causal link” between the addiction and misconduct in
question triggers the employer’s duty to accommodate to the point of undue hardship.128
Adopting a generous medical-human rights approach, the arbitrator accepted that
addiction is in fact a disease, the nurse’s addiction was directly connected to the thefts,
and, in such circumstances, employers have a duty to accommodate.129 He also
acknowledged that the impaired ability to control cravings, theft, dishonesty, denial and
shame are all features of addiction.130 The arbitrator concluded that, in cases like this one,
“where the evidence establishes that an employee suffers from an addiction to drugs and
the employee not only is unable to resist use of drugs while at work, but is also unable to
resist the urge to divert those drugs from the Employer, the employee must be treated as
any other employee suffering from a disability;” the employer must accommodate the
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employee to the point of undue hardship.131 In this case, the termination of the grievor’s
employment constituted discrimination.
The arbitrator provided insightful guidance for assessing addiction cases in light of the
employer’s duty to accommodate: “[W]here the addicted employee is in remission, is
fully cooperative in accepting recommended treatment and acknowledges the extent of
addiction and the improper behaviours that have occurred as a result, efforts can then be
made to determine whether accommodation of the employee’s disability can be
accommodated.”132 Fully appreciating the grievor’s individual circumstances and
prognosis, the arbitrator placed importance on the fact that the grievor eventually
acknowledged the extent of her addiction and related misconduct, was in remission and
continued the recommended treatment.133 The arbitrator directed the employer to
reinstate the nurse, subject to conditions recommended by the doctor and imposed by the
College of Nurses. Compensation was not requested nor awarded.
Although the grievor in this case was reinstated, it is important to note that similar
grievances, involving the termination of a nurse with a drug addiction for stealing drugs
from her employer, have resulted in starkly different outcomes. In Royal Victoria
Regional Health Centre v. Ontario Nurses’ Association134 and Cambridge Memorial
Hospital v. Ontario Nurses’ Association135 the arbitrators found no discrimination and
dismissed the grievances. However, both these cases have since been judicially reviewed
by the Ontario Divisional Court and overturned.136 The Court’s decision in Cambridge
Memorial Hospital v. Ontario Nurses’ Association is discussed in Chapter 6.
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4.9 McNulty v. Canada Revenue Agency
Mary Ann McNulty began working at the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) in 1989 as a
clerk and advanced to senior programs officer in 2010. In 2014, the employer terminated
her employment for submitting forged medical certificates, resulting in an irreparable
breach of trust. McNulty filed a grievance, alleging the employer discriminated against
her, and sought reinstatement. The employer denied the grievance and it was referred to
the Public Service Labour Relations and Employment Board.
McNulty often missed work and failed to notify the employer of her absences. The
manager provided the grievor with a letter to remind her of the administrative conditions
and mechanisms related to requests and authorization for leaves, including the
requirement to notify her immediate supervisor and provide a medical certificate and that
the failure to comply with these measures could result in progressive discipline, up to and
including termination. The manager asked McNulty whether there was anything the
employer could do to help but she stated that there were no issues and she would be back
at work. Nevertheless, McNulty continued to be absent from work and often called in
sick. She generally did not have a medical certificate and submitted the documentation
much later, sometimes weeks later. The employer directed the grievor to undergo a
fitness to work evaluation in order to determine the cause of her absences and provide
some insight into possible accommodation. The physician’s report indicated that the
grievor was fit to work on a full-time basis and did not specify any limitations, aside from
the stipulation that she be allowed to take breaks.
McNulty submitted 16 medical certificates from May 2013 to March 2014 from ten
different doctors and a physiotherapy clinic. The manager became suspicious when she
received two undated certificates from the physiotherapy clinic in March 2014. The CRA
determined that the certificates were falsified and initiated an investigation. In April, the
grievor told her employer that she suffered from alcoholism and forged the certificates
because she had been too drunk to go to the doctor. She revealed that she had been
treated for alcohol abuse in the past and had been sober for years but relapsed about two
years prior, when members of her family became ill. The grievor told the employer that
she wanted to stop drinking and sought treatment. She admitted to the investigator that
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she had been sick as a result of her drinking and forged the 16 medical certificates
because she was not sober enough to go to the doctor’s office to obtain them legitimately.
The employer determined that these 16 medical certificates were used to claim 216 hours
of sick leave with pay, worth roughly $9,300 before deductions, and 218.5 hours of sick
leave without pay.137 The investigation report indicated that McNulty expressed remorse
and a desire to regain the trust of her managers and colleagues.
At the disciplinary meeting, the grievor indicated that she had not realized the seriousness
of her actions when she forged the notes and did not consider it to be fraud. The CRA
Director General testified that the grievor revealed that she was not under the influence of
alcohol when she forged the certificates but was sometimes hungover and had always
been sober when submitting the notes to her manager.138 The grievor stated that she
forged the medical certificates while intoxicated, hungover and sober.139 Weeks later, the
employer decided to terminate the grievor’s employment. The employer contended that
the grievor had not apologized for her behaviour, failed to show remorse or accept
responsibility for her actions and instead blamed management as well as her personal
circumstances. In making its decision, the employer considered the seriousness and
repetitive nature of the grievor’s misconduct, her performance and length of employment
with the CRA as well as the agency’s values, including integrity, professionalism and
respect, and ultimately concluded that McNulty had irreparably breached its confidence
and trust.140
McNulty stated that she was diagnosed with an alcohol dependency following her arrest
for impaired driving in 2004. In February 2005, she completed a 28-day outpatient
rehabilitation program and continued to be monitored by medical professionals. The
grievor remained sober until she relapsed in late 2011; during this time, multiple
members of the grievor’s family had passed away and experienced serious health issues.
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She continued to be monitored by medical professionals until the fall of 2012. McNulty
indicated that she abstained from drinking when her daughter visited; she would drink all
day from Monday to Friday and abstain over the weekend to recover. Following her
termination, McNulty attended an outpatient program for over a month but stopped, as
her mother’s health declined and she needed to care for her. The grievor sought medical
assistance, maintained her sobriety and attended Alcoholics Anonymous twice a week.
The CRA argued that McNulty’s repeated misconduct warranted termination. The
employer asserted that it did not matter whether the hybrid or human rights approach was
applied, as the nexus between the misconduct and disability remained the focus.141
Relying on Gooding, Wright and Bish v. Elk Valley Coal Corp.,142 the employer
contended that, “not just any nexus or cause is sufficient.”143 The CRA terminated
McNulty’s employment because she forged medical certificates to obtain sick leave, not
because of her disability.144 The employer accepted that the grievor had a disability but
asserted that there was no nexus between her disability and the misconduct: “There was
only a bald assertion that they are connected. The grievor said she stayed at home
because she was intoxicated and that she did not obtain a legitimate medical certificate
because she could not drive;”145 the grievor had other options available to her, other than
forging a medical certificate, such as speaking to a doctor or her manager.146 The
employer asserted that alcohol did not cause McNulty to forge and submit the medical
certificates, as she had not forged medical certificates in 2004 when she drank heavily.147
The CRA submitted that the grievor provided insufficient medical evidence to establish a
medical defense and failed to seek treatment.
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McNulty argued that the CRA discriminated against her on the basis of her disability and
failed to accommodate her. The grievor contended that the investigation was flawed, as it
did not consider the medical information related to her disability. Although some form of
discipline was warranted, termination was excessive under the circumstances. McNulty
cooperated with the employer’s investigation, she admitted to her misconduct and the
investigation report indicated that she showed remorse for her actions. Furthermore,
McNulty had 25 years of service with the CRA and sought medical treatment following
her termination. She requested reinstatement, subject to conditions regarding her
continued treatment.
The arbitrator began his analysis by outlining “the usual basis for adjudicating issues of
discipline,” as set out in William Scott & Co. v. C.F.A.W., Local P-162,148 which
involves determining: whether the grievor committed misconduct; if so, whether the
discipline imposed by the employer was appropriate in the circumstances; and, if not,
what alternative penalty would be just and equitable.149 The arbitrator found that
McNulty’s actions amounted to serious misconduct and went on to examine her addiction
disability as a mitigating factor. He asserted that the grievor had the burden to prove that
“her disability was a factor in the employer’s decision to terminate her employment”150
and the addiction disability was a causal factor in her misconduct.151 However, requiring
the grievor to demonstrate that the employer considered her disability in its decision to
terminate effectively imported the requirement of direct discrimination into the prima
facie discrimination analysis, contrary to human rights law. The arbitrator determined
that the employer terminated McNulty for forging the medical certificates, not for her
addiction disability,152 and found insufficient evidence to support the argument that the
grievor’s addiction should mitigate the penalty imposed:
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I have no expert evidence that alcohol dependency would remove any
inhibitions or control that the grievor should otherwise have had with
respect to the actions she undertook to acquire the leave by fraudulent
means. Indeed, while the grievor suggested that sometimes she had been
intoxicated or hung-over when she typed the forged medical certificates,
she had been sober when she handed them to her supervisor.153
Although she forged the medical certificates for her addiction-related absences, the
arbitrator concluded that McNulty failed to establish that her misconduct was causally
related to her disability and did not demonstrate prima facie discrimination.154 Despite
finding no discrimination, the arbitrator went on to comment on the duty to accommodate
and indicated that, “It is both hard to envision and difficult to comprehend the grievor’s
suggestion that the CRA should have accommodated her when it appears from the
evidence before me that she had been resolute in concealing her disability and in
thwarting any attempt at accommodation from the CRA.”155
In assessing the conflicting evidence regarding the grievor’s remorsefulness, the
arbitrator utilized the grievor’s past deceptive behaviour related to her disability—
namely, lying to the employer about being sick, seeing a medical professional and
obtaining medical certificates, misleading her family physician about her drinking
problem and lying to her supervisor by indicating that everything was fine—to
characterize the grievor as untruthful.156 The arbitrator failed to recognize that denial and
deception are common features of addiction and assessed McNulty’s behaviour in
isolation from her disability:
I find particularly troubling the grievor’s excuse for not obtaining
legitimate medical certificates, which was that she was either too
intoxicated or too hung-over to drive. At first blush, one might consider
that a somewhat commendable action, within an otherwise dreadful
situation; however, when looked at a little closer, it is really meaningless
and self-serving and is a way of avoiding responsibility for her actions.
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Had she not been intoxicated or severely hung-over, she would not have
missed work; ergo, she would not have required a medical note and would
not have had to see a doctor. I have never seen or heard of a situation in
which an employee has shown up at a doctor's office and asked for a note
to excuse him or her from work because he or she was too intoxicated or
was hung-over. What is particularly disquieting about this in the grievor's
situation is that if she really needed to see her family doctor, she had a
sister who lived close by and who could drive; but more troubling is that
the grievor’s family physician's office was within walking distance of her
home [emphasis added].157
Contrary to the human rights approach, the arbitrator’s assessment of the grievor’s
drinking and related misconduct was devoid of any appreciation of the impact an alcohol
addiction may have on an individual and their behaviour.
Considering the grievor’s testimony and the employer’s evidence, the arbitrator
concluded that, “while the grievor might have said that she is sorry and remorseful for her
conduct, her past behaviour suggests that she is not always truthful and that she tends to
blame others and not accept responsibility for her actions” and accepted the employer’s
evidence on this point.158 The arbitrator found the grievor’s evidence regarding her
rehabilitative efforts indicated that she “ha[d] not pursued rehabilitation in a meaningful
way”159 and also concluded that her work performance, length of service and cooperation
with the investigation were not sufficient to convince him to alter the penalty. He held
that McNulty’s misconduct warranted termination and dismissed the grievance.

4.10 Conclusion
Historically, in Canadian labour law, the competing approaches towards workplace
misconduct arising from drug and alcohol addiction have been the traditional disciplinary
approach, rooted in the long-standing arbitral approach to culpable misconduct, and the
human rights approach, originating from human rights legislation and the subsequent
statutory grant of power incorporated in labour relations legislation enabling arbitrators to
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interpret and apply human rights statutes. Under the disciplinary approach, the arbitrator
determines whether the employer had just cause to discipline or terminate the employee
and whether the disciplinary action was excessive under the circumstances. The duty to
accommodate is typically regarded as a mitigating factor once the grievor’s culpability
has been determined.160 Consequently, under this approach, the employee’s addiction
disability is treated as a mitigating factor in determining the appropriate discipline, as
opposed to a trigger for the application of the prima facie discrimination analysis and the
duty to accommodate to the point of undue hardship. In contrast, the human rights
approach strives to determine whether there is a connection between the employee’s
misconduct and their addiction disability. If a compelling connection can be established,
the human rights analysis centres on whether the employer fulfilled its duty to
accommodate the employee to the point of undue hardship, rather than the employee’s
culpability.
The hybrid disciplinary approach developed as a middle ground between the disciplinary
and human rights approaches, integrating the traditional disciplinary analysis with
accommodation principles. This approach arose from concerns about abandoning the
application of culpability to workplace misconduct, particularly in addiction cases where
there appears to be a quasi-voluntary aspect.161 Under the hybrid analysis, the legal
decision maker applies a disciplinary or just cause analysis to the voluntary, culpable
aspects of the employee’s misconduct and applies a human rights analysis to the
involuntary, non-culpable components that are causally connected to the employee’s
disability.162
The SCC has repeatedly affirmed that human rights statutes must be interpreted in a
liberal, contextual and purposive fashion163 and human rights are to be given a broad
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interpretation. To establish prima facie discrimination, the employee must simply
demonstrate that they have an addiction, they experienced an adverse impact and the
addiction was in some way a factor in the adverse impact.164 Regardless of whether or not
it intended to discriminate against the employee, the employer has the onus of
demonstrating that it cannot accommodate the employee without giving rise to undue
hardship.165 The employer must present convincing objective evidence to substantiate its
undue hardship claim and justify limiting the employee’s right to be free from
discrimination and accommodated in their workplace. The human rights approach to
addiction disability—illustrated in New Flyer, Seaspan, Canadian National Railway,
Sunnybrook and Saskatchewan Gaming—is most in line with these human rights laws
and principles.
The traditional disciplinary approach has largely fallen out of favor in the past ten years,
as it has no regard for human rights; however, elements of this approach have remained
in the addiction jurisprudence. The tension in the addiction case law during this period
has been between the human rights approach and the hybrid approach. The development
of the hybrid model provided an alternative to the full-bore human rights analysis,
maintaining elements of the traditional labour relations approach. Nevertheless, this
approach is premised on principles that are both contrary to human rights law and the
sociopolitical model of disability.
Contrary to the sociopolitical model of disability, endorsed by the SCC, the hybrid model
espouses a biomedical concept of disability by focusing on individual pathology, as
opposed to the social and built environment. Emphasizing the culpability of one’s
behaviour, the hybrid model seeks to derive a finding of legal fault from the medical
principle that the capacity to control addiction-related compulsions varies amongst
individuals,166 thus focusing on the element of choice in their behaviour.167 The

164

Moore, supra note 13 at para 33.

165

Meiorin, supra note 15 at para 54.

166

Richard Coleman, “The Clash between Traditional Labour Law and Contemporary Human Rights:
Evaluating the Hybrid Approach to Employee Addiction,” Labour Arbitration Yearbook 2011-2012
(Toronto: Lancaster House, 2012) 183 at 183.

125

examination of an individual’s culpability under this model introduces the consideration
of factors, such as choice and control, that are irrelevant to the human rights analysis and
creates a stricter, narrower test for individuals with addiction disability. This
consequently detracts attention from the effects of the addiction on the individual and
emphasizes concepts of legal responsibility and fault, ultimately eclipsing the duty to
accommodate.168 The hybrid model has failed to provide a principled and consistent
approach towards the accommodation standards reflected in the human rights
jurisprudence, namely Meiorin and British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor
Vehicles) v. British Columbia (Council of Human Rights).169
In an attempt to blend the disciplinary and human rights approaches, the hybrid model
ultimately subordinates fundamental human rights law to labour law principles:
Employers are understandably concerned to maintain their ability to
discharge problem employees. The conceptual difficulty with the hybrid
approach, and the root of all of its weaknesses — analytical and legal — is
the attempt to address those concerns by interpolating the idea of degrees
of culpability within a human rights context, and by attempting to balance
labour law against human rights law without regard to the established
legal hierarchy. It is not a matter of molding human rights law to the
employment context, but of ensuring that the employment context
complies with human rights law. That is the legal requirement in Canada
and not a matter of predilection.
The answer to the problem of addicted employees who commit
employment offenses does not lie in bypassing or diminishing human
rights law, but in applying that law properly and consistently, utilizing the
concepts and tools provided by the courts within the human rights
paradigm, especially undue hardship.170
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Unfortunately, Canadian legal decision makers have opted to adopt this flawed approach,
contrary to human rights laws and principles. The dilution and misinterpretation of
fundamental human rights law is evident in the addiction disability jurisprudence.
Under Canadian human rights law, prior to terminating the employment of an individual
with an addiction, the employer “must prove that their condition adversely affects their
work, has not responded to efforts to accommodate and is not, in the foreseeable future,
likely to improve.” 171 Where the workplace misconduct is attributable to the individual’s
addiction and the evidence demonstrates that they are committed to rehabilitation and a
positive employment relationship can be re-established, most arbitrators are inclined to
give another chance.172 However, this is not always the case. The flexible, liberal human
rights approach, consistent with well-established human rights laws and principles, is not
always applied. Some Canadian legal decision makers continue to diverge from this
approach and impose a narrower standard in cases of alleged discrimination on the basis
of addiction disability and accept a low standard of direct objective evidence of
employers’ undue hardship defense, contrary to human rights jurisprudence and
principles. Placing the focus on blame and culpability, either consciously or
subconsciously, distorts the human rights analysis and elicits the imposition of additional
factors and stricter standards.
As evidenced in Gooding, Wright and McNulty, some decisions fail to regard addiction as
a disability garnering human rights protections, resulting in the misapplication—
specifically, an inappropriately narrow interpretation—of the Moore and Meiorin tests, in
favour of a disciplinary approach. Certainly, there are cases, like Seaspan, Canadian
National Railway, Sunnybrook and Saskatchewan Gaming, that reflect a broad and
generous human rights approach and uphold the employer’s duty to accommodate to the
point of undue hardship. The New Flyer decision also reflects the difficult balancing of
the grievor’s human rights with the likelihood of successful remission and return to work;
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although the arbitrator ultimately decided not to reinstate the grievor’s employment, this
conclusion arose from the particular circumstances of the case—namely, the employer’s
multiple attempts at accommodation and the grievor’s poor prognosis for recovery and
return to work—and not a rejection of the human rights approach. Wright and
Sunnybrook, two cases involving a nurse stealing narcotics from her employer, illustrate
how similar facts and circumstances can lead to starkly different outcomes. The
difference appears to lie in the approach adopted by the legal decision maker: “Running
like a constant thread through these reinstatement rulings is the application of a more
liberal and generous approach towards the definition of disability in human rights law,
and the acceptance of some of the current medical thinking regarding addictions.”173
A segment of the addiction case law departs from the Moore and Meiorin tests and
fundamental human rights principles. As evidenced in this chapter, some legal decision
makers require the employee to establish more than a simple connection between the
addiction and imposed discipline, contrary to Moore, and do not properly assess the
accommodation duty in compliance with Meiorin and based on objective evidence.
Furthermore, some decisions incorrectly accept formal equality, as opposed to
substantive equality, and require direct discrimination as well as discriminatory intent,
stereotyping and arbitrary decision-making on behalf of the employer, thus making it
more difficult to establish prima facie discrimination. Although addiction disability is
recognized as a protected human rights ground, claims of discrimination have been
dismissed on the basis that the addiction did not reach a level of compulsiveness
rendering the individual completely unable to make decisions and recognize their
wrongdoing, importing elements of the disciplinary approach.
Prior to Elk Valley, there was no common approach amongst legal decision makers to
assessing issues of discrimination and accommodation with respect to addiction
disability. Of course, addictions are complex and present unique features and
characteristics that are not shared by most disabilities and these differences appear to
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have contributed to the apparent difficulty in establishing a standard approach towards
addiction disability:
… addiction is a disease; diseases and the manifestation of disease are by
definition not culpable, and by law must be accommodated; but negative
workplace behaviour is normally considered culpable and subject to
discipline. Furthermore, there are elements of the disease of addiction
which legitimately differentiate addiction from most other disabilities,
including components of denial and relapse, both of which may be
affected by the manner in which the suffering employee is dealt with. In
addition, there is a widespread perception that an element of choice and
self-control is involved in addiction that is not present in other disabilities,
which legitimately pits the excuse of compulsion against the effect of
enabling, and more controversially, against the concepts of personal
responsibility and blame. All of this contributes to the challenge of
reconciling the clash between traditional labour law and contemporary
human rights.174
Individuals are also expected to have some degree of awareness of their addiction
disability and be committed to recovery. Consequently, arbitrators have had difficulty
reconciling accommodation principles with the traditional workplace and arbitral
approaches towards an employee’s personal responsibility for their misconduct and
recovery.175 In some cases, this difficulty resulted in the adoption of an approach that
failed to adhere to human rights laws and principles, in favor of a disciplinary-focused
approach. In the pre-Elk Valley era, the addiction disability jurisprudence was
inconsistent, creating uncertainty in the law, and Elk Valley provided the SCC with the
opportunity to offer clear guidance and affirm the proper approach to be applied in such
cases.
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Chapter 5

5

Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp.

Ian Stewart, an employee of Elk Valley Coal Corporation’s (Elk Valley) coalmine near
Hinton, Alberta, had an accident at work while operating a truck. Pursuant to the
company’s drug and alcohol policy, Stewart underwent a urine test, which indicated he
had cocaine in his system at the time. Elk Valley’s subsequent investigation revealed that
Stewart suffered from a drug addiction. Nevertheless, the company decided to terminate
his employment. Brent Bish, Vice President of the United Mine Workers of America,
Local 1656, filed a complaint with the Human Rights Tribunals of Alberta (Tribunal), on
behalf of Stewart, claiming that Elk Valley discriminated against Stewart on the basis of
his addiction, contrary to the Alberta Human Rights Act.1
The Tribunal concluded that Elk Valley terminated Stewart for violating the company’s
drug and alcohol policy, and not for his drug addiction.2 Although Stewart’s addiction
impaired his ability to comply with the workplace policy, the Tribunal held that the
addiction was not a factor in his termination and, therefore, Elk Valley did not
discriminate against Stewart. Stewart appealed the Tribunal’s decision to the Court of
Queen’s Bench of Alberta (ABQB). The ABQB agreed that Elk Valley did not prima
facie discriminate against Stewart on the basis of his addiction but found that the
employer failed to accommodate him to the point of undue hardship.3 Both Stewart and
Elk Valley appealed this decision to the Court of Appeal of Alberta (ABCA), which held
that Elk Valley did not discriminate against Stewart and had fulfilled its accommodation
duty.4
Stewart appealed the ABCA decision to the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC), requesting
the Court to review the Tribunal’s judgment. The SCC granted leave to appeal, making
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Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp. the first addiction disability accommodation case to be
heard by the highest court in the country.5 Elk Valley provided the SCC with the
opportunity to address the apparent inconsistencies in the legal approach applied to
addiction disability cases and provide much needed clarification with respect to the
appropriate approach.
The SCC affirmed the prima facie discrimination test articulated in Moore v. British
Columbia (Education)6 and asserted that stereotypical or arbitrary decision-making is not
a requirement for establishing prima facie discrimination and that the protected human
rights ground must merely be a factor in the adverse impact. The majority of the Court
found sufficient evidence supporting the Tribunal’s decision that Stewart was not
terminated for his addiction, but for breaching the drug policy, and concluded that it was
reasonable for the Tribunal to find no prima facie discrimination.
This chapter provides a summary of the facts in Elk Valley and analyzes the various
levels of decisions respecting this case, with a particular emphasis on the SCC
decisions—the majority, partial dissent and dissent. It examines the decisions from a
human rights perspective and with a biopsychosocial understanding of addiction,
grounded in human rights principles, legislation and jurisprudence, and explores the
implications of the SCC majority decision. The legal reasoning in the SCC majority
decision is faulty; in finding that Mr. Stewart’s termination was not discriminatory, based
on the superficial distinction that Elk Valley terminated him for breaching the employer’s
drug policy, and not for his addiction disability, the majority departed from fundamental
human rights laws and principles as well as the modern scientific understanding of
addiction.

5.1 Facts
Ian Stewart began working for Cardinal River Operations Limited (Cardinal River), the
predecessor of Elk Valley Coal Corporation, in September 1996. Stewart operated trucks
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and wheel loaders in the course of his employment at the coalmine and, from July to
November 2005, he worked as a plant loader operator. Stewart was a member of the
United Mine Workers of America, Local 1656 (Union) and covered by the collective
agreement between Elk Valley and the Union.
In 2000, the Union and the predecessor employer jointly agreed to an alcohol and drug
policy. This policy was subject to review and modification. In May 2005, Elk Valley
unilaterally implemented an amended “Alcohol, Illegal Drugs & Medications Policy”
(Policy), which committed Elk Valley to “providing a safe work environment.”7 Stewart
and other employees attended a training session, where Elk Valley officials explained the
new Policy, and the employees signed a form indicating receipt and understanding of the
Policy. The Policy stated that the use or possession of an illegal drug is prohibited while
on duty or at the operation and, “[w]here an act or omission by an employee who is On
Duty or at one of the Mining Operations causes or contributes to a Significant Event, the
Company as part of the investigation of the cause of the Significant Event may require
the employee to undergo testing.”8 The Policy indicated that it did not apply to off duty
conduct, “where the circumstances do not reasonably support an inference that the
employee’s work performance has been or may be adversely affected.”9
The new Policy affirmed that Elk Valley would assist employees struggling with drug
and alcohol abuse, dependency or addiction, with the goal of prevention and providing
access to treatment resources. The Policy asserted that employees “with a dependency or
addiction” could seek rehabilitative assistance without fear of discipline or termination
before the occurrence of a “Significant Event,” such as a work related incident.10
However, “[i]nvolvement in a rehabilitative effort or seeking rehabilitative help for an
abuse, dependency or addiction problem after a Significant Event has occurred, or after a
demand is made for the employee to undergo testing for reasonable cause under this
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Policy, will not prevent an employee from being disciplined or terminated.”11
Nevertheless, the Policy indicated that Elk Valley would not automatically terminate an
employee who did not reveal a dependency or addiction until after an incident. The
Policy provided that, if an employee violated the Rules of Conduct or tested positive for
drugs or alcohol in a test administered under the policy, Elk Valley would decide whether
or not the employee should be terminated by considering all the relevant circumstances,
including the employee’s employment record, the circumstances surrounding the positive
test result, the pattern of usage, the likelihood that work performance has or may be
negatively affected and the importance of deterring this behaviour by other employees.12
If Elk Valley determined that the conduct warranted discipline, the company would place
“primary importance upon deterring similar behaviour by other employees” and terminate
the employee unless it would be unjust given the circumstances.13 If Elk Valley decided
to continue employment, the employee would be required to take the necessary and
appropriate steps to avoid the risk of future workplace impairment and, if reasonable
under the particular circumstances, Elk Valley could require the employee to undergo
periodic or random testing.14
On October 18, 2005, while operating a loader truck at the worksite, Stewart hit a
stationary 170-ton truck, consequently breaking its mirror. Elk Valley considered the
incident to be a Significant Event under the Policy and required Stewart to undergo drug
testing. The preliminary test revealed the presence of cocaine type drugs. Elk Valley
suspended Stewart, pending confirmation of the test result. The subsequent test
confirmed the presence of cocaine. Elk Valley conducted an investigative meeting where
Stewart was asked about the incident, the drug test and his results. Stewart admitted to
using crack cocaine on his days off work and admitted to using crystal methamphetamine
and marijuana months before the incident. Stewart indicated that he did not think he had a
drug problem prior to the accident but, after talking to a psychologist, he came to realize

11

Ibid.

12

Ibid at para 17.

13

Ibid.

14

Ibid.

133

that he did have a problem and thought he was addicted. Stewart did not approach anyone
at Elk Valley or the Union about his drug use or addiction prior to the incident.
On November 3, Elk Valley terminated Stewart effective immediately. The termination
letter stressed the importance of complying with the Policy and disclosing a drug or
alcohol dependency before a violation, in order to ensure mine site safety. The letter
reiterated the Policy, stating that, “in responding to a violation of the policy the Company
will place primary importance upon deterring similar behaviour by other employees and
will terminate the employee unless termination could be unjust in all of the
circumstances.”15 In the letter, Elk Valley indicated that it would consider an application
for new employment from Stewart after 6 months, given the availability of a suitable
vacancy and if he successfully completed a rehabilitation program and agreed to a 24
month “Recovery Maintenance Agreement,” including terms and conditions to monitor
and ensure his commitment to sobriety; Elk Valley also stated that it would reimburse
50% of Stewart’s rehabilitation program costs, if he successfully complied with the
“Recovery Maintenance Agreement.”16 The next day, Elk Valley received a letter from
Stewart dated November 1, 2005—two days before his termination—stating that he had a
problem and was seeking professional help. He indicated that he could not afford the cost
of the recommended addiction rehabilitation center and asked for the company’s
assistance. While Elk Valley refused to pay the $5,000, the Union offered to pay but
Stewart ultimately decided not to pursue the treatment.
The Union grieved Stewart’s termination and Brent Bish, Vice President of the Union,
also filed a complaint with the Alberta Human Rights Commission, alleging that Elk
Valley discriminated against Stewart on the grounds of physical and mental disability,
contrary to sections 7(1)(a) and (b) of the Alberta Human Rights Act:
No employer shall (a) refuse to employ or refuse to continue to employ
any person, or (b) discriminate against any person with regard to
employment or any term or condition of employment, because of the
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race, religious beliefs, colour, gender, physical disability,17 mental
disability,18 age, ancestry, place of origin, marital status, source of income,
family status or sexual orientation of that person or of any other person.19
Of course, there is an exception where the refusal, limitation, specification or preference
is based on a bona fide occupational requirement.20

5.2 Summary of Previous Decisions
5.2.1 Arbitration and Judicial Review
Arbitrator Lucas, appointed under the terms of the collective agreement, heard the
grievance and suspended Stewart for 24 months and imposed conditions for his
reinstatement.21 Both the Union and Elk Valley applied for a judicial review of the
decision on the grounds that the arbitrator erred in law by assuming, without deciding,
that Stewart’s termination pursuant to the Policy constituted prima facie discrimination.
The ABQB held that the arbitrator made a legal error and set aside the arbitration
decision and remitted the case to a different arbitrator for a rehearing.22 Elk Valley
appealed the decision and the ABCA upheld the ABQB decision, concluding that
remitting the arbitration to a new arbitrator satisfied the standard of reasonableness due to
the reasonable apprehension of bias.23 The Union decided to proceed to the Alberta
Human Rights Tribunal, instead of conducting another arbitration hearing.
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5.2.2 Alberta Human Rights Tribunal
5.2.2.1

Position of the Parties

The human rights complaint proceeded to the Tribunal. On behalf of Stewart, Brent Bish
claimed discrimination on the grounds of “physical and/or mental disability,” contrary to
the Alberta Human Rights Act.24 Bish submitted that Stewart’s drug addiction was a
factor in Elk Valley’s decision to terminate his employment, therefore, the termination
constituted prima facie discrimination. Furthermore, Elk Valley did not accommodate
Stewart to the point of undue hardship; it failed to conduct a medical assessment and
consider other viable options, such as a last chance or rehabilitation agreement.
Elk Valley claimed that terminating Stewart for breaching the Policy did not contravene
the Act, as the safety sensitivity of the mine site required the company to take every
reasonable step to ensure a safe workplace and prevent its employees from using illegal
drugs.25 The employer contended that it terminated Stewart, not because he was a drug
addict, but because he did not stop using drugs before he had a workplace accident,
despite being aware of the Policy.26 Elk Valley claimed that neither Stewart’s termination
nor the Policy amounted to prima facie discrimination; thus, it had no duty to
accommodate Stewart. In the alternative, Elk Valley claimed that, if the termination
constituted prima facie discrimination, it satisfied the duty to accommodate because
placing Stewart on its disability plan and paying for his treatment after the accident
would have sent a message to the other employees in this safety sensitive workplace that
they could continue using drugs until they had an accident.27
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5.2.2.2

Medical Evidence

5.2.2.2.1

Dr. Charl Els

Ian Stewart’s counsel called upon Dr. Charl Els, a psychiatrist and addictions specialist,
to conduct a medical evaluation of Stewart in November 2010 and testify at the Tribunal
hearing on his findings. Dr. Els concluded that, at the time of his termination, Stewart
suffered from “moderate cocaine dependence”28 but was “in full remission” at the time of
the medical assessment.29 Dr. Els described addiction as a chronic brain disease,
characterized by a loss of control,30 and confirmed that denial and cravings—defined as
“‘a strong subjective drive to use the substance’ or ‘a psychological state characterized by
obsessive thoughts and compulsive behaviour’”31—are common elements of addiction.32
In response to the question of whether Stewart was aware of his substance issues, Dr. Els
replied, “I believe that prior to the termination, Mr. Stewart was not aware, and he was
likely to be in the equivalent of the precontemplation stage with elements of denial
explaining it. I do not believe he was aware of the extent of the problem, nor of the
impact it had on his physical use and physical fitness for duty at the mine.”33 Dr. Els
explained that, like most people struggling with substance dependence, Stewart did not
perceive any need for treatment, as he did not believe he had a drug problem.34 Thus, he
did not see the need to access Elk Valley’s assistance program. Dr. Els agreed that Elk
Valley’s policy of terminating employees for a positive drug test after a workplace
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accident deterred drug use but suggested that other consequences, such as the prospect of
having to enter a rehabilitation program, could serve as an equally sufficient deterrent.35

5.2.2.2.2

Dr. Mace Beckson

Elk Valley requested the medical opinion of Dr. Mace Beckson, a psychiatrist and
addictions specialist. Dr. Beckson concluded that Stewart had a mild to moderate case of
cocaine dependence at the time of the accident; he demonstrated a maladaptive pattern of
drug use, resulting in “clinically significant impairment.”36 Stewart acknowledged that he
was sleepy at the time of the incident due to his cocaine use the night before and Dr.
Beckson agreed that the drug consumption impaired his ability to handle the vehicle.37
According to Dr. Beckson, Stewart met three of the seven substance dependence criteria
in the DSM-IV: he spent a substantial amount of time obtaining, using and recovering
from the effects of cocaine; discontinued important social and recreational activities due
to his use; and experienced withdrawal symptoms when he stopped using cocaine.38
Nevertheless, Dr. Beckson concluded that, even though Stewart was addicted to cocaine,
he “did not lack the capacity to change his behavior if he so chose.”39 Adopting the moral
model of addiction, Dr. Beckson opined that, “Addicted individuals have not lost the
capacity to control their behavior; they do not lack the capacity to choose to discontinue
drug use; and they do respond to negative consequences and change their behavior in the
face of potential punishment.”40 The doctor asserted that, despite his addiction, Stewart
was capable of complying with the Policy but simply chose not to,41 pointing to the
choices he made with respect to his cocaine use, such as abstaining while at work, not
going to work in an intoxicated state and limiting the amount he used when he did not
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have enough money. However, this ostensible display of self-control is arguably eclipsed
by the fact that Stewart obtained a second job in order to finance his addiction.42
Stewart’s ability to limit his cocaine use before and during work does not mean he was in
full control of his addiction or addictive behaviours; it may, however, speak to the
severity of his addiction and suggest he was able to restrict his cocaine use in certain
circumstances. Furthermore, Stewart’s efforts to limit his use to when he was off-duty
illustrate his attempts to comply with the workplace policy.
Dr. Beckson also asserted that Stewart’s denial of his addiction did not impair his
decision-making abilities43 and determined that, “[g]iven his capacity for awareness,
decision-making, and follow-through,” he was not disabled from complying with the
Policy.44 While Dr. Beckson emphasized the notion of choice and evidently adopted the
antiquated moral model of addiction, Dr. Charl Els presented a more nuanced
understanding of addiction disability, reflecting the medical model, which should have
been weighed more favorably by the Tribunal.

5.2.2.3

Tribunal Decision

The Tribunal held that Elk Valley did not prima facie discriminate against Stewart. It
determined that Elk Valley terminated Stewart for failing to comply with Elk Valley’s
drug policy and that his addiction was not a factor in the termination.45 The Tribunal also
concluded that the Policy did not adversely impact Stewart because he had the capacity to
comply with its terms.46
The Moore decision, which established the current test for prima facie discrimination,
had not yet been released. Nevertheless, relying on human rights jurisprudence up to that
point, the Tribunal adopted an approach identical to the Moore test and asserted that, in
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order to establish prima facie discrimination, the claimant must demonstrate that: 1) they
had a disability protected under the Act; 2) the respondent terminated their employment
or treated them adversely; and

3) it is reasonable to infer that their disability was a

factor in their termination or adverse treatment.47
The Tribunal contemplated an additional element applied by the SCC minority in McGill
University Health Centre (Montreal General Hospital) v. Syndicat des employés de
l’Hôpital général de Montréal48 and seemingly applied by the majority in Honda Canada
Inc. v. Keays:49 “examining whether the adverse action of the employer based on a
prohibited ground is stereotypical or arbitrary.”50 Nonetheless, the Tribunal affirmed that
“proof of prejudice or stereotyping are not additional evidentiary requirements for the
Complainant in proving prima facie discrimination. Once adverse treatment is shown on
the basis of a prohibited ground, an inference of stereotyping, arbitrariness or
perpetuation of disadvantage will usually be drawn.”51
The Tribunal acknowledged that Stewart had a cocaine addiction at the time of the
incident, constituting a disability under the Act, and that Elk Valley terminated his
employment but determined that his addiction was not a factor in the termination. Similar
to British Columbia (Public Service Agency) v. British Columbia Government and
Service Employees’ Union,52 the evidence indicated that “Mr. Stewart was not fired
because of his disability, but rather because of his failure to stop using drugs, failure to
stop being impaired in the workplace and failing to disclose his drug use” prior to the
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workplace accident.53 Firstly, it is apparent the Tribunal applied the incorrect prima facie
discrimination test. The prima facie discrimination test—correctly stated by the Tribunal
at the outset of the decision—does not demand a causal relationship; it merely requires
the disability to be a factor in the termination. However, the Tribunal inappropriately
imposed the onerous requirement of a causal connection between the termination and
addiction. The Tribunal asserted that, “While any adverse effect of an employer’s
treatment towards an employee, whether intended or not, is part of the discrimination
analysis, the adverse effect must be causally linked, in some fashion, to the disability. In
this case the adverse effect was due to the failure of Mr. Stewart to stop using drugs and
failing to disclose his use prior to the accident.”54 In finding no such causal connection,
the Tribunal ultimately determined that there was no connection between Stewart’s
addiction and his termination. The Tribunal’s decision disregarded the fact that Stewart’s
cocaine addiction impacted his ability to abstain from drugs, in accordance with the
workplace policy, thus, demonstrating the absence of a rudimentary understanding of the
primary manifestations of addiction.
Although the SCC rejected the notion that a claimant’s choices can undermine their
human rights claim, the issue of choice continued to influence lower court decisions
involving addictions, as evidenced in this Tribunal decision.55 In Canada (Attorney
General) v. PHS Community Services Society, the SCC refuted the relevance of choice in
the context of addiction.56 Nevertheless, the Tribunal heavily relied on Dr. Beckson’s
evidence indicating that, although Stewart suffered from a cocaine addiction, he was “not
‘disabled’ from making choices with respect to his compliance with the Policy”57 and
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concluded that denial did not impair Stewart’s ability to comply with the drug policy.58
The Tribunal also accepted Elk Valley’s evidence that Stewart would have been
terminated, regardless of whether he had an addiction or was a casual drug user.59 The
Tribunal incorrectly endorsed a formal notion of equality, as opposed to substantive
equality, and failed to acknowledge the clear presence of indirect discrimination in this
case. Relying on irrelevant factors, external to the legal test for prima facie
discrimination, the Tribunal determined that the termination and Policy were “directed at
accountability for an individual who had the capacity to make choices” and did not
perpetuate stereotypes or disadvantages suffered by individuals with addiction.60
Further, the Tribunal determined that, even if the termination did constitute prima facie
discrimination, it was a bona fide occupational requirement due to the safety-sensitive
work environment and Elk Valley accommodated Stewart to the point of undue hardship,
particularly through the pre-incident assistance plan, the opportunity for future
reemployment and offering to assist with rehabilitation costs.61 However, the pre-incident
assistance plan was effectively inaccessible to Stewart since he did not realize he had a
problem to disclose before the accident occurred and the two other measures do not
constitute accommodation. The fundamental purpose of workplace accommodation is to
enable an individual’s continued employment with the employer; offering to pay for
Stewart’s rehabilitation program and suggesting he can later re-apply for employment,
after termination, does nothing to further the goal of maintaining his current employment.
The Tribunal acknowledged the employer’s duty to inquire about medical information
but concluded that Stewart had the capacity to fulfill his duty to request
accommodation.62 Although Elk Valley did not provide direct objective evidence with
respect to undue hardship, the Tribunal held that, if Elk Valley had to provide an
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individual assessment—required both under human rights law and the company’s own
policy—or impose a lesser punishment, the deterrent effect of the Policy would be
significantly reduced and constitute an undue hardship to the company, given its safety
responsibilities.63 The Tribunal dismissed the complaint and the Union appealed the
decision to the ABQB.

5.2.3 Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta
On behalf of Ian Stewart, Brent Bish objected to the Tribunal’s decision on the basis that
it: (1) applied the incorrect legal test to Stewart’s addiction disability; (2) failed to find a
causal connection between Stewart’s disability and termination; (3) incorrectly inferred
that the absence of Elk Valley’s intention to discriminate was relevant; (4)
inappropriately considered safety risks at the prima facie discrimination stage; (5) failed
to recognize the clear adverse effect discrimination; and (6) misapplied the third step of
the Meiorin test64 in assessing the duty to accommodate to the point of undue hardship.65
Bish argued that the appropriate standard of review was correctness, while Elk Valley
and the Alberta Human Rights Commission argued for the reasonableness standard.66

5.2.3.1

Decision

Justice Michalyshyn of the ABQB heard the appeal. Relying on a series of Alberta
decisions endorsing the application of the correctness standard of review to human rights
panels’ decisions on questions of law, he applied the correctness standard to the issue of
prima facie discrimination.67 The jurisprudence supported the notion that “the nature of
human rights issues are questions of law of general importance to the legal system,” thus
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attracting the correctness standard.68 Justice Michalyshyn concluded that the issue of
whether any existing discrimination was reasonable and justified in the circumstances
was a question of mixed law and fact, subject to the reasonableness standard.69
Justice Michalyshyn held that Stewart’s termination did not constitute prima facie
discrimination and concluded that the Tribunal correctly rejected the notion that “any
connection” between the disability and adverse treatment was sufficient to find prima
facie discrimination.70 He concluded that, taken together, McGill University Health
Centre (Montreal General Hospital) v. Syndicat des employes de l’Hopital General de
Montreal,71 Honda Canada Inc. v. Keays,72 British Columbia (Public Service Agency) v.
British Columbia Government and Service Employees Union73 and Wright v. College and
Association of Registered Nurses of Alberta (Appeals Committee)74 confirmed that the
test for prima facie discrimination included some consideration of whether stereotypical
or arbitrary assumptions underlie the adverse treatment.75 Justice Michalyshyn asserted
that, “Stewart was treated not as a drug addict but as a drug user” and, thus, the decision
to terminate him was not based on arbitrary or stereotypical preconceived notions.76 He
accepted the Tribunal’s conclusion that Stewart was in control of his drug use and Elk
Valley terminated his employment because he failed to stop using drugs and disclose his
drug use, and not because of his addiction.77 The ABQB decision concluded that there
was no causal connection between Stewart’s disability and termination and found no
prima facie discrimination.
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Despite finding no prima facie discrimination, Justice Michalyshyn went on to examine
the issue of accommodation. Bish argued that the Tribunal misapplied the third part of
the Meiorin test and failed to demonstrate that the standard was reasonably necessary to
accomplish the legitimate work-related purpose—namely, ensuring safety. Stewart did
not recognize that he had an addiction disability at the time of the accident and the Policy
only offered protection and confidential, individualized assistance to individuals with a
dependency or addiction, not casual drug users or drug users who later realized they had
an addiction after a workplace incident; thus, Elk Valley’s offer of no-risk self-reporting
was inadequate in this case.78 The Tribunal erred in finding that termination was
appropriate on the basis that Stewart could have reasonably complied with the Policy by
seeking assistance before the accident, because he did not actually know he had an
addiction at the time.79 Accordingly, the ABQB held that the Tribunal erred in finding
that Elk Valley accommodated Stewart to the point of undue hardship.

5.2.4 Court of Appeal of Alberta
Bish, on behalf of Stewart, challenged the ABQB’s decision to dismiss the appeal on the
ground that the Tribunal failed to apply the proper legal test for prima facie
discrimination. Elk Valley, on the other hand, disputed the court’s decision on
accommodation and contended that its Policy and practice established bona fide
occupational requirements. The Alberta Human Rights Commission intervened to argue
that it should receive deference on all legal issues under its authorizing statute.

5.2.4.1

Majority Decision

The ABCA examined whether Stewart’s termination amounted to discrimination on the
basis of his addiction, whether the Tribunal applied the proper legal test for prima facie
discrimination and whether Elk Valley accommodated Stewart to the point of undue
hardship. The ABCA applied the standard of correctness to the legal interpretation of the
Moore and Meiorin tests, as “these definitions are questions of law of fundamental
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significance to the Canadian legal system,”80 and applied the reasonableness standard to
fact findings and findings of mixed fact and law.81 The ABCA majority, comprised of
Justices Picard and Watson, concluded that Stewart’s termination did not amount to
discrimination and dismissed the appeal.82 The majority held that the Tribunal applied the
proper test for prima facie discrimination, finding the legal analysis to be consistent with
Moore and did not import a new requirement that the discrimination must be based on
arbitrariness or the perpetuation of historical stereotypes.83
The ABCA majority asserted that the Moore test requires the disability to be “a real
factor in the adverse impact and not just part of the necessary background.”84
Accordingly, the ABCA concluded that the Tribunal’s decision did not violate the Moore
test because “the disability did not constitute a real factor in the adverse impact” and the
Policy did not distinguish between people with a disability and people without a
disability, it simply distinguished between people who complied with the Policy and
those who did not.85 The ABCA put forward two possible interpretations of the
Tribunal’s decision: firstly, the Tribunal considered arbitrariness and stereotypes as an
alternative to its primary conclusion that Stewart’s disability was unrelated to the adverse
impact—since his disability would have been addressed without discipline had he come
forward prior to the incident and he was capable of complying with the Policy—or,
secondly, the Tribunal effectively determined that the application of the Policy was not a
pretext for discriminatory action against Stewart and there was no evidence of
discrimination revealed by arbitrariness or stereotypical thinking.86 The ABCA did not
find sufficient evidence indicating that arbitrariness or stereotypical thinking motivated
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Elk Valley to terminate Stewart and concluded that the Tribunal did not err in
determining that his disability was not a factor in the adverse impact.87
The ABCA majority also found the Tribunal’s accommodation analysis to be consistent
with the Meiorin test and concluded that the ABQB erred by finding the Tribunal’s
decision to be unreasonable, as the Court’s inference regarding Stewart’s capacity to selfreport before the incident failed to show the required deference to the Tribunal’s factual
findings.88 Emphasizing the objective of maintaining a safe work environment and
deterring employees from neglecting to address or disclose their addiction, the ABCA
held that Elk Valley’s Policy and practices addressed bona fide occupational
requirements and constituted reasonable accommodation for employees with addiction.89

5.2.4.2

Dissenting Decision

In dissent, Justice O’Ferrall determined that the Tribunal and ABQB erred in finding that
Stewart’s addiction was not connected to his dismissal and that he had not established a
prima facie case of discrimination. Justice O’Ferrall asserted that the protected ground
must simply be a part of the causal chain leading to the adverse impact in order to
constitute a factor under the Moore test.90 The Moore test did not require evidence of
arbitrariness or stereotypical behaviour to establish a prima facie case of discrimination
and placing such an obligation on the complainant, before the onus shifted to the
respondent, would prevent most cases of unintentional discrimination from proceeding.91
Justice O’Ferrall concluded that a complainant is simply required to demonstrate a
connection between the protected characteristic and adverse effect.92 In response to the
employer’s argument for the stricter approach applied in Wright and Gooding, Justice
O’Ferrall distinguished the two cases on the basis that they were decided before Moore
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and involved the culpable behavior of theft; he problematically suggested that, in such
situations, there may be a greater onus to demonstrate how the protected characteristic is
connected to the adverse effect.93
Justice O’Ferrall determined that both the Tribunal and ABQB applied the wrong legal
test for prima facie discrimination, stating: “The complainant’s addiction was not just a
factor leading to his dismissal, it was the entire reason for it… the discrimination was
‘because of’ the complainant’s conceded physical or mental disability.”94 Elk Valley
terminated Stewart because it wanted to deter other employees from failing to disclose
their addiction prior to a workplace incident and the Tribunal fundamentally erred by
failing to consider the motive of deterrence in determining whether Stewart’s addiction
was a factor in his termination.95
Justice O’Ferrall also held that Elk Valley failed to accommodate Stewart to the point of
undue hardship. He agreed with the ABQB that the Tribunal erred by finding that Elk
Valley’s voluntary referral program sufficiently accommodated Stewart; the Policy did
not accommodate employees, like Stewart, who were unaware of their addiction and
unable to disclose before an incident.96 He asserted that the Tribunal erred by concluding
that no other penalty besides termination could both accommodate Stewart’s disability
and satisfy Elk Valley’s goal of deterrence, given the available alternatives, such as
suspension without pay.97 The Tribunal also erred in finding that the need for deterrence
superseded the requirement of conducting an individual assessment, prescribed by both
Meiorin as a procedural duty as well as the company’s own policy.98
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5.3 Supreme Court of Canada Decision
Bish, on behalf of Stewart, appealed the ABCA decision to the SCC and raised three
issues on appeal. First, Bish asserted that the correctness standard of review should be
applied, as the legal tests for prima facie discrimination and the duty to accommodate
“must be based on the same elements and the same degree of proof in every case, applied
in an objectively principled way.”99 The respondents—Elk Valley, Cardinal River
Operations and the Alberta Human Rights Commission—contended that issues related to
findings of mixed fact and law, including the application of the Moore and Meiorin tests,
were within the Tribunal’s expertise and subject to the reasonableness standard.100
Second, Bish argued that the Tribunal erred in concluding that prima facie discrimination
had not been established in this case. Third, the Tribunal erred in finding Elk Valley met
its burden of establishing undue hardship.101

5.3.1 Majority Decision
Chief Justice McLachlin and Justices Abella, Karakatsanis, Côté, Brown and Rowe
formed the majority in Elk Valley, with the Chief Justice articulating the majority’s
reasoning. The majority applied deference to the Tribunal’s decision and found its
conclusion, that Stewart’s addiction was not a factor in his termination, to be reasonable.
The SCC accordingly upheld the termination and dismissed the appeal.

5.3.1.1

Standard of Review

The majority briefly addressed the issue of standard of review and determined that the
Tribunal’s decision attracted deference. Although questions of law typically attract the
standard of correctness and the SCC ultimately holds the responsibility of “assur[ing]
uniformity, consistency and correctness in the articulation, development and
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interpretation of legal principles throughout the Canadian judicial system,”102 the
majority applied the reasonableness standard to all issues raised in the appeal, including
the Tribunal’s application of the Moore and Meiorin tests. Chief Justice McLachlin, on
behalf of the majority, asserted:
In sum, this case involves the application of settled principles on
workplace disability discrimination to a particular fact situation. The
nature of the particular disability at issue — in this case addiction — does
not change the legal principles to be applied. The debates here are not
about the law, but about the facts and the inferences to be drawn from the
facts. These issues were within the purview of the Tribunal, and attract
deference. The only question is whether the Tribunal’s decision was
reasonable.103
However, the apparent differences in the interpretation of the prima facie discrimination
test by the Tribunal and lower courts, including the issue of whether the individual must
establish arbitrariness or stereotyping, suggested that the legal principles regarding
workplace disability discrimination were not, in fact, settled.104 The conflicting
application of the prima facie discrimination test by the SCC majority and dissenting
justices also called into question whether the law was settled.105 Accordingly, the
decision to apply deference to the interpretation of such fundamental legal principles was
arguably inappropriate.

5.3.1.2

Was the Tribunal’s Decision Unreasonable?

In Elk Valley, the SCC majority reaffirmed the prima facie discrimination test originally
established in Moore, and later affirmed in Quebec (Commission des droits de la
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personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Bombardier Inc. (Bombardier Aerospace
Training Center):106
To make a case of prima facie discrimination, “complainants are required
to show that they have a characteristic protected from discrimination under
the Code; that they experienced adverse impact with respect to the service;
and that the protected characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact”:
Moore, at para. 33. Discrimination can take many forms, including
“‘indirect’ discrimination”, where otherwise neutral policies may have an
adverse effect on certain groups: Quebec (Commission des droits de la
personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Bombardier Inc. (Bombardier
Aerospace Training Center), 2015 SCC 39, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 789, at para.
32. Discriminatory intent on behalf of an employer is not required to
demonstrate prima facie discrimination: Bombardier, at para. 40.107
The majority concluded that, “[t]he Tribunal cited the proper legal test and noted, at para.
117, that it was ‘not necessary that discriminatory considerations be the sole reason for
the impugned actions in order for there to be a contravention of the Act.’”108 However,
although the Tribunal initially cited the correct prima facie discrimination test, it later
deviated from this test, asserting that, “the adverse effect must be causally linked, in
some fashion, to the disability.”109 The Tribunal ultimately imposed the requirement of a
causal connection between Stewart’s addiction and his termination, contrary to the wellestablished prima facie discrimination test.
As the first two elements of the prima facie discrimination test were not contested by the
parties, the SCC went on to examine the Tribunal’s finding that Stewart’s addiction was
not a factor in his termination: “In the Tribunal’s view, Mr. Stewart was fired not because
he was addicted, but because he had failed to comply with the terms of the Policy, and for
no other reason. The Tribunal also concluded that Mr. Stewart was not adversely
impacted by the Policy because he had the capacity to comply with its terms.”110 The
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majority stated that the only question before the Court was whether the Tribunal’s
conclusion was reasonable—essentially whether “the decision is within a ‘range of
possible, acceptable outcomes’ which are defensible in respect of the evidence and the
law”111—and ultimately found the decision that Stewart’s addiction was not a factor in
his termination to be reasonable. However, the majority failed to recognize that the
Tribunal applied the incorrect prima facie discrimination test and required more than a
connection between the disability and termination. Imposing the requirement of a causal
connection, the Tribunal found that Stewart’s addiction had not reached this threshold
and erroneously concluded that it was not a factor at all. It is difficult to conceive how the
adoption of incorrect legal principles amounted to the reasonable application of the prima
facie discrimination test and a reasonable legal decision, as the majority found.
In coming to its conclusion, the majority reviewed the evidence and summarized the
Tribunal’s findings, as follows:
The Tribunal found, based on the evidence before him, that Mr. Stewart
was terminated “due to the failure of Mr. Stewart to stop using drugs and
failing to disclose his use prior to the accident” (para. 120). It accepted
that people with addictions may experience denial and that the distinction
between termination due to disability and termination due to the failure to
follow a policy may appear “superficial” given that the failure to follow a
policy may be a symptom of an addiction or disability (para. 122).
However, in the circumstances of this case, the Tribunal found that the
evidence established that the Policy adversely impacted Mr. Stewart not
because of denial “but rather because he chose not to stop his drug use or
disclose his drug use” (para. 122).
…
The Tribunal went on to consider whether the Policy itself adversely
impacted Mr. Stewart because of his addiction. In that context, the
Tribunal noted that “Mr. Stewart would have been fired whether or not he
was an addict or a casual user” (para. 123) and that “[t]he Policy as
applied to Mr. Stewart which resulted in Mr. Stewart’s termination was
not applied due to his disability” (para. 125). The Tribunal concluded that
Mr. Stewart had “the capacity to make choices” about his drug use (para.
126). In the Tribunal’s view, the expert evidence in this case demonstrated
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that Mr. Stewart’s addiction did not diminish his capacity to comply with
the terms of the Policy. Accordingly, the Policy did not adversely impact
Mr. Stewart [emphasis added].112
The majority determined that there was sufficient evidence capable of supporting the
Tribunal’s conclusion that Stewart was not terminated for his addiction, but rather the
breach of the Policy, and accepted the Tribunal’s finding that he had the capacity to
comply. Accordingly, the majority held it was reasonable for the Tribunal to find no
prima facie discrimination.113
The language used by the Tribunal, and cited by the SCC majority above, is revealing.
The terms “due to” and “because of” indicate the Tribunal sought a causal relationship,
not just a connection, between Stewart’s drug addiction and the termination of his
employment. This inappropriately stringent application of the third step of the prima facie
discrimination test is inconsistent with the Moore test, as clarified in Bombardier.114
Furthermore, the majority accepted the Tribunal’s conclusion that the Policy only
adversely impacted Stewart because he “chose” not to stop using drugs or disclose his use
to the employer and that the Policy was not discriminatory because it applied to both
casual drug users and individuals with addictions. The imposition of a causal connection
requirement, relying on reasoning based on “choice” to defeat a discrimination claim,
placing emphasis on the employer’s intent rather than the resulting discriminatory effect
and the acceptance of a formal equality approach to discrimination are problematic and
inconsistent with human rights law jurisprudence.115 It is unclear how this constituted a
reasonable application of the prima facie discrimination test, as the majority
concluded.116 To find a connection between the addiction and termination under the
Moore test, Stewart’s addiction must have merely impacted his ability to stop using drugs
and comply with the Policy in some way. The Tribunal disregarded the indirect
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discrimination resulting from the application of the Policy and the majority failed to
acknowledge this error.
The majority rejected the Union’s claim that the Tribunal’s conclusion could be
interpreted to mean that, although the breach of the Policy was the primary cause of the
termination, Stewart’s addiction was still a factor in the termination, because the Tribunal
“unequivocally and repeatedly stated that addiction was not a factor.”117 Certainly, the
Tribunal came to this conclusion; however, that in itself does not make it true or even
reasonable. The majority also dismissed the argument that Stewart’s denial prevented him
from disclosing his addiction prior to the accident, in compliance with the Policy. The
majority accepted the Tribunal’s determination that, although Stewart may have been in
denial, “he knew he should not take drugs before working, and he had the ability to
decide not to take them as well as the capacity to disclose his drug use to his employer”
and held that denial was irrelevant in this case.118
Chief Justice McLachlin stated that, “It cannot be assumed that Mr. Stewart’s addiction
diminished his ability to comply with the terms of the Policy,”119 and went on to assert
that the ability of an individual to control their addictive behaviours should be
conceptualized and assessed on a spectrum:
In some cases, a person with an addiction may be fully capable of
complying with workplace rules. In others, the addiction may effectively
deprive a person of the capacity to comply, and the breach of the rule will
be inextricably connected with the addiction. Many cases may exist
somewhere between these two extremes. Whether a protected
characteristic is a factor in the adverse impact will depend on the facts
and must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The connection between an
addiction and adverse treatment cannot be assumed and must be based on
evidence: Health Employers Assn. of British Columbia v. B.C.N.U., 2006
BCCA 57, 54 B.C.L.R. (4th) 113, at para. 41 [emphasis added].120
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Although it is important to acknowledge that addictions range in severity, it cannot be
forgotten that the very fact of being diagnosed with a drug or alcohol addiction means the
individual is experiencing severe symptoms and difficulties controlling their substance
use. It is difficult to imagine how a drug addiction would have absolutely no impact on an
individual’s ability to comply with a workplace drug policy. Furthermore, Stewart’s state
of denial, the presence of which was not refuted by the employer’s medical expert,
impeded his ability to comply with the disclosure component of the Policy. Nevertheless,
the Tribunal, applying more of an all-or-nothing approach, found Stewart completely
capable of complying with the Policy, resulting in the unreasonable decision that his
addiction disability was not a factor in his termination.
The SCC majority found “ample evidence” to support the Tribunal’s conclusion that
there was no prima facie discrimination and found no basis to overturn its decision.121 In
accepting the Tribunal’s findings, the majority failed to acknowledge that Stewart’s
addiction played any role in his termination, even though the addiction clearly impaired
his ability to comply with the drug policy—an issue raised in Justice Gascon’s dissent.122
In light of its determination on prima facie discrimination, the majority did not proceed to
examine the issue of accommodation.
The majority confirmed that stereotypical or arbitrary decision-making was not a standalone requirement for demonstrating prima facie discrimination and should not be added
as a fourth requirement.123 Chief Justice McLachlin affirmed the test for prima facie
discrimination, stating:
I see no need to alter the settled view that the protected ground or
characteristic need only be “a factor” in the decision. It was suggested in
argument that adjectives should be added: the ground should be a
“significant” factor, or a “material” factor. Little is gained by adding
adjectives to the requirement that the impugned ground be “a factor” in the
adverse treatment. In each case, the Tribunal must decide on the factor or
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factors that played a role in the adverse treatment. This is a matter of fact.
If a protected ground contributed to the adverse treatment, then it must be
material.124
This approach is consistent with the Moore test and Bombardier, where the SCC
confirmed that the prohibited ground must have simply contributed to the discriminatory
conduct,125 aside from the suggestion that there must be a connection between the
disability and the employer’s decision to terminate, rather than the termination itself. In
light of the previous accurate restatement of the Moore test126 and the declaration that
there was “no need to alter the settled view,” this was likely an oversight on the part of
the majority. However, read literally, it drastically changes the nature of the prima facie
discrimination test to require direct discrimination.
The SCC jurisprudence has established that an individual must simply establish a
connection, not a causal connection, between the prohibited ground of discrimination and
the adverse treatment;127 requiring a causal connection would impose an inappropriately
onerous obligation.128 Nevertheless, the decisions of the Tribunal, ABQB and ABCA
majority in this case were inconsistent with this approach, as they appeared to suggest the
requirement of a causal connection. Despite seemingly affirming the prima facie
discrimination test established in Moore and clarified in Bombardier, the SCC majority
neglected to acknowledge that the Tribunal did not actually apply this test. The Tribunal
sought a causal connection between Stewart’s drug addiction and his termination, which
is an inappropriately stringent application of the third step of the prima facie
discrimination test. Consequently, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that Stewart’s
addiction had no impact on his ability to comply with the employer’s drug policy, which,
quite frankly, is contrary to the very nature of addiction. The apparent difficulty of the
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SCC majority in recognizing the Tribunal’s unreasonable application of the prima facie
discrimination test casts serious doubt on whether the test was actually settled law.129
The majority’s extreme, and arguably unwarranted, deference to the Tribunal suggests
there may have been underlying policy reasons for favoring such a strict approach to
discrimination claims on the basis of addiction.130 Perhaps, the safety-sensitive nature of
the energy industry implicitly impacted the outcome.131 In justifying the Tribunal’s
decision, Chief Justice McLachlin appeared to espouse floodgates reasoning, stating:
If an employee fails to comply with a workplace policy for a reason
related to addiction, the employer would be unable to sanction him in any
way, without potentially violating human rights legislation. Again, to take
an example given by the majority of the Court of Appeal, if a nicotineaddicted employee violates a workplace policy forbidding smoking in the
workplace, no sanction would be possible without discrimination
regardless of whether or not that employee had the capacity to comply
with the policy [emphasis added].132
This comment revealed the majority’s concern with opening the floodgates for addiction
discrimination claims and problematically conflated the prima facie discrimination and
accommodation analyses. The question of whether disciplinary action is appropriate in
the particular circumstances must be assessed at the bona fide occupational requirement
stage of the accommodation analysis, not by importing these considerations into the
prima facie discrimination test.133 This would place a significantly greater burden on the
employee and serve as a barrier to establishing a claim of prima facie discrimination.134
Employers may have legitimate concerns and reasons for imposing discipline to deter
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substance use that could affect job performance or pose a safety risk.135 However, it is
important to remember that these concerns are to be considered and assessed after prima
facie discrimination has been established; they are not meant to defeat a claim of prima
facie discrimination, as it arguably did in Elk Valley.

5.3.2 The Partial Dissent: Justices Moldaver and Wagner
Justices Moldaver and Wagner dissented from the majority in part. The justices held that
prima facie discrimination had been established and found the Tribunal’s conclusion that
Stewart’s cocaine addiction was not a factor in his termination to be unreasonable.
However, Justices Moldaver and Wagner concluded that the Tribunal reasonably held
that the employer fulfilled its obligation to accommodate Stewart to the point of undue
hardship and, thus, did not discriminate against him on the basis of his addiction.
Applying the Moore test, Justices Moldaver and Wagner found a connection between
Stewart’s addiction and his termination:
We accept the Tribunal’s finding that Mr. Stewart was not wholly
incapacitated by his addiction and maintained some residual control over
his drug use. But we fail to see how the Tribunal could reasonably
conclude that because Mr. Stewart had a limited ability to make choices
about his drug use, there was no connection between his dependency on
cocaine and his termination on the basis of testing positive for cocaine
after being involved in a workplace accident.
To prove prima facie discrimination, Mr. Stewart is not required to show
that his termination was caused solely or even primarily by his drug
dependency. Rather, Mr. Stewart must only show that there is a
“connection” between the protected ground — his drug dependency —
and the adverse effect: Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et
des droits de la jeunesse) v. Bombardier Inc. (Bombardier Aerospace
Training Center), 2015 SCC 39, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 789, at para. 52. We
agree with Gascon J. that Mr. Stewart’s exercise of some control over his
drug use merely reduced the extent to which his dependency contributed to
his termination — it did not eliminate it as a “factor” in his termination
(para. 120). Mr. Stewart’s impaired control over his cocaine use was
obviously connected to his termination for testing positive for cocaine
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after being involved in a workplace accident. In our view, the Tribunal
unreasonably focused on Mr. Stewart’s limited capacity to control his
choices and behaviour regarding his use of drugs and failed to consider the
connection between his drug dependency and his employer’s decision to
fire him.136
Unlike the majority, Justices Moldaver and Wagner appreciated the impact Stewart’s
addiction had on his drug use and capacity to abstain from drugs, in compliance with the
workplace policy. Accordingly, the justices concluded that Stewart’s impaired control
over his cocaine use was “obviously connected” to his termination.137
Justices Moldaver and Wagner assessed Elk Valley’s accommodation duty and found it
was reasonable for the Tribunal to conclude that Stewart’s termination was reasonably
necessary to ensure that the deterrent effect of the Policy was not significantly
reduced.138 Given the safety-sensitive nature of the workplace and Elk Valley’s safety
obligations, it was important for the employer to deter other employees from using drugs
in a manner that could impair their work performance or pose a safety risk. Justices
Moldaver and Wagner asserted that subjecting Stewart to an individual assessment or
imposing a temporary unpaid suspension, rather than termination, would have
undermined the deterrent effect of the drug policy and its valid objective of preventing
serious harm in the safety-sensitive workplace.139 Thus, it was reasonable for the
Tribunal to conclude that incorporating aspects of individual accommodation within the
workplace standard would constitute undue hardship.140
Justices Moldaver and Wagner found that Elk Valley provided reasonable
accommodation—namely, the opportunity to apply for re-employment after six months,
upon the completion of a rehabilitation program, and the offer to pay for 50% of the cost
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of the program, subject to certain conditions.141 However, as mentioned above, neither of
these proposals actually constituted workplace accommodation, as they did not sustain
Stewart’s continued employment with Elk Valley. Nevertheless, Justices Moldaver and
Wagner concluded that it was reasonable for the Tribunal to find that Elk Valley fulfilled
its duty to accommodate to the point of undue hardship and did not discriminate against
Stewart on the basis of his drug addiction.

5.3.3 The Dissent: Justice Gascon
Justice Gascon’s reasoning is most in line with the law on discrimination and reasonable
accommodation, human rights principles and a broad, generous approach to interpreting
human rights legislation. Departing from the majority decision and partial dissent, he
found the Tribunal’s decision, with respect to both prima facie discrimination and the
duty to accommodate, to be unreasonable.
Notably, Justice Gascon proceeded by identifying the obstacles and challenges arising in
addiction disability cases, stating:
Still, stigmas surrounding drug dependence — like the belief that
individuals suffering from it are the authors of their own misfortune or that
their concerns are less credible than those of people suffering from other
forms of disability — sometimes impair the ability of courts and society to
objectively assess the merits of their discrimination claims. These stigmas
contribute to the “uneasy fit of drug addiction and drug testing policies in
the human rights arena” noted by the Alberta Human Rights Commission
(the “Tribunal”) below (Tribunal reasons, 2012 AHRC 7, at para. 153
(CanLII)).
Yet, as drug-dependent persons represent one of the marginalized
communities that could easily be caught in a majoritarian blind spot in the
discrimination discourse, they of course require equal protection from the
harmful effects of discrimination. In my view, improper considerations
relied on by the Tribunal here — such as drug-dependent persons having
some control over their choices and being treated “equally” to non-drugdependent persons under drug policies, and drug policies not necessarily
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being arbitrary or stereotypical — effectively excluded Mr. Stewart, a
drug-dependent person, from the scope of human rights protections.142
Justice Gascon vehemently disagreed with the majority’s decision, stating that a
workplace policy that, in application, automatically terminates an employee who uses
drugs prima facie discriminates against individuals with addictions.143 Stewart’s
addiction was very much a factor in his drug use, which was ultimately the basis for his
termination. Furthermore, he concluded that Elk Valley failed to discharge its duty to
accommodate Stewart to the point of undue hardship.144 Although the safety-sensitive
nature of a workplace may prompt the implementation of strict drug policies, “such
policies, even if well-intentioned, are not immune from human rights scrutiny.”145
Justice Gascon agreed with the majority that, given the Court recently settled the tests for
discrimination and the duty to accommodate, the Tribunal’s decision, “which at least
noted these settled legal principles and merely purported to apply them to the facts at
issue,” should be reviewed on the standard of reasonableness.146 Although the majority
identified the correct prima facie discrimination test, it failed to recognize how the
Tribunal applied the test unreasonably. Justice Gascon asserted that the majority decision
deviated from the established approach by (1) failing to detect the Tribunal’s
misunderstanding of the factor test for contribution, under the third step of the analysis;
(2) implicitly affirming the erroneous legal principles the Tribunal relied upon in its
reasoning; and (3) improperly importing justification considerations, belonging in the
accommodation analysis, into the prima facie discrimination test.147
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The majority failed to recognize that the Tribunal’s reasoning was premised on incorrect
legal principles. Justice Gascon contended that the Tribunal’s decision was not actually
concerned with whether Stewart’s drug addiction contributed to his termination:
Rather, the Tribunal was concerned with whether Mr. Stewart’s addiction
was (1) an irrepressible factor in his termination, i.e. a factor which was
completely beyond his control (an improper approach, as I explain below,
and as the Chief Justice recognizes at para. 46); and (2) a factor in Elk
Valley’s decision to terminate Mr. Stewart (i.e. the intent requirement
rejected by this Court’s jurisprudence, as I explained above, and about
which the Chief Justice also agrees at para. 24). In light of these errors,
while the Tribunal may have repeatedly found that Mr. Stewart’s addiction
was not a factor in his harm, that conclusion was based on
misapprehensions of principle and is therefore undeserving of
deference.148
The Tribunal narrowed the prima facie discrimination analysis by essentially requiring
direct discrimination and the addiction to be more than a factor in the adverse impact.
The majority found the Tribunal’s conclusion to be reasonable on the basis that Stewart’s
addiction purportedly did not diminish his capacity to comply with the employer’s policy.
However, the Tribunal did not conclude that Stewart’s addiction did not impair his ability
to comply with the policy, but rather that it did not eliminate his capacity to comply:
… the Tribunal’s various choice-related findings — i.e. that Mr. Stewart
“was able to make choices” about drug use (para. 121); “could, and in fact
did make rational choices” about drug use (para. 122); and “had the
capacity to make choices” about drug use (para. 126) — only mean that
Mr. Stewart maintained some residual control over his choice to use
drugs, not that he maintained complete unimpaired control over that
choice. In my view, that is the only possible interpretation of these
findings when the Tribunal found that Mr. Stewart was addicted to cocaine
(para. 118) and interpreted “addiction” as meaning “impaired control”
over drug use (para. 109). As a result, admitting that Mr. Stewart had
impaired control regarding drug use is irreconcilable with that control
being in no way diminished by his addiction [emphasis added].149

148

Ibid at para 87.

149

Ibid at para 88.

162

Addiction, by its very nature, entails a diminished ability to resist using the addictive
substance. A person diagnosed with a drug addiction would experience, to some degree, a
diminished capacity to control their choices and behaviours regarding drug use,150 thus
establishing the necessary connection between the disability and discipline for violating
the employer’s drug policy.
By approvingly summarizing how the Tribunal limited its’ reasoning to discriminatory
intent rather than effect, despite recognizing that intent is not required to establish prima
facie discrimination, and relied on notions of choice and formal equality, the majority
decision implicitly affirmed these erroneous legal principles.151 The majority also
appeared to endorse a narrow interpretation of prima facie discrimination “to preserve the
enforceability of drug and alcohol policies,”152 inappropriately importing justificatory
considerations, such as the importance of the workplace policy, into the prima facie
discrimination analysis and espousing a narrow understanding of the factor test.153
Justice Gascon identified four conceptual errors in the Tribunal’s prima facie
discrimination analysis: (1) requiring Stewart to make prudent choices to avoid
discrimination; (2) limiting Stewart’s human rights protections to a sense of formal
equality; (3) requiring Stewart to prove the employer treated him arbitrarily or
stereotypically; and (4) requiring Stewart to establish a causal relationship between his
addiction and termination.154 Importing considerations of choice into the prima facie
discrimination test fundamentally alters the nature of the analysis, effectively requiring
the protected ground to be a direct factor in the adverse impact, as opposed to just a
factor.155 It problematically places the burden on employees to avoid discrimination,
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rather than on employers to not discriminate,156 and places blame on marginalized
communities for their choices, reinforcing stigma and stereotypes.157 Justice Gascon
rejected the Tribunal’s conclusion that, because Stewart had the capacity to make some
choices with respect to his drug use, his termination resulted from his choice to use drugs,
and not his addiction. This reasoning “has the effect of denying human rights protections
to a vast majority of drug-dependent people who, despite their addiction, most likely
maintain some modicum of control over things as basic as ‘when and where’ they use
drugs.”158 Furthermore, relying on principles of formal equality, the Tribunal disregarded
the presence of indirect discrimination. The Tribunal asserted that the Policy’s equal
treatment of individuals with and without addictions prevented it from being
discriminatory; however, such “equal” treatment only relates to direct discrimination and
does not exhaust the prima facie discrimination analysis.159 The Tribunal also improperly
imported considerations of arbitrariness and stereotyping into the prima facie
discrimination analysis.
The Tribunal misinterpreted and misapplied the factor analysis by requiring a causal
connection and assessing discriminatory intent, rather than effect. Justice Gascon
interpreted the Tribunal’s assertion that Stewart’s addiction was not a factor in his
termination to mean that the addiction was not a factor in Elk Valley’s decision to
terminate his employment—in other words, Elk Valley did not intentionally discriminate
against Stewart, but this is the incorrect legal test.160 The Tribunal “relied on Gooding for
the proposition that a ground is not a factor in harm unless it plays a role ‘in the
employer’s decision’ to terminate an employee,” narrowing the scope of prima facie
discrimination to direct and intentional discrimination.161
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The evidence established that Stewart’s addiction was at least one factor in his
termination. Justice Gascon recognized that, “Mr. Stewart had an impaired ability to
comply with the Policy in two respects: (1) it prohibited drug use, which he uniquely and
inordinately craved; and (2) it provided accommodation to drug-addicted persons, which
he appears to have denied being — a symptom of his addiction.” 162 This established the
necessary connection between his disability and termination:
It is true that Mr. Stewart was not wholly incapacitated by his addiction
and maintained some residual control over his choices (paras. 121-22). But
that merely diminishes the extent to which his dependence contributed to
his harm, it does not eliminate it as “a factor”. To require complete
incapacitation for addiction to ground a discrimination claim would
effectively erase addiction from the scope of legal disability. This is
because addiction, by definition, refers to impaired, not eliminated,
control. According to the Chief Justice, the Tribunal “rejected this
argument” based “on the facts” of this case (paras. 38-39). But, in reality,
the Tribunal did not reject this argument; rather, it avoided it by
interpreting the “factor” test as relating to discriminatory intent, not
adverse effect, and by improperly requiring absolute incapacity to ground
a claim relating to discrimination based on addiction [emphasis added].163
With respect to accommodation, Justice Gascon concluded that the Tribunal identified
the correct test but disagreed with its finding that Elk Valley fulfilled its duty to
accommodate. The employer failed to conduct an individualized assessment of Stewart as
part of its accommodation efforts to determine reasonable alternative measures, contrary
to its own Policy and human rights principles. In fact, the employer did not provide him
with any accommodation:
A policy that “accommodates” employees through mechanisms which are
either inaccessible by the employee due to their disability or only
applicable to the employee post-termination cannot justify prima facie
discrimination. Before his termination, Mr. Stewart was purportedly
accommodated by the offer of lenient treatment if he voluntarily disclosed
his drug dependence. But that accommodation was inaccessible by him
because he, as the Tribunal found, appeared to have been unaware of his
dependence, a symptom of his disability. After his termination, Mr.
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Stewart was allegedly accommodated by being given the prospect of
reapplying for his position. But, again, accommodation assists employees
in their sustained employment, not former employees who may, or may
not, successfully reapply for the position they lost as a result of a prima
facie discriminatory termination.164
Elk Valley failed to consider Stewart’s circumstances—for example, the extent of his
addiction, employment history and capacity for rehabilitation—before terminating his
employment. The Tribunal justified this omission partly on the basis that Stewart
disregarded his duty to request accommodation, given his “capacity” to do so.165
However, Stewart’s ability to make some choices about his drug use did not eliminate
Elk Valley’s accommodation duty: “Complainants’ choices, imprudent or otherwise, do
not weaken their human rights, either in law or in policy. Such an approach reverses the
burden and requires that complainants avoid discrimination.”166 Justice Gascon
concluded that neither the pre-incident nor post-incident accommodations offered by Elk
Valley qualified as reasonable accommodation, as they were not accessible to Stewart
during his employment. He opined that the Tribunal should have considered the deterrent
effect of alternative penalties, such as suspension without pay.167

5.4 Conclusion
The majority SCC decision in Elk Valley exhibited an unfortunate disregard of the wellestablished fundamental human rights laws and principles that are at the very heart of
Canadian human rights law. The most problematic and disappointing aspect of the
majority’s decision is its silence on the various flaws and departures from fundamental
human rights law demonstrated in the Tribunal’s analysis—specifically, requiring a
causal relationship between the employee’s addiction and adverse impact; importing
additional requirements into the analysis, such as requiring the employee to make prudent
choices to avoid discrimination, demonstrate a complete lack of self-control and establish
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arbitrary or stereotypical treatment and discriminatory intent; limiting human rights
protections to formal equality; and accepting insufficient evidence of accommodation. By
not acknowledging the various flaws in reasoning and deviations from established human
rights law, the majority appeared to accept these erroneous legal principles. Despite
explicitly affirming the prima facie discrimination test articulated in Moore, the majority
failed to acknowledge the Tribunal’s various departures from this test. In finding the
Tribunal’s decision to be reasonable, in spite of these flaws, the SCC left many
unanswered questions with respect to the legal and evidentiary requirements for
satisfying the prima facie discrimination test, particularly, the third element—establishing
a connection between the protected human rights characteristic and adverse impact.
Affirming the approach in Moore and Bombardier, Elk Valley seemingly settled the test
for establishing prima facie discrimination; however, it is clear from the decision that
differences in opinion still remained with respect to the legal and evidentiary
requirements for satisfying the test, particularly the factor element, in cases of indirect
discrimination.168 Although Elk Valley purportedly involved “the application of settled
principles on workplace disability discrimination,”169 as asserted by the majority, the
SCC justices did not apply a unanimous approach to prima facie discrimination and
accommodation—demonstrating disagreement regarding these ostensibly settled,
fundamental legal principles. Justice Gascon’s approach to discrimination and workplace
accommodation adhered to foundational, established human rights law, while the
majority and partial dissent endorsed divergent legal tests and principles. The SCC
justices’ apparent difficulty in recognizing the Tribunal’s unreasonable application of the
legal tests seriously calls into question whether the law has actually been settled in this
regard.170
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Despite correctly identifying the relevant legal tests and principles, the majority failed to
acknowledge the Tribunal’s clear departure from the very human rights analyses it
endorsed. The majority’s acceptance of the Tribunal decision, despite being riddled with
various legal errors and flaws, is concerning and reflects uncertainty in addiction law:
[W]hile the majority claims that the test for discrimination is settled, its
deference to the application of that test by the Tribunal, along with its own
language and reasoning, indicate that several trouble spots remain: the
application of the factor/contribution step and whether a causal link is
required in practice; the reliance on “choice” as a means of defeating a
discrimination claim, a particular concern in cases involving addictions;
the focus on the employer’s intent rather than effects and corresponding
erasure of adverse effects discrimination; and the endorsement of a formal
equality approach to discrimination.171
Furthermore, the Tribunal decision also indicated that an employee must demonstrate
arbitrary or stereotypical treatment in order to establish discrimination—a principle
rejected by the SCC. Arising from the application of the incorrect legal test and reliance
on medical evidence based on the moral model of addiction, the Tribunal came to the
unreasonable conclusion that Stewart’s drug addiction was not a factor in his termination.
Making the superficial distinction that the employer terminated Stewart for violating the
drug policy, as opposed to the drug addiction that led to this behaviour, should not
preclude a finding of prima facie discrimination and evade an individual’s human rights
protections. The Moore test merely requires a connection between the addiction and
termination. It is inconceivable how a drug addiction, which by its very nature impacts an
individual’s ability to control and limit their drug use, to some degree, has absolutely no
connection to their termination for breaching the employer’s drug policy. Clearly,
Stewart’s addiction impaired his ability to fully comply with the drug policy, which
ultimately led to his termination. Had the Tribunal reasonably applied the legal test it
identified, it would have found prima facie discrimination in this case; its decision to the
contrary was absolutely unreasonable.172
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The conclusion that the Tribunal’s decision was reasonable demonstrates a lack of
rudimentary understanding of addiction and its primary symptoms. The majority’s
decision was internally inconsistent and failed to correspond with its findings regarding
the existence and nature of Stewart’s addiction. Astutely articulated in his dissent, Justice
Gascon asserted that:
The Chief Justice accepts that “[t]he question, at base, is whether at least
one of the reasons for the adverse treatment was the employee’s
addiction” (para. 43). In my view, drug addiction was at least one, if not
the central, factor in Mr. Stewart’s termination for drug use. The Tribunal
found, and both parties’ experts opined, that addiction means “impaired
control” over drug use (para. 109). The Tribunal also found that Mr.
Stewart was drug-dependent with respect to cocaine (para. 118). Both
experts agreed that Mr. Stewart was unaware of his drug dependence at
the time of the incident (paras. 58, 61, 66 and 80). Accordingly, Mr.
Stewart had an impaired ability to comply with the Policy in two respects:
(1) it prohibited drug use, which he uniquely and inordinately craved; and
(2) it provided accommodation to drug-addicted persons, which he appears
to have denied being — a symptom of his addiction.173
Given these findings, it is unclear how the majority came to the conclusion that it did,
following the legal test it claimed to have applied. The majority clearly departed from the
Moore test and fundamental human rights principles and, instead, applied a stricter,
narrower standard that incorporated irrelevant and inappropriate considerations, contrary
to the human rights framework and a biopsychosocial understanding of addiction.
Legal decision makers must examine addiction cases through a human rights lens that
views addiction as a disability garnering human rights protections and appreciates the
realities of addiction disability. Compulsions and feeling a lack of control are common
symptoms of drug and alcohol addiction disability. Naturally, addictions, and the
intensity of addiction-related compulsions, vary in severity and individuals will vary in
their capacity to resist these compulsions. Compulsion arising from addiction, regardless
of its intensity, would not exist but for the addiction, and thus is a manifestation of the
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disability.174 Accordingly, discipline for misconduct arising from the employee’s
compulsive substance use constitutes a connection between the addiction and the adverse
impact. In finding an insufficient connection between Stewart’s addiction and his
termination for violating the employer’s drug policy, the Tribunal clearly applied a
different standard from the one necessitated by the Moore test. Decisions in addiction
disability cases, like Elk Valley, have diverged from the factor requirement of the prima
facie discrimination analysis and placed the focus on the individual, examining the
strength of their compulsions and ability to make choices. This approach problematically
espouses a moralistic understanding of addiction and places the blame on individuals
with addiction disability. It is important for legal decision makers to recognize that, “the
concept of ‘compulsion’, and the varying ability of addicts to control compulsion, cannot
be seen as equivalent to the concept of choice as it applies to non-addicts. Addicts are
adversely affected by a disease, others are not.”175 The ability to make some choices
about one’s drug use does not and should be used to eliminate an employer’s duty to
accommodate: “Complainants’ choices, imprudent or otherwise, do not weaken their
human rights, either in law or in policy. Such an approach reverses the burden and
requires that complainants avoid discrimination.”176
The importation of additional requirements beyond a simple connection between the
addiction and termination—namely, a direct, causal connection and considerations of
control and decision-making capacity—conflicts with the factor requirement under the
Moore test for prima facie discrimination and inappropriately increases the evidentiary
burden for employees with addiction disability, contrary to human rights law and
principles. The prima facie discrimination analysis is not an assessment of the employer’s
justification for termination. The sole purpose of the analysis is to determine whether the
employee had a protected characteristic, they experienced an adverse impact and the
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protected characteristic was, in some way, a factor in the adverse impact. These elements
were present in Elk Valley. However, this would not have been the end of the analysis. A
finding of prima facie discrimination does not in itself mean that the employee’s
employment should be reinstated. These concerns are to be addressed in the next step, the
duty to accommodate analysis, and not imported into the prima facie discrimination
analysis.
It is understandable that an employer in a safety-sensitive workplace would have
legitimate concerns about reinstating an employee who had previously been impaired at
work while in the thralls of their addiction. While employers have an obligation to
maintain a safe work environment, this responsibility must be balanced with its duty to
accommodate an employee with a disability to the point of undue hardship. In order to
reach the threshold of undue hardship, the employer must provide objective evidence
demonstrating the presence of an actual, serious safety risk. The employer in Elk Valley
did not provide such evidence and failed to offer accommodation that was accessible to
Stewart during his employment, yet the Tribunal found this to be sufficient. Posttermination measures do not legally constitute accommodation and should not be treated
as such. Unfortunately, the SCC majority opted not to comment on the Tribunal’s
problematic accommodation analysis upon finding no prima facie discrimination.
Elk Valley failed to consider Stewart’s individual circumstances, including the extent of
his addiction, employment history and capacity for rehabilitation, before terminating his
employment. The Tribunal justified this omission partly on the basis that Stewart
disregarded his duty to request accommodation, given his “capacity” to do so.177 Elk
Valley’s Policy provided pre-incident accommodation to employees with addictions;
however, given that Stewart was unaware of his addiction at the time of the incident, as
confirmed by the two medical experts, this pre-incident accommodation was inaccessible
to him. Diminishing Elk Valley’s duty to accommodate on the basis that Stewart failed to
request accommodation, which was symptomatic of his disability, was unreasonable:
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Bearing in mind that those suffering from addiction are routinely unaware
of their drug dependence, this amounts to, in effect, removing all human
rights protections for such individuals. In other words, it says: you only
get human rights protections if you ask, though we know, due to your
disability, that you will not.
This insensitivity arises disproportionately in the context of addictions,
likely because of the stigma associated with them. We would never
demand that an employee with a physical disability complete an
unattainable physical activity to access accommodation. Still, that is
precisely what Elk Valley, in a psychological context, did to Mr. Stewart
here. He could never have sought accommodation for a disability he did
not know he had.178
It is true that both the employer and employee seeking accommodation must cooperate in
the accommodation process. However, the employee’s inability to initiate or participate
in the process, as a result of their denial, does not eliminate the employer’s obligations.
Elk Valley still had a duty to accommodate Stewart to the point of undue hardship and
failed to do so. The Tribunal’s analysis inappropriately placed the focus on the employee,
rather than the employer, and disregarded key accommodation principles. The SCC
majority should have taken the opportunity to comment on these apparent errors and the
Tribunal’s unreasonable application of the accommodation analysis.
Elk Valley provided the SCC with the opportunity to offer much needed clarity on
disability law but it is clear that it was a missed opportunity. Unfortunately, the majority
decision arguably created more confusion and left many unanswered questions regarding
the application of the prima facie discrimination test and workplace accommodation
analysis.
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Chapter 6

6

The Aftermath of Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp.

Following the release of Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp.,1 the law on prima facie
discrimination and the duty to accommodate employees with addiction appeared to be
unclear and unsettled. While the majority decision in Elk Valley did not, on its face,
change the legal framework for establishing discrimination, the majority’s application of
the law did not reflect the well-established human rights principles underlying Canadian
human rights law, described in Chapter 2. It was unclear what impact this Supreme Court
of Canada (SCC) decision would have on the subsequent addiction disability case law
and which direction the jurisprudence would take.
Some in the legal community feared that the majority decision would leave Canadian
employees suffering from drug and alcohol addictions without human rights protections
in their workplace.2 There was concern that Elk Valley “could have a chilling effect,” as
the majority’s decision rested on a very narrow understanding of addiction disability,
which ultimately led to the conclusion that Stewart’s addiction was not a factor in his
termination.3 Although the SCC majority decision did not appear to change the legal
framework for finding discrimination, the majority’s application of the law to the facts of
the case is troubling:
It placed emphasis on the individual “choice” of Mr. Stewart to use drugs,
and accepted the Tribunal’s rather superficial distinction between
termination for using drugs and termination for breaching a policy
forbidding the use of drugs. As Justice Gascon noted in dissent, the
majority also afforded too much deference to the Tribunal’s finding that
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Mr. Stewart’s addiction was not a factor in the employer’s decision to
terminate him. The correct question rather was whether Mr. Stewart’s
addiction was a factor in his termination – including his breach of the
policy.4
It was uncertain whether or how the decision would affect addiction disability law in
Canada. Would Elk Valley thwart or halt the progress towards a broad, liberal human
rights approach to addiction in the workplace, or would legal decision makers distinguish
the case in their decisions? If legal decision makers did consider or apply Elk Valley,
would they adopt the law as stated in the decision or rely upon the SCC majority’s
application of the law to successfully justify termination in safety-sensitive workplaces?
The answer to these questions would soon be revealed with the release of legal decisions
in the post-Elk Valley era.
Since the release of Elk Valley in June 2017, numerous addiction disability cases have
been decided5 and it is clear that the Elk Valley decision has shaped and developed the
current addiction jurisprudence. The subsequent case law—especially, arising in the
nursing sector in Ontario—has espoused the legal principles affirmed in Elk Valley and
provided insightful commentary on the SCC decision. This chapter examines five
decisions that are representative of the case law that has emerged in the wake of Elk
Valley: Toronto District School Board v. Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local
4400,6 Humber River Hospital v. Ontario Nurses’ Association,7 Regional Municipality of
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Waterloo (Sunnyside Home) v. Ontario Nurses’ Association,8 Canadian Pacific Railway
v. Teamsters Canada Rail Conference9 and Ontario Nurses’ Association v. Cambridge
Memorial Hospital.10 These cases reflect the current trend towards a more liberal, broad
human rights approach to addiction cases and the reliance on Elk Valley—namely, the
law as stated, rather than applied, by the SCC—to support such an approach.

6.1 Toronto District School Board v. Canadian Union of
Public Employees, Local 4400
Toronto District School Board concerned the termination of a school caretaker with
approximately 22 years of service. The grievor started working for the Toronto District
School Board in 1996 and had an unblemished employment record until 2015, when she
entered into an abusive relationship and developed an alcohol addiction. She was absent
for nearly 40% of her scheduled shifts in 2015, about 25% in 2016 and approximately
87% in 2017.11

The grievor entered into but failed to complete addiction treatment

programs and continued to be absent from work. She met with the employer in February
2017 and agreed to enter a residential treatment program; the employer suspended her
sick pay when it did not receive proof of treatment. In May 2017, the grievor entered into
a last chance agreement, as a settlement for the grievance challenging the suspension of
her sick pay. The last chance agreement required her to enter into a residential treatment
program, submit to an assessment by an addictions specialist, remain abstinent, provide
written proof of program completion with a prognosis for continued abstinence, enroll in
an aftercare program and submit to random alcohol testing. The last chance agreement
stated that any breach of the terms would result in her termination and that the employer
fulfilled its duty to accommodate.
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The grievor began a 20-day residential treatment program in early April 2017 but failed
to provide the employer with proof of completion, apart from a generic doctor’s note in
late May, indicating that she would be absent from work until the end of the month.
When the grievor did not return to work, the employer requested further documentation
and arranged for a meeting. When she failed to attend the meeting, the employer
terminated her in June 2017. The termination letter provided that she had been terminated
for breaching the last chance agreement, failing to cooperate with the employer’s
accommodation efforts, being absent from work without leave, failing to comply with
absence reporting procedures and frustration of contract.12 The grievor continued to
struggle with her addiction and, in February 2018, she enrolled in a two-week community
withdrawal management day program. Leading up to the arbitration hearing, the
counselor from the treatment centre submitted a letter, indicating that clients present
different levels of readiness and intention to change their substance use, the centre “does
not provide diagnostic or prognostic information,” the grievor was expected to complete
the program in late February and they would discuss next steps for her treatment.13 A
subsequent letter from the treatment centre confirmed that the grievor completed the
outpatient program and voluntarily joined a recovery group.
The Toronto District School Board contended that: it had accommodated the grievor to
the point of undue hardship, as confirmed by the parties in the last chance agreement; the
grievor breached the last chance agreement; absent extraordinary circumstances, the last
chance agreement should be given effect; and the post-treatment evidence did not provide
a prognosis for recovery.14 The union asserted that the employer could not contract out of
its statutory duty to accommodate to the point of undue hardship and that the last chance
agreement was not determinative.15 The union asserted that:
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[I]n this case, the Employer’s duty to accommodate continued beyond the
effective date of the “last chance” agreement; that the point of undue
hardship has not yet been reached in the case of an employee with 20
years of unblemished service who has ended an abusive relationship,
stabilized her housing and taken steps to deal with her addiction; that the
post-discharge evidence establishes that the grievor is capable of regular
attendance going forward; and that given the nature of her disability, a
relapse should not have resulted in the grievor’s termination.16
The arbitrator, affirming human rights law principles and jurisprudence, confirmed that,
“parties to a collective agreement cannot contract out of their statutory obligation to
accommodate an employee disability to the point of undue hardship.”17 He correctly
acknowledged that the existence of a last chance agreement does not in itself constitute
accommodation to the point of undue hardship. Nevertheless, the arbitrator found that,
given the particular circumstances, the employer accommodated the grievor to the point
of undue hardship:
[T]he evidence in this case is that prior to executing the “last chance”
agreement, the grievor’s attendance was far below the minimally
acceptable level of attendance even though the Employer had supported
the grievor with changes in work location, leaves of absence and sick pay
through various relapses. It is not surprising, therefore, that the parties and
the grievor confirmed in the “last chance” agreement that the grievor had
been accommodated to the point of undue hardship and that the “last
chance” agreement itself constituted further accommodation. The evidence
satisfies this arbitrator that the grievor had been accommodated to the
point of undue hardship as of the time the “last chance” agreement was
executed.18
Last chance agreements are useful devices that enable employers to communicate the
seriousness of the situation to the employee, without resorting to termination.19 Although
such agreements are not determinative on the issue of accommodation, absent compelling
evidence of rehabilitative potential, arbitrators have been hesitant to question last chance
agreements, provided that the terms are reasonable in light of the underlying
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circumstances, as this would ultimately inhibit their use.20 In this case, the employer
made several attempts to accommodate the grievor and the arbitrator reasonably found no
compelling evidence of rehabilitative potential. Despite the last chance agreement, the
grievor continued to drink alcohol, failed to submit to an assessment by an addictions
specialist, did not complete a residential treatment program and was resistant to the
random drug and alcohol testing.21 She made no effort to comply with the agreement
until the employer decided to terminate her. The arbitrator concluded that the medical
evidence failed to demonstrate she had a positive prognosis for recovery that supported
overriding the last chance agreement.22 He held that the employer had satisfied its duty to
accommodate to the point of undue hardship and dismissed the grievance.
Although the decision was not in the grievor’s favour, it was reasonable given the
circumstances. Correctly acknowledging that a last chance agreement does not in itself
constitute accommodation to the point of undue hardship, the arbitrator conducted an
individualized assessment. He recognized the employer’s several previous attempts to
accommodate the grievor and found no compelling evidence of rehabilitative potential.
Ultimately, the absence of promising medical evidence, in light of the grievor’s previous
relapses, led the arbitrator to reasonably conclude that the employer fulfilled its duty to
accommodate the grievor to the point of undue hardship.

6.2 Ontario Nurses' Association v. Humber River Hospital
Humber River involved the termination of an emergency department nurse. After
working there for four years, she was terminated following the employer’s discovery that
she stole narcotics and other medications from the hospital. In late February 2016, a
colleague saw the grievor put an ampule of morphine in her pocket and reported it to the
team leader. When confronted with the allegation, she pulled multiple unopened vials of
morphine from her pocket as well as various vial medications and tablets from her bag.
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The grievor admitted that she obtained the medications from the hospital. She said that
she suffered from headaches and stole the medication to fight her condition, not yet
revealing that she had an addiction at the time. The grievor also admitted to consuming
injectable drugs prior to her shift, which she stole from the hospital, and took Tylenol
once it wore off. Following the investigation meeting, the grievor e-mailed the employer,
indicating that she was ready to take responsibility, would seek medical assistance and
“want[ed] to be clean.”23 The employer’s investigation confirmed that the grievor stole
medication from the hospital and terminated her employment. The union filed a
grievance on behalf of the grievor.
The union asserted that the grievor’s termination constituted prima facie discrimination
and the employer failed to take any steps to accommodate her. The union sought the
grievor’s reinstatement with appropriate accommodation as well as compensation and
damages. The employer claimed that it had just cause to terminate the grievor and, thus,
the termination did not constitute discrimination. Alternatively, the employer argued it
was not an appropriate case for reinstatement. The parties agreed to bifurcate the
proceeding to first address the alleged discrimination and later address the issue of
accommodation, following the determination of the discrimination issue.
In the course of the hearing, the grievor testified that she began using narcotics in the fall
of 2015, when she was prescribed Percocet for a running injury. When this prescription
ran out, she went to a different doctor to get Percocet for her headaches. By the time the
second prescription ran out, she did not need the drugs for her injury but felt like she was
hooked. The grievor indicated that she stole narcotics from the hospital from December
2015 until her termination in March 2016. She did not immediately reveal to the
employer that she had an addiction because she was in denial and had not yet
acknowledged that she had an addiction. Following the incident, the grievor quickly ran
out of morphine and subsequently went through withdrawal. In April, she began seeing
Dr. Bobrowski, an addictions specialist, and enrolled in an outpatient program in May. In
July, the grievor relapsed and was subsequently discharged from the program. In cross-
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examination, it became clear that she failed to attend almost half of the sessions, missed
drug testing and tried to manipulate tests. She claimed that she stopped using by
September 2016 but then later indicated that she may have continued until October or
November. The grievor enrolled in another outpatient program in November and
continued regular drug testing. The following spring, she entered a day program and
attended a caduceus group program—a recovery group for healthcare professionals.
Dr. Bobrowski provided a medical report stating that the grievor had a severe opioid
addiction and was in early remission at the time of the hearing. He stated that the
diversion of drugs for personal use is a “hallmark of addiction in health professionals”
and “[RI's] theft of drugs could reasonably have been driven by her addictive illness.”24
The doctor also explained that the theft of non-narcotic drugs, which treat nausea,
headaches and pain, could have been a means to self-medicate the effects of her
addiction.25 Prior to giving his evidence, Dr. Bobrowski learned that the grievor tested
positive for opioids in July 2017, which she claimed was the result of eating poppy seed
cake. The doctor stated that it was impossible to determine whether or not the positive
test resulted from poppy seeds and that this altered the conclusion in his report that the
grievor was in remission. He also discovered that, at the time of the grievor’s termination,
she had been using significantly more drugs than previously reported, underreported her
symptoms of withdrawal and also acquired drugs from the street. Dr. Bobrowski
acknowledged that much of the grievor’s self-reported information was unreliable but
explained that denial and underreporting were symptoms of addiction. In light of this new
information, Dr. Bobrowski testified that he had doubts about the accuracy of the
timeline the grievor provided of her drug use, as it was unlikely she could have built up
the tolerance necessary to reach that dosage over such a short period of time.
As a result of the doctor’s testimony, the employer conducted a further investigation and
discovered that the grievor’s running accident and initial Percocet prescription occurred
in June 2014 and the subsequent prescription for her headaches occurred in June 2015.
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The employer argued that the grievor deliberately lied about when she started using
narcotics and likely stole drugs for longer than she admitted. When asked to explain these
discrepancies, the grievor accepted that she first started using Percocet in 2014 and stated
that working night shifts and her addiction affected her memory regarding the dates. She
maintained that she had not started using morphine until November or December 2015.
The union asserted that the medical evidence established the required nexus between the
grievor’s addiction and misconduct to establish prima facie discrimination and trigger the
employer’s duty to accommodate. The union relied on six Ontario arbitration decisions
where the arbitrator found a nexus between the nurse’s addiction and theft of drugs from
their employer and ordered their reinstatement.26 The union contended that the line of
cases arising from British Columbia (Public Service Agency) v. British Columbia
Government and Service Employees’ Union,27 relied upon by the employer, adopted a
formalistic view of equality that has long been rejected in Canadian law and improperly
focused on discriminatory attitude, as opposed to adverse affect, contrary to the human
rights analysis endorsed in Elk Valley.28 With respect to the issue of accommodation, the
union acknowledged that an employee must first accept and pursue treatment for their
addiction before engaging the employer’s duty to accommodate, and contended that,
although the grievor may not have been a “poster child” for recovery, she pursued
treatment and persevered; the denial and relapse she experienced are common features of
addiction.29
The employer argued that the grievor’s addiction was not a factor in her termination and
maintained that it neither knew nor ought to have known that she had an addiction at the
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time of her termination. Furthermore, the grievor suffered no greater impact than any
other employee would have for the same conduct.30 The hospital argued that Gooding
provided the correct approach, requiring a causal connection between the disability and
decision to terminate. The employer also relied on Bellehumeur v. Windsor Factory
Supply Ltd.,31 an Ontario Court of Appeal case that cited Gooding and concluded that the
termination of an employee for making threats of violence in the workplace did not
constitute discrimination because the employer was unaware of his mental disability, as
well as two Ontario arbitration decisions in support of the Gooding approach—Royal
Victoria Regional Health Centre v. Ontario Nurses’ Association,32 and Cambridge
Memorial Hospital v. Ontario Nurses’ Association.33 It is important to note that both of
these arbitration decisions have since been judicially reviewed and overturned.
The employer argued that the line of cases relied upon by the union conflated the issues
of discrimination and the duty to accommodate, effectively assuming a connection
between the disability and termination.34 The employer argued that, even applying this
approach, the arbitrator should dismiss the grievance because the grievor: stole more than
just the drug she was addicted to; was not compelled to use, as she did not use drugs
when they were unavailable; did not use drugs everyday; did not immediately detox; did
not follow recommendations to attend inpatient treatment; was not a “poster child” for
recovery; experienced a relapse; had subsequent positive drug test results; never admitted
to the full extent of her addiction; and repeatedly failed to be honest and forthright.35 She
continued to be dishonest about her drug use even while in remission, including in her
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testimony under oath.36 The employer argued that, even if the union established prima
facie discrimination, reinstating the grievor would constitute undue hardship.37
The arbitrator categorically rejected the Gooding approach, asserting that it was
inconsistent with the established human rights analysis, most recently affirmed in the Elk
Valley decision.38 He went on to state that, “What is clear from the Court’s reasoning,
and highly significant to my assessment of the Gooding approach, is that where it is
established that an employee's addiction disability is a factor in their inability to comply
with a workplace rule… the employee will have established a prima facie case of
discrimination.39 Elk Valley also made clear that, in cases of indirect discrimination, the
focus must be on the effect of the disability on the employee’s ability to comply with the
workplace rule, and not the extent to which the employee’s disability was a factor in the
employer’s decision to discipline the employee for their misconduct.40 Gooding did not
follow these human rights principles; the decision focused on the employer’s decision to
terminate the employee for theft, rather than whether his disability was a factor in the
theft.41
Elk Valley affirmed that the focus of the analysis must be on the discriminatory impact of
the action, not the presence of a discriminatory attitude. The court in Gooding, however,
concluded that, although the grievor’s addiction may have impacted his conduct and
ability to comply with the workplace rule, it was “irrelevant” if the addiction “played no
part in the employer's decision to terminate his employment and he suffered no impact
for his misconduct greater than that another employee would have suffered for the same
misconduct.”42 The arbitrator explicitly rejected this approach to discrimination, stating:
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… This distinction, which goes so far as to deem “irrelevant” the effect of
the employee’s ability to comply with a rule by virtue of having a
characteristic protected from discrimination, is precisely what the
Supreme of Canada rejects in cases such as Meiorin, as reinforced in Elk
Valley. To adopt the Gooding approach would be to read adverse effect
discrimination out of our human rights analysis and to embrace a
superficial understanding of discrimination that the Supreme Court of
Canada has rejected.43
Furthermore, the arbitrator rejected the hospital’s argument that Bellehumeur endorsed
the Gooding approach, as the court did not engage in a substantive analysis or assess the
broader meaning of discrimination.44 He rejected the Royal Victoria and Cambridge
Memorial arbitration decisions, to the extent that they endorsed Gooding and suggested
that the compulsion to steal must be so powerful as to eliminate any notion of choice or
intention and that there must more be than a connection between the addiction and
adverse impact to establish prima facie discrimination.45 Elk Valley confirmed that the
disability must simply be a factor in the adverse impact and rejected the notion of
applying a higher standard. The arbitrator also rejected the employer’s claim that the
cases relied upon by the union conflated the discrimination and accommodation analyses;
decisions generally reflect the manner in which the cases were argued and the focus of
the arguments, which in most cases is the nexus between the addiction and adverse
impact.46
The arbitrator acknowledged the seriousness of theft and the use of narcotics in a hospital
setting as well as the resulting concerns for safety and patient care. He recognized that the
employer’s desire to protect itself and others from potential harm was well grounded47
and confirmed that such legitimate safety concerns do not eliminate the employer’s
human rights obligations:
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The question is not, therefore, whether an employer is entitled to take
action to ensure the behaviour does not continue; clearly, it is. And the
need to address effectively the problem behaviour is no less pressing
simply because there is a nexus between the conduct and a disability. The
question is rather whether the employer can take action that both addresses
its legitimate interests and accommodates the employee's disability. And
in this regard, arbitrators have been careful to emphasise that a finding of
prima facie discrimination does not automatically entitle an employee to
accommodated employment.48
Upon finding prima facie discrimination, the arbitrator must then determine whether the
employer can accommodate the employee to the point of undue hardship.
The arbitrator applied the human rights approach to discrimination, relying on the human
rights principles affirmed by the SCC in Elk Valley, and found that the grievor’s thefts
were caused by her addiction and held that her termination constituted prima facie
discrimination. In light of the bifurcation of the proceedings, the decision should have
ended there. However, despite the parties not making submissions with respect to the
duty to accommodate, the arbitrator ultimately went on to decide the issue of
reinstatement. Acknowledging the realities of addiction disability, he affirmed that the
failure to disclose the disability prior to termination cannot preclude the employer’s duty
to accommodate, when the inability to disclose may be a feature of the disability.49 The
arbitrator concluded that the employer either knew or ought to have known that the
grievor’s conduct could have been related to an addiction disability. He found that the
employer made no effort to inquire into the grievor’s disability or to determine whether
she could be accommodated, thereby breaching its procedural duty to accommodate,50
but ultimately accepted the employer’s argument that reinstatement was not an
appropriate remedy in this case.51
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The arbitrator shared the employer’s concerns with respect to the grievor’s honesty and
forthrightness. In light of the evidence, he concluded that the grievor continued to lie
about her addiction and workplace misconduct, despite claiming to be in remission with
full insight into her disability, thus justifying the employer’s lack of trust:52
... To be clear, my conclusion here is not about whether or not sufficient
safeguards could be put in place to ensure that the grievor does not have
access to drugs in the course of her employment. That is a question that,
had it needed to be answered, would have been addressed in the second
stage of this bifurcated proceeding. Rather, I find that the grievor’s
ongoing lack of candour even while purporting to be clean and in
remission has undermined the trust that is essential to the employment
relationship [emphasis added].53
Consequently, the arbitrator held that reinstatement was not an appropriate remedy; the
employer’s duty to accommodate to the point of undue hardship “does not require them
to employ individuals where the necessary trust relationship between employer and
employee has not been rehabilitated.”54 Finding that reinstatement was not an appropriate
remedy, the arbitrator remitted the issue of remedy to the parties.
While the arbitrator’s ruling on reinstatement, without hearing submissions on the duty to
accommodate, was improper, the bulk of the decision was progressive and rich in its
human rights analysis of prima facie discrimination. Following the law and principles
stated in Elk Valley, the decision espoused the human rights approach to addiction
disability and explicitly renounced the Gooding approach. The arbitrator reiterated that
the focus of the analysis must be on the discriminatory effect, and not intent, in order to
capture instances of indirect discrimination and firmly rejected the notion that the grievor
must establish something more than a connection between the addiction and adverse
impact, such as a compulsion eliminating any notion of choice or intention. In this case,
the analysis should have ended there. Although making a determination regarding
reinstatement would normally be within an arbitrator’s jurisdiction, the bifurcation of the
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proceeding limited the scope of the hearing to prima facie discrimination and
considerations of reinstatement are not part of the prima facie discrimination analysis.
Clearly, trust and the viability of the employment relationship are important
considerations in determining whether to reinstate the grievor. However, this is not an
issue to be determined prior to examining the duty to accommodate; it should be
addressed after the duty to accommodate analysis, which was bypassed in this case.

6.3 Regional Municipality of Waterloo (Sunnyside Home) v.
Ontario Nurses’ Association
This decision was released just a month after Humber River. Prior to her termination, the
grievor worked as a nurse and team leader at the Sunnyside Home Long Term Care
Facility for nearly 14 years. For approximately two years, the grievor repeatedly
misappropriated narcotics for her own use and falsified medical records to conceal the
thefts, by charting that patients requested and received the narcotics she used.
In July 2015, a nurse found an empty ampule of hydromorphone in the staff bathroom.
The employer’s investigation revealed that the grievor regularly came into work early and
was in the facility at the time of the incident. She denied any connection to the incident.
From January to August 2016, other nurses noticed that the grievor often prepared
medication in one unit and then administered them in another unit and sometimes took
the medication to her office before administering it to residents. In August 2016, a
colleague reported to the employer that she found the grievor in the washroom with an
ampule of hydromorphone and that, two weeks prior, she witnessed the grievor slipping a
syringe of hydromorphone into her pocket and did not administer it to the resident,
contrary to the medical records. The employer conducted an investigation and put the
grievor on paid leave. The grievor subsequently informed the employer that she had
kidney stone surgery and would be off work. Days later, she revealed that she was being
hospitalized for severe withdrawal from narcotics.
The grievor suffered from a kidney condition, which resulted in the production of excess
kidney stones. She had multiple surgeries to remove the kidney stones and her doctor
prescribed Percocet to control the pain. In the fall of 2014, she started to use Percocet as a
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means to cope with stress and exhausted her prescription. The grievor admitted to
abusing drugs, including Tylenol 3s, Percocet, hydromorphone and morphine, and
misappropriating drugs from the home over the past two years. She also admitted to
falsifying medical records to indicate that she administered more pain medication than
was actually given and did not always waste the unused remainder of narcotics so she
could use them. The employer terminated her for the thefts, falsification of medical
records and the resulting patient abuse, irreparable breach of trust and gross misconduct
related to protocols.55
The grievor testified that she started misappropriating drugs from the employer in
October 2014 to control her pain. She indicated that she needed the drugs to get through
work and was unable to stop. She would stockpile drugs in advance, when she knew she
would be away from work, and supplemented them with over-the-counter medications.
She also testified that she experienced withdrawal symptoms when she did not have a
sufficient supply of drugs. The grievor admitted responsibility for the empty ampule of
hydromorphone found in the staff bathroom in July 2015 and stated that she initially
denied any involvement because she felt ashamed. She did not seek help prior to the
August 2016 incident because she thought she could stop without help. Following her
kidney stone surgery in August 2016, she exhausted her prescriptions and went into
extreme withdrawal, which led to her hospitalization. In October, the grievor entered a
35-day inpatient rehabilitation program, where she was diagnosed with severe opioid use
disorder and mild to moderate sedative-hypnotic use disorder. Upon successfully
completing the inpatient program, she enrolled in an aftercare program and continued to
see an addictions specialist. She also went to caduceus group and twelve step meetings.
Her doctor indicated that she strictly complied with the treatment plan and she testified
that she had not used narcotics since September 2016.
The employer reported the grievor’s misconduct to the College of Nurses of Ontario
(CNO), the nursing regulatory body. The CNO prohibited the grievor from practicing
nursing until June 2017, subject to conditions, including continuing treatment, monitoring

55

Supra note 8 at para 34.

188

recommendations, no administration of or access to controlled substances, direct
observation, a workplace monitor and supervisor agreement; any violation could result in
significant sanctions, up to and including the revocation of her nursing license.56 The
employer argued that it could not comply with many of the restrictions imposed by the
CNO. The employer asserted that it could not eliminate all access to narcotics, it was not
feasible to have other nurses administer narcotics for the grievor, it could not provide a
setting where the grievor could be directly observed at all times, given that most of the
team leader’s work was done independently, and the grievor violated the trust of the
residents and their families. Furthermore, the employer argued that committing to a
workplace supervisor agreement would be professionally irresponsible because the
restrictions could not be satisfied, there were not enough registered nurses to fulfill the
workplace monitor role and the manager stated that she would not risk her professional
license by entering into such an agreement.57
Both the union and employer called expert medical evidence. The employer called Dr.
Lawrie Reznek, a psychiatrist and associate professor in psychiatry, and Dr. David
Wolkoff, a psychiatrist and expert in addiction treatment. The union called Dr. Gerrit
Veenman, the grievor’s addiction physician and expert in the treatment of addiction. Dr.
Reznek espoused the view that addiction should not be classified as a mental disorder and
likened addiction to a bad habit, which he acknowledged was the minority view in the
psychiatric profession.58 In his opinion, the grievor had the capacity to disclose her
addiction at an earlier time and comply with the workplace policies prohibiting the
diversion of drugs and falsification of medical records.59 Dr. Wolkoff, on the other hand,
indicated that, “the grievor had a significantly diminished capacity to resist the urges to
engage in behaviours that supported her addiction.”60 Dr. Veenman testified that the
grievor was in recovery, compliant with all aspects of her aftercare program and fit to
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return to work under the conditions set by the CNO. Dr. Veenman believed that “the
grievor had no capacity to make choices about whether or not she could prevent herself
from diverting medications or disclosing her addiction.”61
The union argued that the grievor’s termination constituted prima facie discrimination
and the employer failed to demonstrate that it could not accommodate the grievor. The
employer contended that prima facie discrimination had not been established; in the
alternative, the grievor did not fulfill the bona fide occupational requirements of the
position and, in the further alternative, she could not be accommodated without undue
hardship. The employer argued that the grievor’s addiction was not a factor in the
termination because she did not disclose her addiction until after the employer discovered
her misconduct, her disability played no role in the employer’s decision to terminate and
she suffered no greater impact than any other employee would have for the same
conduct.62 The decision to terminate her employment stemmed from the grievor’s thefts
and falsification of medical records, failing to admit to her wrongdoing and the resulting
patient abuse, breach of trust and the risk to residents.63
Like the employer in Humber River, Sunnyside Home primarily relied upon the decisions
in Elk Valley, Gooding, Bellehumeur, Wright, Cambridge Memorial and Royal Victoria
to support this argument.64 The employer asserted that the grievor could not fulfill the
bona fide occupational requirements of the team leader position—particularly, having the
trust of her employer, colleagues, residents and their families that she would not engage
in further misconduct, having a positive therapeutic relationship with the residents and
their families, having access to controlled drugs and working independently.65
Furthermore, it could not satisfy some of the CNO’s conditions without undue
hardship—namely, the requirement to have a workplace supervisor agreement and a
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workplace monitor on every shift, the ability to directly observe the grievor at any time
and the prohibition on administering or having access to controlled substances.66
The union asserted that the addiction must only be a factor in the adverse impact to
establish prima facie discrimination. It argued that the grievor’s misconduct was causally
related to her addiction disability, as the medical evidence indicated she had no capacity,
or at least diminished capacity, to make choices and control the urges with respect to her
addictive behaviour, as a result of her addiction.67 The union relied on the line of arbitral
cases finding that the presence of an addiction and its impact on a nurse’s ability to
control or prevent the diversion of medication constituted a factor in her termination.68
The employer argued that these decisions conflated the prima facie discrimination and
accommodation analyses and should not be followed.69 The union asserted that Gooding
was “premised on a flawed understanding of the law of discrimination” because it
imported notions of intention into the prima facie discrimination analysis, contrary to Elk
Valley.70 The union argued that the employer breached both its procedural and
substantive duty to accommodate; the employer failed to consider the issue of
accommodation, including the duty to inquire where there were reasonable concerns that
she may be suffering from a disability, and failed to establish that it could not
accommodate the grievor’s restrictions without undue hardship.71
The arbitrator began by explicitly rejecting Dr. Reznek’s anomalous view that addiction
is not a mental disorder. He concluded that the grievor had “a mental disorder
characterized by, among other things, compulsive behaviour and either a complete
inability or a diminished capacity to resist the urge to engage in behaviour supporting her
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addiction.”72 The arbitrator determined that the grievor only engaged in misconduct when
“her addiction had control of her and her urges and her choices were motivated by
obtaining narcotics to satisfy her addiction,”73 consistent with the behaviour of a person
suffering from substance use disorder.
As the Humber River decision was released during the preparation of this arbitration
award, the arbitrator gave the parties the opportunity to make submissions on the new
decision. The employer argued that Humber River misconstrued the reasoning in Elk
Valley, by removing any consideration of the employer’s reasons for imposing the
discipline from the prima facie discrimination analysis.74 The arbitrator rejected this
argument, as Elk Valley clarified that, in cases of indirect discrimination, discriminatory
intent is not required to establish prima facie discrimination and the focus is to be on
discriminatory impact, not whether the employee’s addiction played a role in the
employer’s decision to terminate.75 Furthermore, the employer asserted that neither
Humber River nor the present case presented evidence demonstrating the disproportionate
impact of rules prohibiting the theft of drugs and falsification of patient records on people
suffering from addiction. The arbitrator challenged this criticism, asserting that the
Humber River decision explained how the law of indirect discrimination applied in cases
where addiction constituted a factor in the violation of a valid workplace rule.76
The arbitrator agreed with the assessment of the addiction case law in the Humber River
decision. He affirmed that Bellehumeur was not a general endorsement of Gooding, as it
“does not engage in any substantive analysis… of whether Gooding is consistent with Elk
Valley or the myriad of other Supreme Court of Canada discrimination jurisprudence”77
and rejected the employer’s argument that the arbitrator in Humber River erred by
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refusing to follow Bellehumeur.78 The arbitrator asserted that Humber River provided a
“carefully reasoned analysis of how Gooding departs from the settled principles of the
Supreme Court of Canada.”79 Accordingly, he disagreed with the Royal Victoria and
Cambridge Memorial arbitration decisions, to the extent that they endorsed the Gooding
approach and suggested the requirement of additional factors in the prima facie
discrimination analysis.80 He rejected the Wright decision, as it imported the requirement
of stereotypical or arbitrary characteristics into the prima facie discrimination test,
contrary to the fundamental principles affirmed in Elk Valley.81 He also rejected the
employer’s claim that the cases relied upon by the union conflated the prima facie
discrimination and accommodation analyses.82
Adopting the human rights approach endorsed in Humber River, the arbitrator held that
the union established prima facie discrimination, concluding that:
The evidence shows beyond any doubt that there is a connection or nexus
between the grievor's substance use disorder and the adverse effect of
termination of employment for violation of admittedly valid workplace
rules. Compulsive behaviour and impaired judgment are symptoms of the
mental illness of substance use disorder. They were manifested in this
case, according to the weight of medical evidence, by either no capacity or
diminished capacity on the part of the grievor to comply with workplace
rules prohibiting diversion of narcotics and falsification of medical
records. Moreover, the grievor testified that she needed opioids “to get
through this shift...get through the evening...get through the next day and I
won't anymore; I am going to stop. But I couldn't stop”. There was no
evidence that the grievor diverted the drugs for any reason other than to
satisfy her substance use disorder. 83
Applying the established prima facie discrimination analysis, the arbitrator found a clear
connection between the grievor’s addiction and her termination for stealing narcotics and
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falsifying medical records to cover up the thefts. He dismissed the employer’s argument
that the grievor’s addiction was not a factor in her termination because it was not a factor
in the employer’s decision to terminate her employment and correctly identified that the
issue is not whether the grievor’s addiction was a factor in the decision to terminate,
rather “[t]he focus at this stage is whether the application of valid workplace norms has a
discriminatory effect on the grievor because her disability interferes with her ability to
comply with those norms.”84
The arbitrator also concluded that the employer failed to establish that the grievor could
not fulfill the bona fide occupational requirements of the team leader position and that it
could not satisfy the CNO’s requirements. The arbitrator went on to comment on the role
of the CNO and the undertaking:
The CNO has been granted the statutory authority and responsibility to
determine whether RNs, like the grievor, who suffer from substance use
disorder and who are in remission, can return to the practice of nursing
and under what conditions. It is explicitly required to exercise its authority
with the public interest as its main focus.
Given its statutory role and its expertise in these matters, it can safely be
assumed, as confirmed by the terms of the Undertaking, that the CNO is
acutely aware of the significance and risks associated with issues such as
relapse rates, trust issues and the like in returning nurses in remission to
nursing practice and has designed the Undertaking accordingly.
As a result, it is my view, that the opinion of the CNO, as expressed in the
Undertaking, must be given significant weight in addressing some of the
issues raised by the employer.85
The arbitrator held that the employer violated its procedural duty to accommodate the
grievor, as it did not consider accommodation issues and failed to take any steps or make
any inquiries in response to troubling observations and reports about the grievor’s
behaviour at work. The arbitrator found the employer’s evidence of undue hardship to be
insufficient, as it was based on the current structure and performance of work; he
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recognized that, “[t]hose opinions were formed and expressed without any analysis or
thought about what changes in work organization or implementation might be required
and might be possible to accommodate the grievor. Any assertion that it would be
impossible to accommodate the grievor, or that doing so would cause undue hardship to
the employer must be evaluated in that context.”86 The arbitrator ordered the employer to
reinstate the grievor, accommodate her to the point of undue hardship and compensate
her for losses, including general damages arising from the employer’s breach of the
procedural duty to accommodate. He remitted the issues of accommodation and
compensation to the parties.
The Sunnyside Home award illustrates a progressive shift in addiction disability law.
Continuing the momentum of Humber River, the arbitrator adopted the human rights
principles endorsed in Elk Valley and rejected the Gooding approach. Upholding the
well-established doctrine of indirect discrimination, the arbitrator correctly dismissed the
notion that, in order to establish prima facie discrimination, the grievor’s disability must
have been a factor in the employer’s decision to impose discipline. The arbitrator applied
a strict approach to the employer’s duty to accommodate, critically assessing the steps
taken by the employer in determining whether the grievor could be accommodated in the
workplace; he found the employer’s evidence of undue hardship to be insufficient, as it
was based on the current structure and performance of work—not satisfying the
employer’s positive obligation to consider the reorganization of work to accommodate an
employee’s restrictions. The award of monetary compensation in this case is also very
significant, as monetary awards are extremely rare in addiction disability cases.
Typically, in successful cases, legal decision makers order reinstatement without any
compensation for lost wages or damages, reflecting a sense of condemnation and
discipline for the misconduct arising from the addiction disability. Perhaps, this is the
beginning of a new trend in remedies in the realm of addiction disability case law.
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6.4 Canadian Pacific Railway v. Teamsters Canada Rail
Conference
Canadian Pacific Railway concerned the termination of Greg Paisley, a locomotive
engineer, with 33 years of service. During his long service, he received minor discipline
and had no disciplinary record at the time of his dismissal. In August 2017, Paisley’s
train had an unavoidable collision with a vehicle on the track. No injuries were sustained.
The grievor brought a bottle of whiskey on the train, which he indicated was a gift for
someone else. After an inspection identified no defects with the train, he continued to
operate the train and consumed some whiskey during this time. Upon interviewing the
crew at the next stop, a CP Police constable detected alcohol on Paisley’s breath and
other symptoms of intoxication and conducted a screening test. Paisley failed the
screening test, which led to his arrest, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)
then administrated a breathalyzer test. He had a blood alcohol concentration of over 0.08,
which led to the RCMP laying criminal charges.
During the employer’s investigation, Paisley admitted to consuming alcohol while
operating the train and stated that he experienced a breakdown during his tour of duty, as
a result of previous incidents in his career, including one that resulted in a death. Paisley
revealed that he had “developed an issue with alcohol and possibly other mental health
issues.” 87 He affirmed that this was the first time he consumed alcohol while on duty and
the incident made him realize that his drinking was a bigger problem than he previously
thought. Paisley disclosed some of the events that caused stress in his life, including the
fact that both he and his wife battled cancer. He apologized for his conduct and disclosed
that he had pursued treatment following the incident. The employer subsequently
terminated Paisley for the use and possession of intoxicants while on duty and violating
its alcohol and drug policy. The union grieved Paisley’s termination, raising the
employer’s duty to accommodate.
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Following his termination, Paisley was diagnosed with severe alcohol use disorder, along
with post-traumatic stress disorder, chronic adjustment disorder and panic attacks. He
attended counseling, completed a two-week residential addiction treatment program and
continued with aftercare treatment. Paisley faced criminal charges for the workplace
incident and pled guilty to one count of Impaired Operation over 0.08 of Railway
Equipment. The court granted him a curative discharge—a sentence available to those
who demonstrate that they needed curative treatment at the time of the offence—with one
year of probation, which prevented him from operating a vehicle or rail equipment for a
year.
The union claimed that the employer failed to consider the mitigating circumstances
Paisley disclosed during the investigation—namely, that he had experienced tragedies in
his life, which led him to rely on alcohol as a coping mechanism. The union contended
that termination was excessive under the circumstances and the employer failed to
accommodate Paisley. The employer, on the other hand, asserted that the incident
constituted just cause for dismissal and argued that, because Paisley did not disclose his
addiction to the employer until after the incident and only provided medical
documentation substantiating his disability after being terminated, he should not be
afforded human rights protections.88 It also claimed that there was no causal connection
between Paisley’s addiction and operating machinery under the influence of alcohol.89
While the employer viewed the case as a disciplinary matter, the union contended that it
was an issue of the duty to accommodate. The arbitrator stated that the resolution of this
case ultimately depended on its characterization.90 As the union alleged the employer had
a duty to accommodate Paisley, it had the burden to demonstrate prima facie
discrimination. If the union failed to meet this burden, the employer could then treat the
case as a regular disciplinary matter.91 However, a finding of prima facie discrimination
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would shift the burden to the employer to establish that it could not have accommodated
Paisley without undue hardship.
Acknowledging the importance of substantive equality, the arbitrator confirmed that,
“Under the applicable jurisprudence, it is no longer enough to show that the conduct,
absent a protected ground under the CHRA being involved, would have attracted a severe
disciplinary measure.”92 Applying the legal principles in Quebec (Commission des droits
de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v. Bombardier Inc. (Bombardier Aerospace
Training Center)93 and Elk Valley, the arbitrator held that the union satisfied its burden of
proving prima facie discrimination; the evidence revealed that Paisley had an alcohol
addiction, he suffered an adverse impact through his termination and his addiction was a
factor in this adverse impact. During the investigation, Paisley revealed that he had an
issue with alcohol and there was no evidence suggesting that this was a ruse to obtain
human rights protections.94
The arbitrator firmly rejected the employer’s argument that Paisley’s failure to disclose
his addiction prior to the workplace incident precluded human rights protections, stating
that, “The case law does not support the suggestion that prima facie discrimination can
never arise if an employee only raises his/her disability after an incident. The SCC
examined this possible scenario in Elk Valley, but in different factual circumstances.”95
The arbitrator also dismissed the employer’s argument regarding Paisley’s delay in
providing medical evidence substantiating his addiction; although Paisley did not
immediately provide medical evidence, he told the employer during the investigation that
he had an issue with alcohol and sought treatment after the incident.96 The arbitrator
concluded that the union established prima facie discrimination.
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Arguing that Paisley’s misconduct was a disciplinary matter, the employer decided not to
directly address the matter of undue hardship and, instead, raised issues with respect to
the use of a “medical condition as a shield,” the grievor’s culpability and the concept of a
causal connection between the disability and misconduct. Following the human rights
approach, the arbitrator affirmed that, “… once prima facie discrimination is shown, the
jurisprudence requires an arbitrator to evaluate whether an employer could have
accommodated an employee suffering from a disability without undue hardship.”97 He
noted that the legal principles underlying the duty to accommodate remained unsettled,
stating: “This area remains exceedingly complex for both parties and decision makers.
Elk Valley showed that three judges on the SCC could not agree on how to apply these
challenging principles.”98 As the employer’s submissions focused on discipline and did
not directly address undue hardship, the arbitrator concluded that the employer failed to
demonstrate undue hardship and ordered the reinstatement of Paisley’s employment,
without loss of seniority but without compensation for any lost wages or benefits. The
arbitration award imposed conditions on Paisley’s employment, including abstaining
from drugs and alcohol and random drug and alcohol testing, and stated that a violation
of any of the conditions could result in his termination.
The decision in Canadian Pacific Railway reflects a broad, liberal human rights approach
to addiction disability. The arbitrator applied the legal principles stated in Elk Valley and
acknowledged that, although the SCC did not find prima facie discrimination, the
decision in Elk Valley was made in light of the particular facts and did not create a
universal bar to finding prima facie discrimination in cases where an employee fails to
reveal the existence of a disability until after a workplace incident. This is especially
important in the context of addiction disability, where individuals are commonly in denial
and may not recognize that they have an addiction until they experience a significant
negative consequence, like a workplace incident. Furthermore, although Paisley clearly
held a safety-sensitive position and legitimate safety concerns could easily be inferred,
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the arbitrator adhered to the established legal analyses and required the employer to
demonstrate that it could not accommodate Paisley without undue hardship.

6.5 Ontario Nurses’ Association v. Cambridge Memorial
Hospital
Like Humber River and Sunnyside Home, Cambridge Memorial involved the termination
of a nurse for stealing drugs from her employer. The nurse had more than 28 years of
discipline-free service at the hospital. An audit in August 2014 revealed that the grievor
had been stealing Percocet from the hospital for several months. When confronted with
the allegation, the grievor admitted to taking Percocet and indicated that she had “a
problem.”99 She subsequently went on leave for a year and attended in-patient and
aftercare treatment programs for her addiction. Further investigation revealed that the
grievor had been stealing Percocet and Tylenol 3 for many years. At this point, the
grievor admitted to stealing and diverting Percocet from patients since 2011. However,
she denied stealing Percocet since 2006, as suggested by the employer’s investigation,
and any misappropriation of Tylenol 3s. The hospital terminated the grievor’s
employment for just cause, “solely due to [her] criminal conduct,”100 but decided not to
press criminal charges. The union grieved her termination and the hospital’s failure to
accommodate her addiction. The grievor stopped using narcotics in August 2014 and,
since entering into an undertaking with the College of Nurses in January 2016, she had
been authorized to resume nursing, subject to terms and conditions with respect to
workplace monitoring.
The grievor admitted that she knew what she was doing was wrong but was afraid to
come forward because she was ashamed and feared the potential legal consequences. She
testified that she never used Percocet at work nor came to work under the influence; she
did not feel compelled to come to work on her days off to steal drugs and could go on
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vacation without using drugs.101 The grievor’s addictions specialist stated that she had a
severe opioid addiction;102 her drug use increased over time, she experienced constant
cravings and was “entirely preoccupied with ensuring that she had enough of her drug of
choice.”103 He explained that addiction impacts decision-making and leads to distorted
thinking and uncharacteristic behaviour and, despite being aware of the negative
consequences of their addiction, individuals are unable to stop using the substance.104
The parties relied upon two different lines of legal authority. The union relied on the
arbitral consensus in Ontario that a nurse with a drug addiction has a human rights
defense for stealing that drug from the employer and patients in her care, if she has
successfully completed rehabilitative treatment.105 The union emphasized the grievor’s
successful rehabilitation and positive prognosis and asserted that she should be reinstated.
The employer, on the other hand, adopted the Gooding approach, rejecting the notion of a
human rights defense to criminal misconduct. The employer submitted that the grievor’s
thefts constituted a fundamental breach of trust and the employment relationship,
amounting to just cause for termination. The hospital claimed that the evidence failed to
establish a connection between the grievor’s addiction and its decision to terminate her
employment, as she had been treated in the same manner as any other employee accused
of theft.106
The arbitrator acknowledged that, “‘but for’ her addiction, she would not have engaged in
the serious misconduct which led to her termination.”107 However, he decided to focus on
issues in the grievor’s evidence instead—particularly, the fact that she did not own up to
the full extent of her misconduct, including the theft of Tylenol 3s, and that her behavior
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did not appear to be compulsive because she went on vacations without using drugs and
was able to work without using drugs.108 Furthermore, the arbitrator indicated he had
“little doubt that she will stay clean and that she could be accommodated by the Hospital
with some hardship,” but revealed that his decision was “not based on either of those
considerations.”109 He denied the grievance, stating that:
In accord with Gooding, I don’t accept that pleading an addiction to the
drug being stolen, which is to say, establishing a nexus between the
addiction and the misconduct, is, in itself, a defense to termination. Put
differently, it is not prima facie evidence of discrimination. There is not
an iota of evidence before me of direct discrimination, to use old
nomenclature, which is what the BCCA required in Gooding
I have no doubt that SM would not have conducted herself in the fashion
she did, ‘but for’ her drug dependence. Nor am I in a position to call into
question Dr. Veenman’s opinion that the Grievor was addicted and not
merely a ‘recreational user’. But in my view, which is consonant with the
Doctor’s evidence, there are degrees of addiction. The Grievor’s
addiction, based on her own evidence, was not compulsive. She did not
use at work. She went on vacation for one or two weeks without using.
She suffered little or no withdrawal when going off the Percocets. She did
not provide a comprehensive narrative of her addiction that dovetailed
with Dr. Veenman’s evidence [emphasis added].110
The arbitrator inappropriately relied on extraneous factors and imposed additional
requirements for establishing prima facie discrimination, clearly departing from the
established human rights approach.
The arbitrator’s reasoning demonstrated many flaws. The prima facie discrimination test
requires a mere connection, not a causal connection, between the disability and
termination. Although the arbitrator accepted that, “but for” her addiction, the grievor
would not have engaged in the misconduct resulting in her termination,111 which clearly
constitutes a connection between the addiction and termination, he found this connection
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to be inadequate to establish prima facie discrimination. The arbitrator improperly
required more than a simple connection, contrary to the proper analysis. Furthermore, his
reasoning only referred to direct discrimination and disregarded the notion of indirect
discrimination, suggesting an employee must satisfy the more onerous burden of
demonstrating direct discrimination, contrary to well-established Canadian human rights
law. The arbitrator also suggested that the human rights defense to misconduct only
applies to “a full blown addiction,” characterized by compulsion and egregious
workplace misconduct, like “shooting up at work.”112 This would problematically ignore
the different manifestations of addiction disability and require the individual to go
beyond simply establishing a disability. Diverting attention from the grievor’s disability
and human rights, the arbitrator emphasized deterrence, stating that, “At a time when
opioid addiction is rampant in the culture and a major issue for healthcare professionals,
sending the message that pleading addiction, only after being caught stealing one’s drug
of choice, should be strongly deterred”113 and essentially dismissed the grievor’s positive
prognosis and likelihood of a successful return to work.
The union sought a judicial review of the arbitrator’s decision.114 The Divisional Court
applied the standard of reasonableness to the question of whether the arbitrator applied
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fact that P.S. had the necessary intention in stealing the drugs to establish mens rea does
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the correct test for prima facie discrimination: “Labour arbitrators, like human rights
tribunals, have developed expertise in the area of human rights discrimination. While the
question of what test to apply is of general importance, it is not outside their expertise.
Thus, the presumption of reasonableness applies.”115

Both the hospital and union

agreed that the SCC settled the test for prima facie discrimination in Elk Valley, which
was released after the arbitration award. The union argued that the arbitrator’s conclusion
that prima facie discrimination had not been established was unreasonable, given that he
accepted that she had an addiction, suffered an adverse impact and that, but for her
addiction, she would not have engaged in the conduct that resulted in her termination.
The arbitrator erred by relying on factors not required by the prima facie discrimination
analysis, like general deterrence and the absence of a compulsion to use drugs. The
hospital, on the other hand, asserted that, although the arbitrator considered the Gooding
line of cases, this jurisprudence did not drive his decision; rather, he came to the decision
as a result of the grievor’s failure to admit to the full extent of her misconduct, her failure

is whether, in the context of human rights jurisprudence, her addiction had reached the
point where it “effectively deprive[d] the complainant of her capacity to comply with the
Hospital's rules regarding the handling of drugs.” Capacity in the human rights law
context is a very different concept from mens rea in the criminal law context.
37 Moreover, in applying a standard of “culpable” versus “non-culpable” in a criminal
law context, the Arbitrator appears to have required demonstration of an absence of
control as the standard for a determination of whether a causal connection existed
between P.S.'s actions and her termination. This is also an unreasonable determination.
As the passage cited above from Elk Valley demonstrates, there is a spectrum along
which most cases will be found. Whether a disability is a factor in the adverse impact
suffered by a complainant will depend on the facts and must be assessed on a case-bycase basis. Because he applied a higher standard of causation in the Decision, the
Arbitrator failed to conduct such an analysis on the particular facts of this case.
38 Given that the Arbitrator's finding of an absence of a causal connection between
P.S.’s actions and her termination was based solely on his unreasonable determination
that her actions were “voluntary”, the Decision was unreasonable. The Arbitrator either
failed to address the issue of indirect discrimination or improperly took into consideration
P.S.’s guilty plea in the criminal proceedings in implicitly finding that there was an
absence of indirect discrimination…
The Court set aside the decision and remitted the grievance back to the arbitrator to determine whether the
employer engaged in indirect discrimination.
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to establish that her addiction developed before she engaged in any misconduct and her
failure to establish that she could not control her addiction.116
The Divisional Court ultimately found the arbitrator’s decision to be unreasonable, in
light of his own findings. The Court affirmed the prima facie discrimination test set out in
Elk Valley and determined that the grievor established the required elements:
In the Award, the Arbitrator refused to accept that the Applicant had
established prima facie discrimination. He did so after (1) finding that he
was not “in a position to call into question Dr. Veenman’s opinion that the
Grievor was addicted” (Award, at para. 81); (2) accepting that the Grievor
suffered an adverse impact as a result of her addiction (termination); and
(3) finding that “but for” her addiction she would not have engaged in the
serious misconduct that led to her termination (Award, at paras. 77, 81 and
82). The Applicant is right that these three findings are all that is necessary
to establish prima facie discrimination under the governing test confirmed
by the Supreme Court of Canada in Elk Valley.117
The Court concluded that, “it is clear that the Arbitrator did not accept that the Applicant
had established prima facie discrimination because he was not applying the Elk Valley
test, but the test in Gooding, which the Hospital agrees is no longer good law. As a result,
he made a decision based on wrong principles and came to an unreasonable result.”118
Applying the correct legal test, the grievor clearly established prima facie discrimination.
The arbitrator inappropriately imported additional factors into the prima facie
discrimination analysis and relied on extraneous issues to thwart a finding of
discrimination. He relied on issues, such as the grievor’s failure to take responsibility for
the full extent of her misconduct and the absence of evidence establishing compulsion,
which are not part of the prima facie discrimination analysis, to justify his conclusion that
the grievor had failed to establish prima facie discrimination. Elk Valley confirmed that
no additional words or concepts should be added to the prima facie discrimination test
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and establishing compulsion is not part of the test.119 The Court recognized that the
arbitrator deviated from the established human rights approach and imposed onerous
requirements, creating an inappropriate bar to demonstrating prima facie discrimination.
Accordingly, the Court allowed the application for judicial review, set aside the
arbitration award and remitted the grievance to a new mutually agreeable arbitrator for a
new hearing and determination in accordance with the Court’s reasons.
Cambridge Memorial reflected the sentiment that emerged in the post-Elk Valley arbitral
jurisprudence: the endorsement and application of the human rights approach to addiction
disability, as affirmed by the SCC in Elk Valley. The SCC’s confirmation of the
fundamental, well-established human rights laws and principles resulted in the explicit
rejection of Gooding by various legal decision makers. Notably, in this case, even the
employer conceded that, in the wake of Elk Valley, Gooding was no longer good law,
signifying the death of the Gooding approach to addiction disability. Following the
SCC’s direction that no additional requirements are to be imported into the prima facie
discrimination analysis, the Court declared that demonstrating compulsion is not
necessary to establish prima facie discrimination. Recognizing the arbitrator’s clear
departure from the proper prima facie discrimination analysis, the Divisional Court did
what the SCC should have done in Elk Valley and found the arbitration decision to be
unreasonable. Although Elk Valley did not change the law, the SCC’s reaffirmation of the
law in the 2017 decision has led to stricter compliance with human rights principles by
arbitrators and the courts.

6.6 Conclusion
In the three years since the release of Elk Valley, the addiction case law has shifted and
evolved. The five cases discussed in this chapter reflect the general trend in the post-Elk
Valley jurisprudence. Although Elk Valley appeared to leave many unanswered legal
questions, arbitrators and judges across Canada have interpreted the decision as an
affirmation of the well-established human rights principles developed in the previous
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SCC jurisprudence. Legal decision makers have been applying the human rights
principles stated in Elk Valley, as opposed to following the SCC’s questionable
application of these principles in the decision.
The post-Elk Valley addiction jurisprudence demonstrates a shift towards the broad,
liberal human rights approach towards addiction disability. Notably, arbitrators and
courts in Ontario finally denounced the Gooding approach. The Elk Valley decision has
been relied upon to affirm that no further considerations or requirements are to be
imported into the prima facie discrimination analysis. Applying fundamental human
rights principles and the correct legal analysis, legal decision makers have recognized the
clear connection between an employee’s addiction and their termination for violating the
employer’s drug and alcohol policy and avoided making superficial distinctions between
discipline for violating a workplace policy and misconduct related to the employee’s
addiction disability, evident in many previous decisions. Legal decision makers have
accepted that denial and relapse are common features of drug and alcohol addiction and
affirmed that initially denying their addiction, failing to disclose their addiction until after
a workplace incident and experiencing relapses cannot in itself preclude their human
rights protections and the employer’s duty to accommodate to the point of undue
hardship. Although legal decision makers acknowledge the legitimate safety concerns of
employers, they have upheld the laws and principles regarding the duty to accommodate
and require employers to take steps to accommodate the employee and demand objective
evidence of the employer’s accommodation efforts and undue hardship claims.
In all five cases, the legal decision maker acknowledged the connection between the
employee’s addiction and termination for misconduct arising from their addiction and
found prima facie discrimination. Both Humber River and Sunnyside Home explicitly
rejected the Gooding approach, as it deviated from the established human rights analysis,
affirmed in Elk Valley. The arbitrators endorsed various principles in the Elk Valley
decision—namely that, the focus of the discrimination analysis must be on the
discriminatory impact of an action, and not the presence of a discriminatory attitude; in
cases of indirect discrimination, the emphasis must be on the effect of the disability on
the individual’s ability to comply with the workplace rule, and not the extent to which the
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disability was a factor in the employer’s decision to terminate; and the rejection of the
notion that there needs to be something more than a connection between the addiction
and termination in order to establish discrimination. The Court in Cambridge Memorial
also affirmed that the Gooding approach was contrary to the human rights principles set
out in Elk Valley.
Although the emerging case law demonstrates a shift towards the human rights approach
to addiction disability, the jurisprudence still does not reflect a biopsychosocial
understanding of addiction, acknowledging the critical role of social factors in the
development and manifestation of the disability, as described in Chapter 3. Legal
decision makers have rejected the moral model of addiction, in favour of the medical
perspective, affirming that drug and alcohol addictions are a serious mental disorder,
constituting a disability warranting accommodation. The legal decision makers in these
five cases unequivocally accepted addiction as a mental disorder. In Sunnyside Home, the
arbitrator rejected medical expert opinion that an addiction is not a mental disorder, in
favor of the medical evidence that addiction is an illness that severely impacts an
individual’s ability to control their behavior related to the addiction. These decision
makers also did not require the grievor to have a compulsion or complete lack of control,
rendering them completely incapable of making decisions or controlling their behaviour
with respect to their addiction.
Of the five decisions examined, Toronto District School Board, Sunnyside Home and
Canadian Pacific Railway addressed the issue of accommodation.120 In the latter two
cases, the arbitrator held that the employer failed to fulfill its accommodation duty and
ordered the employer to reinstate the grievor. Notably, the arbitrator in Sunnyside Home
ordered the grievor’s reinstatement as well as monetary compensation for her losses,
which is exceptionally rare in addiction cases. The arbitrator held that the employer had a
responsibility to inquire into the presence of a disability and to take steps to
accommodate the employee and demanded strict proof of the employer’s accommodation
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The Court in Cambridge Memorial, supra note 10, remitted the grievance to a new mutually agreeable
arbitrator for a new hearing and did not decide the issue of accommodation.
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efforts and alleged undue hardship. The arbitrator in Sunnyside Home held that simply
determining whether it could accommodate the employee within its current
organizational structure was insufficient; the employer had an obligation to consider
making changes to its organization of work in order to fulfill its duty to accommodate to
the point of undue hardship. In Canadian Pacific Railway, the arbitrator required the
employer to demonstrate its accommodation efforts, despite acknowledging the safetysensitive nature of the grievor’s position, and did not accept the inadequate evidence
presented by the employer. Although the arbitrator in Toronto District School Board did
not order reinstatement, his reasoning and conclusions were reasonable under the
circumstances; the arbitrator went through the discrimination and accommodation
analyses and found that the employer had satisfied its duty to accommodate to the point
of undue hardship, given the employer’s previous accommodation attempts and the
absence of compelling medical evidence indicating a positive prognosis for the grievor’s
recovery. Unfortunately, as described above, the arbitrator in Humber River decided—
without going through the accommodation analysis—that, under the circumstances, it
was not an appropriate case to order reinstatement.
The case law emerging in the post-Elk Valley era reflects a movement towards the broad,
liberal human rights approach to addiction disability. It is well established that drug and
alcohol addiction constitutes a disability and the recent jurisprudence rejects the notion
that the addiction must completely eliminate an individual’s self control and ability to
make decisions. Relying on the SCC’s reasoning in Elk Valley, arbitrators and judges
have rejected the notion that there must be more than a mere connection between the
addiction and adverse impact and the imposition of additional factors and considerations
in the prima facie discrimination analysis. Furthermore, even in the context of safetysensitive workplaces, legal decision makers have required employers to provide objective
evidence of their accommodation efforts and alleged undue hardship. The legal decisions
in the wake of Elk Valley have adhered to the well-established human rights approach to
discrimination and workplace accommodation and signify a change in the landscape of
addiction disability case law.
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Chapter 7

7

Conclusion

Drug and alcohol addiction has been recognized and accepted as a form of disability
under Canadian human rights law for decades. However, despite this recognition,
addiction disability has had a tumultuous history in the realm of discrimination and
accommodation law jurisprudence. Historically, the three primary legal approaches to
addiction disability have been the traditional disciplinary, hybrid disciplinary and human
rights approaches. Although the traditional disciplinary approach to addiction disability
has largely fallen out of favour, principles underlying this approach have remained in the
modern Canadian addiction disability jurisprudence. Legal decision makers have
continued to apply approaches deviating from the well-established broad, liberal human
rights approach to be applied to all protected human rights grounds. Prior to Stewart v.
Elk Valley Coal Corp.,1 the jurisprudence was divided with respect to the approach to be
applied to cases of discrimination and accommodation on the basis of drug and alcohol
addiction. Canadian addiction disability law appeared to be confused and unsettled,
requiring clarification and guidance from the court.
The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) reached a disappointing conclusion in Elk Valley.
The Court’s application of the law to the particular facts of the case illustrated flawed
reasoning and inadequate appreciation of the broad human rights analysis that should
have been applied. Nevertheless, despite these flaws, the Elk Valley decision provided
positive direction by affirming and endorsing the Moore test2 and the application of
human rights principles in addiction disability cases.

1

2017 SCC 30 [Elk Valley].

2

Moore v British Columbia (Education), 2012 SCC 61 [Moore].
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7.1 Continuation of the Supreme Court of Canada’s
Disappointing Track Record
Elk Valley provided the SCC with the opportunity to provide much needed clarity and
confirm the correct approach to be applied to case of discrimination and accommodation
on the basis of drug and alcohol addiction disability. Unfortunately, the majority issued
an internally inconsistent decision that appeared to leave more unanswered questions than
provide answers. Although the decision ostensibly espoused and confirmed the human
rights approach to addiction disability, the SCC majority failed to actually apply this
approach to the situation experienced by Ian Stewart and disregarded the well-established
fundamental human rights laws and principles that form the foundation of Canadian
human rights law.
Despite explicitly affirming the prima facie discrimination test articulated in Moore and
clarifying the principles to be applied, the majority failed to acknowledge the Tribunal’s
obvious departures from this approach. The majority decision was silent on the various
flaws and deviations from fundamental human rights law evident in the Tribunal’s
analysis—specifically, requiring a causal relationship between the employee’s addiction
and adverse impact; importing additional requirements into the analysis, such as requiring
the employee to make prudent choices to avoid discrimination, demonstrate a complete
lack of self-control and establish arbitrary or stereotypical treatment and discriminatory
intent; limiting human rights protections to formal equality; and accepting insufficient
evidence of accommodation. In finding the Tribunal’s decision to be reasonable, in spite
of these serious flaws in reasoning and deviations from established human rights law, the
majority appeared to accept these erroneous legal principles and left unanswered
questions with respect to the legal and evidentiary requirements for satisfying the prima
facie discrimination test, particularly, establishing a connection between the protected
human rights characteristic and adverse impact.
This, unfortunately, was not the first time the SCC issued a flawed decision. Elk Valley
continued the Court’s disappointing track record with respect to disability
accommodation cases, where the SCC offered a series of puzzling decisions that failed to
clarify the prima facie discrimination and accommodation analyses and ultimately created
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more uncertainty. Particularly, three SCC decisions released in 2007 and 2008 added to
the confusion by suggesting the importation of additional factors into the prima facie
discrimination analysis and an inconsistent approach to the employer’s duty to
accommodate to the point of undue hardship: McGill University Health Centre (Montreal
General Hospital) v. Syndicat des employés de l’Hôpital général de Montréal,3 Honda
Canada Inc. v. Keays4 and Hydro-Québec v. Syndicat des employé-e-s de techniques
professionnelles et de bureau d’Hydro-Québec, section locale 2000 (SCFP-FTQ).5
Notably, the British Columbia Court of Appeal in British Columbia (Public Service
Agency) v. British Columbia Government and Service Employees' Union relied on these
three SCC decisions to establish the importance of demonstrating the stereotypical or
arbitrary nature of the discriminatory conduct in order to prove prima facie
discrimination.6 This remained a point of contention for approximately ten years, until
Elk Valley confirmed that arbitrary and stereotypical thinking was not a requirement.
McGill University concerned an employee who went on a leave of absence due to mental
health concerns. For more than two years, she unsuccessfully attempted to return to work.
The collective agreement provided that an employee’s employment would be terminated
upon 36 months of absence by reason of illness or non-occupational accident. After the
expiry of the rehabilitation period, provided for in the collective agreement and extended
by the employer, the employee remained unable to return to work as a result of a car
accident. The employer terminated the grievor’s employment due to her prolonged
absence from work. The arbitrator dismissed the grievance on the basis that the employer
had already accommodated the grievor by providing her with rehabilitation periods more
generous than provided for in the collective agreement and she was still unfit for work at
the end of the three-year period provided for in the agreement. The Superior Court
dismissed the union’s application for judicial review. The Court of Appeal reversed the

3

2007 SCC 4 [McGill University].

4

2008 SCC 39 [Honda Canada].

5

2008 SCC 43 [Hydro-Québec].

6

2008 BCCA 357 at paras 12-14 [Gooding].

212

decision and remitted the case to the arbitrator to assess the accommodation issue on an
individualized basis and rule on appropriate compensation. The SCC allowed the appeal.
The SCC majority7 determined that, although the automatic termination clause negotiated
by the parties should be considered when assessing the duty to accommodate, it was not
determinative of the issue of accommodation, as accommodation must be evaluated on a
case-by-case basis. The SCC found that the arbitrator looked beyond the collective
agreement and correctly concluded that the employer could not continue to employ an
individual who was unable to return to work in the foreseeable future. 8 Given the
particular circumstances, this was a reasonable decision. However, the majority then went
on to suggest that, if the grievor felt that the accommodation measure provided for in the
collective agreement was insufficient, and she could return to work within a reasonable
period of time, she had an obligation to demonstrate her ability to return to work, 9 thus
inappropriately reversing the burden of proof with respect to the employer’s duty to
accommodate to the point of undue hardship.
In concurring reasons, the remaining justices10 disagreed with the majority’s conclusion
that automatic termination clauses were prima facie discriminatory. They asserted that,
accepting such clauses to be automatically prima facie discriminatory would render all
time-limited legislated employment protections for absences due to illness, disability or
pregnancy presumptively vulnerable, regardless of the reasonableness of their length, and
would remove the incentive to negotiate mutually acceptable absences. 11 Although the
clauses provided protections for an arbitrary, limited period of time, “they are not
arbitrary in the way we understand arbitrariness in the human rights context, that is, they
do not unfairly disadvantage disabled employees because of stereotypical attributions of
their ability” but rather “acknowledge that employees should not be at unpredictable risk

7

The majority comprised of Justices Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps, Fish, Charron and Rothstein.

8

Supra note 3 at para 36.

9

Ibid at para 38.

10

The minority comprised of Chief Justice McLachlin and Justices Bastarache and Abella.

11

Supra note 3 at paras 54-55.
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of losing their jobs when they are absent from work due to disability.”12 The justices
appeared to import the additional requirement of arbitrariness into the prima facie
discrimination analysis and conflated the prima facie discrimination and accommodation
analyses, finding that:
This does not target individuals arbitrarily and unfairly because they are
disabled; it balances an employer’s legitimate expectation that employees
will perform the work they are paid to do with the legitimate expectations
of employees with disabilities that those disabilities will not cause
arbitrary disadvantage. If the employee is able to return to work, the same
or an analogous job remains available. If not, he or she lacks, and has
lacked for three years, the ability to perform the job. This, it seems to me,
is precisely what is protected by s. 20 of the Quebec Charter which states,
in part, that “[a] distinction, exclusion or preference based on the aptitudes
or qualifications required for an employment . . . is deemed nondiscriminatory.”13
The concurring justices conducted a fundamentally flawed analysis by relying upon
occupational requirements, which are to be considered in the accommodation analysis, to
conclude that the grievor failed to establish prima facie discrimination.
The SCC perpetuated flawed reasoning in Honda Canada and Hydro-Québec, cases
involving the termination of an employee due to their chronic, excessive absenteeism
resulting from their disability. Honda Canada concerned the wrongful dismissal suit of a
non-unionized employee. Honda placed the employee in a disability program that
allowed employees to take time off work if they provided medical notes confirming that
their absences were related to their disability. The employer became concerned with the
frequency of his absences and questioned the legitimacy of the medical notes, particularly
whether the doctor had independently evaluated whether the absences were related to his
disability. Honda asked the employee to meet with an occupational medical specialist in
order to determine how he could be accommodated. On the advise of legal counsel, he
refused to meet with the specialist without an explanation of the purpose, methodology
and parameters of the consultation. Following his continued refusal, the employer

12

Ibid at para 56.

13

Ibid at para 63.
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terminated his employment. He sued for wrongful dismissal, claiming discrimination,
harassment and misconduct on the part of the employer.
Assessing the termination from a traditional wrongful dismissal lens, both the Superior
Court and the Court of Appeal failed to apply the human rights approach to addressing
the allegations of discrimination on the basis of disability and the issue of workplace
accommodation. The decisions focused on the issue of damages, without first
determining the issues of prima facie discrimination and accommodation, which were
treated as supplemental issues to be considered at the remedies stage. Both courts
determined that the employer’s discriminatory conduct amounted to an independent
actionable wrong for the purposes of awarding punitive damages.
The SCC had the opportunity to clarify the approach to disability discrimination and
accommodation in wrongful dismissal cases. Unfortunately, the SCC also failed to apply
the prima facie discrimination and accommodation analyses; the Court simply concluded
that there was no evidence of discrimination and held that both courts erred in finding
that the employer committed discriminatory conduct amounting to an independent
actionable wrong.14 The SCC asserted that it found no arbitrariness or stereotyping and
accepted that the need to monitor the absences of employees who are regularly absent
constitutes a bona fide occupational requirement.15 In Hydro-Québec, the SCC once
again inappropriately emphasized the presence of arbitrariness and stereotyping in cases
of discrimination, asserting that the objective of human rights legislation is to “eliminate
exclusion that is arbitrary and based on preconceived ideas concerning personal
characteristics which, when the duty to accommodate is taken into account, do not affect
a person’s ability to do a job.”16
The SCC has had a disappointing track record when it comes to disability
accommodation cases. The McGill University, Honda Canada and Hydro-Québec

14

Supra note 4 at para 67.

15

Ibid at para 71.

16

Supra note 5 at para 13, citing Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la
jeunesse) v Montréal (City), 2000 SCC 27 at para 36.
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decisions advanced flawed legal reasoning with respect to the prima facie discrimination
and accommodation analyses, contrary to well-established human rights laws and
principles, and created more confusion than it provided clarity. Consequently, many legal
decision makers have disregarded and not applied these contradictory principles.
Nevertheless, the flawed reasoning and principles espoused in these decisions persisted to
a certain degree and remained in the workplace accommodation law discourse for many
years, as evidenced in the addiction disability jurisprudence. Approximately ten years
later, the SCC was called upon once again to clarify and confirm the correct legal
approach to workplace discrimination and accommodation in Elk Valley.
Unfortunately, Elk Valley was yet another disappointing decision. The SCC majority’s
reasoning was internally inconsistent. The majority expressly affirmed the Moore test for
prima facie discrimination, confirmed that the disability must merely be factor in the
adverse impact, asserted that discrimination may be direct or indirect and rejected the
requirement of establishing discriminatory intent and stereotypical or arbitrary decision
making. Nevertheless, the SCC majority curiously did not apply this approach. It failed to
acknowledge the Tribunal’s deviations from this approach, committing the very errors
renounced by the Court, and upheld the Tribunal’s conclusion that Elk Valley fired
Stewart for breaching the workplace rule, and not because of his disability, on the limited
ground that it was a reasonable finding of fact. Frankly, Elk Valley was a case of the
majority failing to practice what it preached. The silver lining of this disappointing
decision is that, in the wake of Elk Valley, legal decision makers have accepted the law as
expressly stated, and not as applied, by the SCC majority.

7.2 The Legacy of Stewart v. Elk Valley Coal Corp.
Despite the SCC majority’s disappointing judgment, the Court’s commentary in Elk
Valley has ultimately helped clarify the principles to be applied in addiction disability
cases involving workplace misconduct. The principles in Elk Valley have been considered
and approvingly cited in subsequent addiction disability jurisprudence. In the wake of Elk
Valley, labour arbitrators have looked to the positive features of the decision, rather than
the SCC’s flawed analysis, and continue to appreciate that individuals struggling with
drug and alcohol addiction disability must be accommodated in a broad and liberal
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fashion, in accordance with Canadian human rights law. Legal decision makers across the
country have applied the law as stated in the Elk Valley decision—paying little attention
to the SCC majority’s problematic application of the law to the particular facts of the
case—and cite Elk Valley as affirming the Moore test for prima facie discrimination and
the fundamental, well-established human rights laws and principles. Elk Valley has
ironically emerged as a landmark decision and triggered the much needed progress and
rehabilitation of Canadian addiction disability law. The subsequent jurisprudence has
reflected a change in the right direction, shifting towards the broad, liberal human rights
approach towards addiction disability.
The Elk Valley decision expressly affirmed the correct human rights analysis and
principles to be applied with respect to determining the existence of prima facie
discrimination. The SCC majority endorsed the prima facie discrimination analysis
established in Moore and reiterated that discrimination can be direct or indirect; thus,
discriminatory intent is not a requirement for establishing prima facie discrimination:
To make a case of prima facie discrimination, “complainants are required
to show that they have a characteristic protected from discrimination under
the [Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210]; that they experienced an
adverse impact with respect to the service; and that the protected
characteristic was a factor in the adverse impact”: Moore, at para. 33.
Discrimination can take many forms, including “‘indirect’
discrimination”, where otherwise neutral policies may have an adverse
effect on certain groups: Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et
des droits de la jeunesse) v. Bombardier Inc. (Bombardier Aerospace
Training Center), 2015 SCC 39, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 789, at para. 32.
Discriminatory intent on behalf of an employer is not required to
demonstrate prima facie discrimination: Bombardier, at para. 40.17
The SCC affirmed that the focus is to be on the discriminatory impact of the employer’s
action on the individual and not the employer’s discriminatory intent. Elk Valley makes
clear that discriminatory intent is not required to establish prima facie discrimination.18

17
18

Supra note 1 at para 24.

Humber River Hospital v Ontario Nurses’ Association, [2018] OLAA No 416 at para 111 [Humber
River]; and Regional Municipality of Waterloo (Sunnyside Home) v Ontario Nurses’ Association, [2019]
OLAA No 16 at para 160 [Sunnyside Home].
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This is important because, as illustrated by the case law, most cases involve indirect
discrimination and requiring evidence of discriminatory intent would, in effect,
necessitate the existence of direct discrimination and place a more onerous burden on the
employee to establish prima facie discrimination. The SCC in Elk Valley once again
“mandated a much broader and robust understanding of discrimination and equality, and
specifically one that accounts for the discriminatory effects of applying standards that
may have been adopted with no discriminatory intent whatsoever.”19
The Moore test provides that an employee must simply establish that the disability was a
factor in the adverse impact, which, in most addiction cases, is a form of discipline.
Nevertheless, the previous addiction disability jurisprudence reveals that legal decision
makers have focused on whether the individual’s disability played a role in the
employer’s decision to impose discipline. This is contrary to the Moore test, which only
requires a nexus between the disability and discipline—not the decision to impose
discipline, thereby altering the analysis to demand evidence of discriminatory intent. Elk
Valley has clarified that, “in cases of indirect discrimination the focus of the analysis
must be on the effect of the disability on the employee’s ability to comply with the rule,
and not on the extent to which the employee’s disability was a factor in the employer's
decision to take disciplinary action for breach of the rule.”20 Following the principles in
Elk Valley, if there is a nexus between the addiction and the misconduct resulting in
discipline, prima facie discrimination will be established, regardless of whether the
employer claims that it would have imposed the same discipline on an employee without
an addiction for the same misconduct.21
Elk Valley further clarified that additional requirements are not to be imported into the
prima facie discrimination analysis. The majority categorically rejected the notion that
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Humber River, supra note 18 at para 109.
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Ibid at para 107.
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Raquel Chisholm and Sabina Veltri, “Addiction Disabilities and Misconduct in the Health Care Sector
Understanding the Duty to Accommodate after Stewart v Elk Valley” in The Six-Minute Labour Lawyer
2019 (delivered at the Law Society of Ontario, 20 June 2019) 6-1 at 6-7.
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stereotypical or arbitrary decision making should be added as a requirement for
establishing prima facie discrimination:
First, I see no basis to alter the test for prima facie discrimination by
adding a fourth requirement of a finding of stereotypical or arbitrary
decision making. The goal of protecting people from arbitrary or
stereotypical treatment or treatment that creates disadvantage by
perpetuating prejudice is accomplished by ensuring that there is a link or
connection between the protected ground and adverse treatment. The
existence of arbitrariness or stereotyping is not a stand-alone requirement
for proving prima facie discrimination. Requiring otherwise would
improperly focus on “whether a discriminatory attitude exists, not a
discriminatory impact”, the focus of the discrimination inquiry: Quebec
(Attorney General) v. A, 2013 SCC 5, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 61, at para. 327
(emphasis in original). The Tribunal expressly noted that proof of
arbitrariness and stereotyping was not required, at para. 117.22
Elk Valley specifically “reject[ed] any notion of requiring complainants to prove that a
decision was arbitrary or based on stereotypes precisely because to do so would
improperly restrict the analysis from addressing the discriminatory impact of seemingly
neutral policies and rules.”23 Although the SCC majority did not explicitly mention other
additional factors that have been improperly imported into the prima facie discrimination
analysis in addiction disability cases, such as compulsion and absence of control, Elk
Valley has been cited as broadly rejecting the importation of any additional factors. The
SCC in Elk Valley clearly stated that the disability must merely be a factor in the adverse
impact and “explicitly reject[ed] the notion of applying a higher standard.”24
Accordingly, Elk Valley does not support the suggestion that it is necessary to establish
that the employee’s compulsion to steal drugs from their employer, as a result of their
addiction, was so strong as to eliminate any sense of choice or intention.25 The Ontario
Divisional Court asserted that, “As Elk Valley made clear, there are no additional words
or concepts that should be added to the test for prima facie discrimination. Establishing
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Humber River, supra note 18 at para 111.
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Ibid; and Sunnyside Home, supra note 18 at para 168.
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such things as ‘compulsion’ is not part of the test.”26 There is no need to demonstrate an
absence of control to establish the necessary connection between the employee’s
misconduct and termination; Elk Valley acknowledged that there is a spectrum of
addiction disability and whether the disability is a factor in the adverse impact depends
on the particular facts and must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.27
Elk Valley also confirmed that the protected ground must only be a factor in the adverse
impact. The majority explicitly rejected the suggestion that a higher standard be imposed
for establishing a connection between the disability and adverse impact in order to
demonstrate prima facie discrimination:
Second, I see no need to alter the settled view that the protected ground or
characteristic need only be “a factor” in the decision. It was suggested in
argument that adjectives should be added: the ground should be a
“significant” factor, or a “material” factor. Little is gained by adding
adjectives to the requirement that the impugned ground be “a factor” in the
adverse treatment. In each case, the tribunal must decide on the factor or
factors that played a role in the adverse treatment. This is a matter of
fact. If a protected ground contributed to the adverse treatment, then it
must be material.28
The SCC clearly stipulated that the disability must only be a factor, not a significant or
causal factor, in the adverse impact. The majority’s statement indicating that the
protected ground must be a factor in the decision, rather than the actual adverse impact,
has been interpreted as an oversight and not an alteration of the prima facie
discrimination analysis. Prima facie discrimination will be established where the
employee’s addiction is a factor in their inability to comply with a workplace rule,
regardless of whether the employer’s decision to discipline the employee was based on
the misconduct, isolated from the disability that contributed to the misconduct.29
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Elk Valley and the subsequent jurisprudence appear to have resolved the competing
approaches to addiction disability, clearly signaling that addiction-related misconduct in
the workplace must attract a human rights approach, as opposed to a disciplinary-focused
approach.30 Although the SCC majority in Elk Valley did not make any mention of
Gooding, the decision has prompted the explicit rejection of the Gooding approach to
addiction disability cases. This hybrid disciplinary approach involved the application of a
disciplinary or just cause analysis to the voluntary, culpable aspects of the employee’s
misconduct and a human rights analysis to the involuntary, non-culpable components,
causally connected to the disability. Recall, the British Columbia Court of Appeal held
that Mr. Gooding’s alcohol dependency played no role in the employer’s decision to
terminate him for stealing alcohol. The court problematically concluded that, although
Mr. Gooding’s conduct may have been influenced by his alcohol dependency, it was
irrelevant if the dependency played no role in the employer’s decision to terminate his
employment and he suffered no greater impact than any other employee would have for
the same misconduct.
Although not widely adopted across Canada, the Gooding approach continued to be
relied upon by employers and lingered in the addiction disability law landscape.
Following the release of the Elk Valley decision, Ontario arbitrators and the Divisional
Court have expressly denounced Gooding, recognizing that it is inconsistent with the
established human rights analysis for workplace discrimination, most recently affirmed
by the SCC in Elk Valley. The SCC made clear that discriminatory intent is not required
to establish prima facie discrimination; the employee does not need to demonstrate that
the employer treated him or her differently than it would have treated another employee
accused of the same misconduct. As stated in Humber River, “To adopt the Gooding
approach would be to read adverse effect discrimination out of our human rights analysis
and to embrace a superficial understanding of discrimination that the Supreme Court of
Canada has rejected.”31 The SCC’s confirmation of the prima facie discrimination
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analysis and human rights principles in Elk Valley has elicited the consensual rejection of
Gooding, at least in Ontario.
Addiction disability law in Canada has developed over the past decade and continues to
evolve. The Elk Valley decision, although flawed, provided clarification and guidance to
legal decision makers with respect to the principles to be applied in addiction disability
cases, resulting in a progressive movement towards the broad, liberal human rights
approach to cases of workplace discrimination and accommodation on the basis of drug
and alcohol addiction. Applying fundamental human rights principles and the correct
prima facie discrimination analysis, unencumbered by extraneous considerations and
inappropriately imposed requirements, legal decision makers have recognized the clear
connection between an employee’s addiction and their termination for misconduct related
to their disability, avoiding the superficial distinction between discipline for violating a
workplace policy and discipline for misconduct related to the employee’s disability. It is
accepted that employees are not required to establish compulsion or a complete lack of
control, rendering them completely incapable of making decisions or controlling their
behaviour with respect to their addiction. Accepting and adopting the medical model of
addiction, legal decision makers recognize that denial, dishonesty and relapse are
common features of addiction and cannot be relied upon to preclude the employer’s duty
to accommodate to the point of undue hardship. While acknowledging the legitimate
safety concerns of employers, legal decision makers have upheld the human rights laws
and principles regarding the duty to accommodate and require employers to take steps to
accommodate the employee and demand objective evidence of the employer’s
accommodation efforts and resulting claims undue hardship.
The guidance provided by the SCC in Elk Valley and the subsequent rejection and
abandonment of disciplinary-centered approaches in the wake of Elk Valley has resulted
in the more consistent application of the principled human rights approach to claims of
discrimination on the basis of addiction disability. This is a very important step in
rehabilitating Canadian addiction disability law and, hopefully, the momentum continues.
As the post-Elk Valley addiction disability case law develops, I predict that the human
rights approach, informed by the principles endorsed by the SCC in Elk Valley, will be
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the predominant approach to addressing discrimination on the basis of addiction
disability and the employer’s duty to accommodate to the point of undue hardship. Time
will tell.
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